Nietzsche as an Aryanist - Peter Myers, February 7, 2002; update June 27, 2004. My comments are shown {thus}.

Write to me at contact.html.

You are at http://mailstar.net/nietzsche2.html.

Nietzsche urged the overthrown of "moralism", which he attributed to Zarathustra (Zoroaster) and his influence on Christianity via Second-Temple Judaism. Zionism, however, a reversion to "First Temple Judaism", is free of that Moralism.

Nietzsche often referred to "Judaism" when he meant "Christianity". Nietzsche opposed Christianity, but supported Aryanism and Judaism: Nietzsche & Jewish Culture.

The rehabilitation of Nietzsche, his sanitising as safe for Zionists and Aryanists of the Imperial kind, made him a rival to Marx, influencing the outcome of the Cold War.

Nietzsche opposed Zarathustra (Zoroaster), as the instigator of Christianity ("Second Temple Judaism"). He opposed Socrates, as the instigator of Rationalism. And he opposed Alexander, as the instigator of Hellenism.

(1) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ (2) Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (3) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (4) Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (5) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals (6) Nietzsche's attack on Zarathustra, Socrates, and Hellenism

(1) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ tr. R.J. Holingdale, in one volume with The Anti-Christ (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974).

{p. 134} Christianity can be understood only by referring to the soil out of which it grew - it is not a counter-movement against the Jewish instinct, it is actually its logical consequence, one further conclusion of its fear-inspiring logic. In the Redeemer's formula 'Salvation is of the Jews' . ...

The Jews are the most remarkable nation of world history because, faced with the question of being or not being, they preferred, with a perfectly uncanny conviction, being at any price: the price they had to pay was the radical falsification of all nature, all naturalness, all reality, the entire inner world as well as the outer. ... they made of themselves an antithesis to natural conditions ... For precisely this reason the Jews are the most fateful nation in world history: their after-effect has falsified mankind to such an extent that today the Christian is able to feel anti-Jewish without realizing he is the ultimate consequence of the Jews.

{p. 135} In my Genealogy of Morals I introduced for the first time the psychology of the antithetical concepts of a noble morality and a ressentiment morality, the latter deriving from a denial of the former: but this latter corresponds totally to Judeo-Christian morality. To be able to reject all that represents the ascending movement of life, well-constitutedness, power, beauty, self-affirmation on earth, the instinct of ressentiment here become genius had to invent another world from which that life-affirmation would appear evil, reprehensible as such. Considered psychologically, the Jewish nation is a nation of the toughest vital energy which, placed in impossible circumstances, voluntarily, from the profoundest shrewdness in self-preservation, took the side of all decadence instincts - not as being dominated by them but because it divined in them a power by means of which one can prevail against 'the world'.

{much of this should be attributed to the Buddhist/Jain influence on that faction of Judaism which became Christianity; the Buddhist/Jain influence contributed the unworldliness, but the revolutionary equalism came from the Zoroastrian influence on Judaism. Before the influence of the universal god Mazda of the universal First Persian empire, Yahweh was probably a tribal god; but the inspiration of Mazda, and the universalism of Zoroastrianism, probably led the Jewish priests to remake Yahweh as a universal god - universal yet tribal}

The history of Israel is invaluable as a typical history of the denaturalizing of natural values: I shall indicate five stages in the process. Originally, above all in the period of the Kingdom, Israel too stood in a correct, that is to say natural relationship to all things. Their Yaweh was the expression of their consciousness of power, of their delight in themselves, their hopes of themselves ...

{p. 136} But every hope remained unfulfilled. The old God could no longer do what he formerly could. One should have let him go. What happened? One altered the conception of him: at this price one retained him. Yaweh the God of 'justice' - no longer at one with Israel, an expression of national self-confidence now only a God bound by conditions. The new conception of him becomes an instrument in the hands of priestly agitators who henceforth interpret all good fortune as a reward, all misfortune as punishment for disobedience of God, for 'sin' ...

{p. 137} ... they translated their own national past into religious terms ...

{p. 144} The 'glad tidings' are precisely that there are no more opposites ... primitive Christianity employs only Judeo-Semitic concepts ... Among Indians he would have made use of Sankhyam concepts {i.e. Buddhist}, among Chinese those of Lao-tse {i.e. Taoist} - and would not have felt the difference. - One could, with some freedom of expression, call Jesus a 'free spirit' - he cares nothing for what is fixed ... {end}

(2) Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols tr. R.J. Holingdale, Penguin, 1974.

{Nietzsche here endorses the Caste system of India}

{p. 56} Let us take the other aspect of so-called morality, the breeding of a definite race and species. The most grandiose example of this is provided by Indian morality, sanctioned, as the 'Law of Manu', into religion. Here the proposed task is to breed no fewer than four races simultaneously: a priestly, a warrior, and a trading and farming race, and finally a menial race, the

{p. 57} Sudras. Here we are manifestly no longer among animal tamers: a species of human being a hundred times more gentle and rational is presupposed even to conceive the plan of such a breeding. One draws a breath of relief when coming out of the Christian sick-house and dungeon atmosphere into this healthier, higher, wider world. How paltry the 'New Testament' is compared with Manu, how ill it smells! - But this organization too needed to be dreadful - this time in struggle not with the beast but with its antithesis, with the non-bred human being, the hotchpotch human being, the Chandala.*

And again it had no means of making him weak and harmless other than making him sick - it was the struggle with the 'great majority'. Perhaps there is nothing which outrages our feelings more than these protective measures of Indian morality. The third edict, for example (Avadana-Shastra I), that 'concerning unclean vegetables', ordains that the only nourishment permitted the Chandala shall be garlic and onions, in view of the fact that holy scripture forbids one to give them corn or seed-bearing fruits or water or fire. The same edict lays it down that the water they need must not be taken from rivers or springs or pools, but only from the entrances to swamps and holes made by the feet of animals. They are likewise forbidden to wash their clothes or to wash themselves, since the water allowed them as an act of charity must be used only for quenching the thirst. Finally, the Sudra women are forbidden to assist the Chandala women in childbirth, and the latter are likewise forbidden to assist one another.... - The harvest of such hygienic regulations did not fail to appear: murderous epidemics, hideous venereal diseases and, as a consequence, 'the law of the knife' once more, ordaining circumcision for the male and removal of the labia minora for the female children. - Manu himself says: 'The Chandala are the fruit of adultery, incest and crime' (- this being the neeessary consequence of the concept ' breeding'). 'They shall have for clothing only rags from corpses, for utensils broken pots, for ornaments old iron, for worship only evil spirits; they shall wander from place to place without rest. They are

{footnote} *: The 'untouchables' excluded from the caste system.

{p. 58} forbidden to write from left to right and to use the right hand for writing: the employment of the right hand and of the left-to-right motion is reserved for the virtuous, for people of race.' -

These regulations are instructive enough: in them we find for once Aryan humanity, quite pure, quite primordial - we learn that the concept 'pure blood' is the Opposite of a harmless concept. It becomes clear, on the other hand, in which people the hatred, the Chandala hatred for this 'humanity' has been immortalized, where it has become religion, where it has become genius. ... From this point of view, the Gospels are documents of the first rank; the Book of Enoch even more so. - Christianity, growing from Jewish roots and comprehensible only as a product of this soil, represents the reaction against that morality of breeding, of race, of privilege - it is the anti-Aryan religion par excellence: Christianity the revaluation of all Aryan values, the victory of Chandala values, the evangel preached to the poor and lowly, the collective rebellion of everything downtrodden, wretched, ill-constituted, underprivileged against the 'race' - undying Chandala revenge as the religion of love ...

{end}

Zionism has none of the moral qualms Nietzsche attributes to Christianity; is not this Judaism akin to Aryanism? tmf.html

And have not White America and White Australia been more Aryan than Christian? whitecon.html

Now that that Aryan system is being undone, by the New Left (see new-left.html), "whites" face an existential crisis: whites.html.

(3) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy tr. Francis Golffing, Doubleday Anchor, NY 1974.

{p. 4} Is pessimism inevitably a sign of decadence, warp, weakened instincts, as it was once with the ancient Hindus {a reference to Buddhist/Jain period}, as it is now with us modern Europeans? Or is there such a thing as a strong pessimism? ... What meaning did the tragic myth have for the Greeks during the period of their greatest power and courage? And what of the Dionysiac spirit, so tremendous in its implications? What of the tragedy that grew out of that spirit?

Or one might look at it the other way round. Those agencies that had proved fatal to tragedy: Socratic ethics, dialectics, the temperance and cheerfulness of the pure scholar - couldn't these, rather than their opposites, be viewed as symptoms of decline, fatigue, distemper, of instincts caught in anarchic dissolution? ... Might it be that the "inquiring mind" was simply the human mind terrified bv pessimism and trying to escape from it, a clever

[p. 5} bulwark erected against the truth? Something craven and false, if one wanted to be moral about it? Or, if one preferred to put it amorally, a dodge? Had this perhaps been your secret, great Socrates? Most secretive of ironists, had this been your deepest irony?

{p. 22} ... Schopenhauer has described for us the tremendous awe which seizes man when he suddenly begins to doubt the cognitive modes of experience ... then we are in a position to apprehend the essence of Dionysiac rapture, whose closest analogy is furnished by physical intoxication. Dionysiac stirrings arise either through the influence of those narcotic potions of which all primitive races speak in their hymns {a reference to the Rig Veda}, or through the powerful approach of spring, which penetrates with joy the whole frame of nature. So stirred, the individual forgets himself completely. It is the same Dionysiac power which in medieval Germany drove ever increasing crowds of people singing and dancing from place to place; we recognize in these St. John's and St. Vitus' dancers the bacchic choruses of the Greeks, who had their precursors

{p. 23} in Asia Minor and as far back as Babylon and the ogiastic Sacaca. There are people who, either from lack of experience or out of sheer stupidity, turn away from such phenomena, and, strong in the sense of their own sanity, label them either mockingly or pityingly "endemic diseases." These benighted souls have no idea how cadaverous and ghostly their "sanity" appears as the intense throng of Dionysiac revelers sweeps past them.

Not only does the bond between man and man come to be forged once more by the magic of the Dionysiac rite, but nature itself, long alienated or subjugated, rises again to celebrate the reconciliation with her prodigal son, man. The earth offers its gifts voluntarily, and the savage beasts of mountain and desert approach in peace.

{p. 25} Throughout the range of ancient civilization (leaving the newer civilizations out of account for the moment) we find evidence of Dionysiac celebrations which stand to the Greek type in much the same relation as the bearded satyr, whose name and attributes are derived from the hegoat, stands to the god Dionysos. The central concern of such celebrations was, almost universally, a complete sexual promiscuity overriding every form of established tribal law; all the savage urges of the mind were unleashed on those occasions until they reached that paroxysm of

{p. 26} lust and cruelty which has always struck me as the "witches' cauldron' par excellence. It would appear that the Greeks were for a while quite immune from these feverish excesses which must have reached them by every known land or sea route. What kept Greece safe was the proud, imposing image of Apollo, who in holding up the head of the Gorgon to those brutal and grotesque Dionysiac forces subdued them. Doric art has immortalized Apollo's majestic rejection of all license. But resistance became difficult, even impossible, as soon as similar urges began to break forth from the deep substratum of Hellenism itself. Soon the function of the Delphic god develoyed into something quite different and much more limited: all he could hope to accomplish now was to wrest the destructive weapon, by a timely gesture of pacification, from his opponent's hand. That act of pacification represents the most important event in the history of Greek ritual; every department of life now shows symptoms of a revolutionary change. The two great antagonists have been reconciled. Each feels obliged henceforth to keep to his bounds, each will honor the other by the bestowal of periodic gifts, while the cleavage remains fundamentally the same. And yet, if we examine what happened to the Dionysiac powers under the pressure of that treaty we notice a great difference: in the place of the Babylonian Sacaea, with their throwback of men to the condition of apes and tigers, we now see entirely new rites celebrated: rites of universal redemption, of glorious transfiguration. ...

{p. 27} It is true: music had long been familiar to the Greeks as an Apollonian art, as a regular beat like that of waves lapping the shore, a plastic rhythm expressly developed for the portrayal of Apollonian conditions. Apollo's music was a Doric architecture of sound - of barely hinted sounds such as are proper to the cithara. Those very elements which characterize Dionysiac music and, after it, music quite generally: the heart-shaking power of tone, the uniform stream of melody, the incomparable resources of harmony - all those elements had been carefully kept at a distance as being inconsonant with the Apollonian norm. ...

{p. 28} Then suddenly all the rest of the symbolic forces - music and rhythm as such, dynamics, harmony - assert themselves with great energy. In order to comprehend this total emancipation of all the symbolic powers one must have reached the same measure of inner freedom those powers themselves were making manifest; which is to say that the votary of Dionysos could not be understood except by his own kind. It is not difficult to imagine the awed surprise with which the Apollonian Greek must have looked on him. And that surprise would be further increased as the latter realized, with a shudder, that all this was not so alien to him after all, that his Apollonian consciousness was but a thin veil hiding from him the whole Dionysiac realm.

In order to comprehend this we must take down the elaborate edifice of Apollonian culture stone by stone until we discover its foundations. At first the eye is struck by the marvelous shapes of the Olympian gods who stand upon its pediments, and whose exploits, in shining bas-relief, adorn its friezes. The fact that among them we find Apollo as one god among many, making no claim to a privileged position, should not mislead us. The same drive that found its most complete representation in Apollo generated the whole Olympian world, and in this sense we may consider Apollo the father of that world. But what was the radical need out of which that illustrious society of Olympian beings sprang?

{p. 29} Whoever approaches the Olympians with a different religion in his heart, seeking moral elevation, sanctity, spirituality, loving-kindness, will presently be forced to turn away from them in ill-humored disappointment. Nothing in these deities reminds us of asceticism, high intellect, or duty: we are confronted by luxuriant, triumphant existence, which deifies the good and the bad indifferently. And the beholder may find himself dismayed in the presence of such overflowing life and ask himself what potion these heady people must have drunk in order to behold, in whatever direction they looked, Helen laughing back at them, the beguiling image of their own existence. But we shall call out to this beholder, who has already turned his back: Don't go! Listen first to what the Greeks themselves have to say of this life, which spreads itself before you with such puzzling serenity. An old legend has it that King Midas hunted a long time in the woods for the wise Silenus, companion of Dionysos, without being able to catch him. When he had finally caught him the king asked him what he considered man's greatest good. The daemon remained sullen and uncommunicative until finally, forced by the king, he broke into a shrill laugh and spoke: "Ephemeral wretch, begotten by accident and toil, why do you force me to tell you what it would be your greatest boon not to hear? What would be best for you is quite beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best is to die soon."

What is the relation of the Olympian gods to this popular wisdom? It is that of the entranced vision of the martyr to his torment.

Now the Olympian magic mountain opens itself before us, showing us its very roots. The Greeks were keenly aware of the terrors and horrors of existence; in order to

{p. 30} be able to live at all they had to place before them the shining fantasy of the Olympians. Their tremendous distrust of the titanic forces of nature: Moira, mercilessly enthroned beyond the knowable world; the vulture which fed upon the great philanthropist Prometheus; the terrible lot drawn by wise Oedipus; the curse on the house of Atreus which brought Orestes to the murder of his mother: that whole Panic philosophy, in short, with its mythic examples, by which the gloomy Etruscans perished, the Greeks conquered - or at least hid from view - again and again by means of this artificial Olympus. In order to live at all the Greeks had to construct these deities. ... The gods justified human life by living it themselves - the only satisfactory theodicy ever invented. ...

{p. 31} It should have become apparent by now that the harmony with nature which we late-comers regard with such nostalgia, and for which Schiller has coined the cant term naive, is by no means a simple and inevitable condition to be found at the gateway to every culture, a kind of paradise. Such a belief could have been endorsed only by a period for which Rousseau's Emile was an artist and Homer just such an artist nurtured in the bosom of nature.

{p. 34} As a moral deity Apollo demands self-control from his people and, in order to observe such self-control, a knowledge of self. And so we find that the esthetic necessity of beauty is accompanied by the imperatives, "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much." Conversely, excess and hubris come to be regarded as the hostile spirits of the non-Apollonian sphere, hence as properties of the pre-Apollonian era - the age of Titans - and the extra-Apollonian world, that is to say the world of the barbarians. ...

The effects of the Dionysiac spirit struck the Apollonian Greeks as titanic and barbaric; yet they could not disguise from themselves the fact that they were essentially akin to those deposed Titans and heroes. They felt more than that: their whole existence, with its temperate beauty, rested upon a base of suffering and knowledge which had been hidden from them until the reinstatement of Dionysos uncovered it once more. And lo and behold! Apollo found it impossible to live without Dionysos. The elements of titanism and barbarism turned out to be quite as fundamental as the Apollonian element. And now let us imagine how the ecstatic sounds of the Dionysiac rites penetrated ever more enticingly into that artificially re-

{p. 35} strained and discreet world of illusion, how this clamor expressed the whole outrageous gamut of nature - delight, grief, knowledge - even to the most piercing cry; and then let us imagine how the Apollonian artist with his thin, monotonous harp music must have sounded beside the demoniac chant of the multitude! ... Wherever the Dionysiac voice was heard, the Apollonian norm seemed suspended or destroyed. Yet it is equally true that, in those places where the first assault was withstood, the prestige and majesty of the Delphic god appeared more rigid and threatening than before. The only way I am able to view Doric art and the Doric state is as a perpetual military encampment of the Apollonian forces. An art so defiantly austere, so ringed about with fortifications - an education so military and exacting - a polity so ruthlessly cruel - could endure only in a continual state of resistance against the titanic and barbaric menace of Dionysos.

{p. 40} Schopenhauer, who was fully aware of the difficulties the lyrical poet creates for the speculative esthetician, thought that he had found a solution, which, however, I cannot endorse. It is true that he alone possessed the means, in his profound philosophy of music, for solving this problem; and I think I have honored his achievement in these pages, I hope in his own spirit. Yet in the first part of The World as Will and Idea he characterizes the essence of song as follows: "The consciousness of the singer is filled with the subject of will, which is to say with his own willing ... {"}

{p. 63} The legend of Prometheus is indigenous to the entire community of Aryan races and attests to their prevailing talent for profound and tragic vision. In fact, it is not improbable that this myth has the same characteristic importance for the Aryan mind as the myth of the Fall has for the Semitic {presumably he bundles Zoroaster here with Christianity & Islam; strangely, Judaism seems to dispense with it}, and that the two myths are related as brother and sister. The presupposition of the Prometheus myth is primitive man's belief in the supreme value of fire as the true palladium of every rising civilization. But for man to dispose of fire freely, and not receive it as a gift from heaven in the kindling thunderbolt and the warming sunlight, seemed a crime to thoughtful primitive man, a despoiling of divine nature. Thus this original philosophical problem poses at once an insoluble confiict between men and the gods, which lies like a huge boulder at the gateway to every culture.

{p. 76} Euripides' basic intention now becomes as clear as day to us: it is to eliminate from tragedy the primitive and pervasive Dionysiac element, and to rebuild the drama on a foundation of non-Dionysiac art, custom and philosophy. Euripides himself, towards the end of his life, propounded the question of the value and significance of this tendency to his contemporaries in a myth. Has the Dionysiac spirit any right at all to exist? Should it not, rather, be brutally uprooted from the Hellenic soil? Yes, it should, the poet tells us, if only it were possible, but the god Dionysos is too powerful ...

{p. 77} The Bacchae acknowledges the failure of Euripides' dramatic intentions when, in fact, these had already succeeded: Dionysos had already been driven from the tragic stage by a daemonic power speaking through Euripides. For in a certain sense Euripides was but a mask, while the divinity which spoke through him was neither Dionysos nor Apollo but a brand-new daemon called Socrates. Thenceforward the real antagonism was to be between the Dionysiac spirit and the Socratic, and tragedy was to perish in the conflict. ...

{p. 83} The fact that the aims of Socrates and Euripides were closely allied did not escape the attention of their contemporaries. We have an eloquent illustration of this in the rumor, current at the time in Athens, that Socrates was helping Euripides with his writing.

{p. 83} ... Socrates, being a sworn enemy of the tragic art, is said never to have attended the theater except when a new play of Euripides was mounted. The most famous instance of the conjunction of the two names, however, is found in the Delphic oracle which pronounced Socrates the wisest of men yet allowed that Euripides merited the second place. The third place went to Sophocles, who had boasted that, in contrast to Aeschylus, he not only did the right thing but knew why he did it. Evidently it was the transparency of their knowledge that earned for these three men the reputation of true wisdom in their day.

It was Socrates who expressed most clearly this radically new prestige of knowledge and conscious intelligence when he claimed to be the only one who acknowledged to himself that he knew nothing. He roamed all over Athens, visiting the most distinguished statesmen, orators, poets and artists, and found everywhere merely the presumption of knowledge. He was amazed to discover that all these celebrities lacked true and certain knowledge of their callings and pursued those callings by sheer instinct. The expression "sheer instinct" seems to focus perfectly the Socratic attitude.

{p. 84} We are offered a key to the mind of Socrates in that remarkable phenomenon known as his daimonium. In certain critical situations, when even his massive intellect faltered, he was able to regain his balance through a divine voice, which he heard only at such moments. The voice always spoke to dissuade. The instinctual wisdom of this anomalous character manifests itself from time to time as a purely inhibitory agent, ready to defy his rational judgment. Whereas in all truly productive men instinct is the strong, affirmative force and reason the dissuader and critic, in the case of Socrates the roles are reversed: instinct is the critic, consciousness the creator. Truly a

{p. 85} monstrosity! Because of this lack of every mystical talent Socrates emerges as the perfect pattern of the non-mystic, in whom the logical side has become, through superfetation, as overdeveloped as has the instinctual side in the mystic.

{p. 87} ... the young tragic poet Plato burned all his writings in order to qualify as a student of Socrates. ...

Although he did not lag behind the naive cynicism of his master in the condemnation of tragedy and of art in general, nevertheless his creative gifts forced him to develop an art form deeply akin to the existing forms which he had repudiated. ... Tragedy had assimilated to itself all the older poetic genres. In a somewhat eccentric sense the same thing can be claimed for the Platonic dialogue, which was a mixture of all the available styles and forms ... The Cynic philosophers went even farther in that direction, seeking, by their utterly promiscuous style and constant alternation between verse and prose, to project their image of the "raving Socrates" in literature, as they sought to enact it in life.

{p. 93} ... Lessing, most honest of theoretical men, dared to say that the search for truth was more important to him than truth itself and thereby revealed the innermost secret of inquiry, to the surprise and annoyance of his fellows. Yet, sure enough, alongside sporadic perceptions such as this one of Lessing's, which represented an act of honesty as well as high-spirited defiance, we find a type of deep-seated illusion, first manifested in Socrates: the illusion that thought, guided by the thread of causation, might plumb the farthest abysses of being and even correct it. ...

If we examine Socrates in the light of this idea, he strikes us as the first who was able not only to live under the guidance of that instinctive scientific certainty but to die by it, which is much more difficult.

{p. 94} ... we cannot help viewing Socrates as the vortex and turning point of Western civilization. ...

To Socratic man the one noble and truly human occupation was that of laying bare the workings of nature, of separating true knowledge from illusion and error. So it happened that ever since Socrates the mechanism of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms has come to be regarded as the highest exercise of man's powers, nature's most admirable gift. Socrates and his successors, down to our own day, have considered all moral and sentimental accomplishments - noble deeds, compassion, self-sacrifice, heroism, even that spiritual calm, so difficult of attainment, which the Apollonian Greek called sophrosyrle - to be ultimately derived from the dialectic of knowledge, and therefore teachable.

{Against this "Platonic illusion", Heinz R. Pagels writes, 'No amount of reading books or attending lectures on bike riding will train you to ride a bicycle - you will fail on your first attempt to ride. Likewise with certain cognitive and intuitive skills; they are a product of implicit skills learned by your "silent partners" during a long training. The implicit skills of a scientist, like the skill of the bike rider, a dancer, or an actor are essential for his work.' (The Dreams of Reason, Bantam Books, New York 1989, p. 161). I knew of young mothers attending courses on childcare given by a woman who never had children: reason has its place but is no substitute for experience.}

{p. 97} The mystical jubilation of Dionysos, on the other hand, breaks the spell of individuation and opens a path to the maternal womb of being. Among the great thinkers there is only one who has fully realized the immense discrepancy between the plastic Apollonian art and the Dionysiac art of music. Independently of Greek religious symbols, Schopenhauer assigned to music a totally different character and origin from all the other arts, because it does not, like all the others, represent appearance, but the will directly. It is the metaphysical complement to everything that is physical in the world; the thing-in-itself where all else is appearance (The World as Will and Idea, I). {end}

(4) Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future

http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bge.htm

Part V: Natural History of Morals

190.

... what is the Platonic Socrates if not prosthe Platon opithen to Platon messe te chimaira? ["Plato in front and Plato behind, in the middle the Chimaera."]

191.

The old theological problem of "faith" and "knowledge" - or, more clearly, of instinct and reason - that is to say, the question whether in regard to the evaluation of things instinct deserves to have more authority than rationality, which wants to evaluate and act according to reasons, according to a "why?," that is to say according to utility and fitness for a purpose - this is still that old moral problem which first appeared in the person of Socrates and was already dividing the minds of men long before Christianity. Socrates himself, to be sure, had, with the taste appropriate to his talent - that of a superior dialectician - initially taken the side of reason; and what indeed did he do all his life long but laugh at the clumsy incapacity of his noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and were never able to supply adequate information about the reasons for their actions? Ultimately, however, in silence and secrecy, he laughed at himself too: he found in himself, before his more refined conscience and self-interrogation, the same difficulty and incapacity. But why, he exhorted himself, should one therefore abandon the instincts! One must help both them and reason to receive their due - one must follow the instincts, but persuade reason to aid them with good arguments. This was the actual falsity of that great ironist, who had so many secrets; he induced his conscience to acquiesce in a sort of self-outwitting: fundamentally he had seen through the irrational aspect of moral judgment. - Plato, more innocent in such things and without the craftiness of the plebeian, wanted at the expenditure of all his strength - the greatest strength any philosopher has hitherto had to expend! - to prove to himself that reason and instinct move of themselves towards one goal, towards the good, towards "God" ... {endquote}

(5) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals tr. Francis Golffing, Doubleday Anchor, NY 1974.

{p. 162} "What does the etymology of the terms for good in various languages tell us?" I discovered that all these terms lead us back to the same conceptual transformation. The basic concept is always noble in the hierarchical, class sense, and from this has developed, by historical necessity, the concept good embracing nobility of mind, spiritual distinction. This development is strictly parallel to that other which eventually converted the notions common, plebeian, base into the notion bad.

{p. 164} The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (The subject races are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe: in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in intellectual and social instincts. Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the commune, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists - whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the Aryan race of conquerors is not doomed?)

{p. 166} Humanity is still suffering from the after-effects of those priestly cures. Think, for example, of certain forms of diet (abstinence from meat), fasting, sexual continence, escape "into the desert"; think further of the whole anti-sensual metaphysics of the priests, conducive to inertia and false refinement; of the self-hypnosis encouraged by the example of fakirs and Brahmans ... And at last ... nothingness - or God, for the desire for a mystical union with God is nothing other than the Buddhist's desire to sink himself in nirvana. ... By now the reader will have got some notion how readily the priestly system of valuations can branch off from the aristocratic and develop into its opposite. An occasion for

{p. 167} such a division is furnished whenever the priest caste and the warrior caste jealously clash with one another and find themselves unable to come to terms. The chivalrous and aristocratic valuations presuppose a strong physique, blooming, even exuberant health, together with all the conditions that guarantee its preservation: combat, adventure, the chase, the dance, war games, etc. The value system of the priestly aristocracy is founded on different presuppositions. So much the worse for them when it becomes a question of war! ...

Whatever else has been done to damage the powerful and great of this earth seems trivial compared with what the Jews have done, that priestly people who succeeded in avenging themselves on their enemies and oppressors by radically inverting all their values, that is, by an act of the most spiritual vengeance. This was a strategy entirely appropriate to a priestly people in whom vindictiveness had gone most deeply underground. It was the Jew who, with frightening consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value equations good/noble/powerful/beautiful/happy/favored-of-the-gods and maintain, with the furious hatred of the underprivileged and impotent, that "only the poor, the powerless, are good; only the suffering, sick, and ugly, truly blessed. But you noble and mighty ones of the earth will

{p. 168} be, to all eternity, the evil, the cruel, the avaricious, the godless, and thus the cursed and damned!" . . . We know who has fallen heir to this Jewish inversion of values.... In reference to the grand and unspeakably disastrous initiative which the Jews have launched by this most radical of all declarations of war, I wish to repeat a statement I made in a different context (Beyond Good and Evil), to wit, that it was the Jews who started the slave revolt in morals; a revolt with two millennia of history behind it, which we have lost sight of today simply because it has triumphed so completely.

{Yet "Leftist" Jews condemn Christianity for its acceptance, like Buddhism, of the inequalities of this world, despite its distaste for them}

{p. 169} What could equal in debilitating narcotic power the symbol of the "holy cross," the ghastly paradox of a crucified god, the unspeakably cruel mystery of God's self-crucifixion for the benefit of mankind? One thing is certain, that in this sign Israel has by now triumphed over all other, nobler values.

{Nietzsche's speaks of Israel, but his target is Christianity}

{p. 185} Let us conclude. The two sets of valuations, good/bad and good/evil, have waged a terrible battle on this earth, lasting many millennia; and just as surely as the second set has for a long time now been in the ascendant, so surely are there still places where the battle goes on and the issue remains in suspension.

{p. 186} The Romans were the strongest and most noble people who ever lived. Every vestige of them, every least inscription, is a sheer delight, provided we are able to read the spirit behind the writing. The Jews, on the contrary, were the priestly, rancorous nation par excellence, though possessed of an unequaled ethical genius; we need only compare with them nations of comparable endowments, such as the Chinese or the Germans, to sense which occupies the first rank. Has the victory so far been gained by the Romans or by the Jews? But this is really an idle question. Remember who it is before whom one bows down, in Rome itself, as before the essence of all supreme values - and not only in Rome but over half the globe, wherever man has grown tame or desires to grow tame: before three Jews and one Jewess (Jesus of Nazareth, the fisherman Peter, the rug weaver Paul, and Maria, the mother of that Jesus). This is very curious: Rome, without a doubt, has capitulated. It is true that during the Renaissance men witnessed a strange and splendid awakening of the classical ideal; like one buried alive, Rome stirred under the weight of a new Judaic Rome that looked like an ecumenical synagogue and was called the Church. But presently Israel triumphed once again, thanks to the plebeian rancor of the German and English Reformation, together with its natural corollary, the restoration of the Church - which also meant the restoration of ancient Rome to the quiet of the tomb. In an even more decisive sense did Israel triumph over the classical ideal through the French Revolution. For then the last political nobleness Europe had known, that of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France, collapsed under the weight of

{p. 187} vindictive popular instincts. A wilder enthusiasm was never seen. And yet, in the midst of it all, something tremendous, something wholly unexpected happened: the ancient classical ideal appeared incarnate ... Like a last signpost to an alternative route Napoleon appeared, most isolated and anachronistic of men, the embodiment of the noble ideal.

{p. 217} I take bad conscience to be a deep-seated malady to which man succumbed under the pressure of the most profound transformation he ever underwent - the one that made him once and for all a sociable and pacific creature. ... All instincts that are not allowed free play turn inward. This is what I call man's interiorization; it alone provides the soil for the growth of what is later called man's soul.

{p. 232} There is no inherent contradiction between chastity and sensual pleasure: every good marriage, every real love affair transcends these opposites.

{p. 241} We must take account of the fact that Schopenhauer, who treated sexuality (including woman, that instrumentum diaboli) as a personal enemy, absolutely required enemies to keep him in good spirits; that he loved atrabilious words, that he fulminated for the sake of fulminating ... Wherever there have been philosophers, from India to England (to indicate the opposite extremes of speculative orientation), there has prevailed a special philosopher's resentment against sensuality; Schopenhauer is only the most eloquent, and, for him who has ears to hear, the most delightful exponent of that resentment. There likewise exists a properly philosophical prejudice in favor of the ascetic ideal, Tet us make no mistake about it. Both dispositions, as I have said, are typical; if a philosopher lacks them, we may be sure

{p. 242} that he is spurious.

{p. 246} Every artist is familiar with the adverse effect wllich sexual intercourse has during times of great intellectual tension and preparation.

{p. 247} We have seen that a certain asceticism, that is to say a strict yet high-spirited continence, is among the necessary conditions of strenuous intellectual activity as well as one of its natural consequences. So it cannot surprise us to find that philosophers have always treated the ascetic ideal with

{p. 248} a certain fondness.

{p. 256} ... to eliminate the will, to suspend the emotions altogether provided it could be done - surely this would be to castrate the intellect, would it not?

Life employs asceticism in its desperate struggle against death; the ascetic ideal is a dodge for the preservation of life.

{p. 262} If the reader has thoroughly grasped - and I demand that here especially he dig down deeply - that it cannot be the task of the healthy to wait on the sick, or to make them well, he will also have grasped another important thing: that for physicians and medical attendants we require men who are themselves sick. I believe that we have here the key to the meaning of the ascetic priest. We must look upon the ascetic priest as the predestined advocate and savior of a sick flock if we are to comprehend his tremendous historical mission.

{p. 281} Just as the ascetic priest has corrupted man's mental health wherever he has held sway, so he has corrupted his esthetic taste. ... In the very heart of Graeco-Roman splendor, which was also a splendor of books, in the heart of a literature not yet atrophied and dispersed, when it was still possible to read a few books for which we would now trade half of all that is printed, the simple-minded presumption of the Christian agitators known as the Fathers of the Church dared to decree: "We have our own classical literature. We don't need that of the Greeks." And they pointed proudly to certain collections of legends, apostolic epistles, and apologetic penny tracts - the same kind of literature with which the English Salvation Army wages its war against Shakespeare and other pagans. The reader may have guessed already that I have no fondness for the New Testament. ... The Old Testament is another story. I have the highest respect for that book. I find in it great men, a heroic landscape, and one of the rarest things on earth, the naivete of a strong heart. What is more, I find a people.

{end of quotes}

(6) Nietzsche's attack on Zarathustra, Socrates, and Hellenism

There are several competing visions of what "One World" should be like.

One is Marxist (these days of the Trotskyist kind ... the violent demonstrations are mostly led by Trotskyists, who say they admire Chomsky).

Then there's the "Jewish fundamentalist" one, based on the Third Temple ... that's what the war against Islam is about (because the Dome of the Rock is in the way): tmf.html.

And Hellenism is a third. Many of those advocating "open borders" have Hellenism in mind as their model. It was instigated by Alexander, and adopted by the Roman Empire. There were no ethnic barriers to intermarriage, and non-Romans could become citizens, and even Emperor. The cultures and religions intermingled freely.

According to Kevin Macdonald, the Roman Empire dissolved all the tribalisms of the people in the empire, except for the Jews ... they alone remained separate: macdonald.html.

Against Hellenism, are those who stand for genetic segregation or racial hierarchy (barriers to intermarriage, such as apartheid, the Nuremberg Laws, and the Jewish ban on marrying out).

But is "Open Borders immigration" Hellenism or Marxism?

Nietzsche had a big effect on me - he contributed to my leaving the Catholic seminary, with his story about the madman announcing that we'd killed God (I read extracts of it in 1968, in a book called The Grave of God, by a renegade monk named Robert Adolfs).

I find Nietzsche an emotive writer. It's very hard to pin him down ... he's not a systematic thinker ... more like an artist who uses words. He has some important insights, but his effect is destructive.

The Protocols of Zion names him as dangerous:

"Do not suppose for a moment that these statements are empty words: think carefully of the successes we arranged for Darwinism, Marxism, Nietzsche-ism. To us Jews, at any rate, it should be plain to see what a disintegrating importance these directives have had upon the minds of the goyim."

Protocol 2: protocol.html.

The following emails are from SK, a student of Nietzsche and an Aryanist, but not in the materialistic Darwinian sense. I agree with the Protocols rather than SK.

I began by asking SK about Nietzsche's attack on Zarathustra. This raises an important question about the basis of the First Persian Empire. It was multicultural, tolerating all religions, even though the rulers were Zoroastrians. Alexander acquired his empire by taking over the Persian one; was the Persian Empire the model for Hellenism?

Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2003 21:04:17 +0000 From: SK

> What is the meaning of Nietzsche's attack on Zarathustra?

"The invention of the Zoroastrian religion was one of the crucial events in world history: we cannot name another man whose effect was as profound and as permanent as Zoroaster's". [R.P.Oliver 'The Origins of Christianity'] {http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/toc_ol.htm}

Nietzsche's Zarathustra was meant as a re-valuation of the Persian Zarathustra; his sister Elizabeth Forster Nietzsche writes -

"Already at the beginning of this history I hinted at the reasons which led my brother to select a Persian as the incarnation of his ideal of the majestic philosopher. His reasons, however, for choosing Zarathustra of all others to be his mouthpiece, he gives us in the following words:-

"People have never asked me, as they should have done, what the name Zarathustra precisely means in my mouth, in the mouth of the first Immoralist; for what distinguishes that philosopher from all others in the past is the very fact that he was exactly the reverse of an immoralist. Zarathustra was the first to see in the struggle between good and evil the essential wheel in the working of things. The translation of morality into the metaphysical, as force, cause, end in itself, was HIS work. But the very question suggests its own answer. Zarathustra CREATED the most portentous error, MORALITY, consequently he should also be the first to PERCEIVE that error, not only because he has had longer and greater experience of the subject than any other thinker - all history is the experimental refutation of the theory of the so-called moral order of things: - the more important point is that Zarathustra was more truthful than any other thinker. In his teaching alone do we meet with truthfulness upheld as the highest ... "

(From Elizabeth F. Nietzsche's introductory foreword to Zarathustra - 'How Zarathustra Came Into Being'; 1905)

The Persian Zarathustra upheld Aryan values that N.'s philosophy incorporates but he had made the very serious error of positing 'Morality' as a truth, as a dogma - 'good' and 'evil', when in fact there are no moral phenomena, Morality is only an interpretation of phenomena; one therefore had to break this truth and move 'beyond good and evil' - N.'s Zarathustra was an attempt to correct the Persian Zarathustra, with the dictum, man was something to be overcome, and morality was something to be surmounted beyond good and evil, because morality is only a partial and perspectival construction.

So N. doesn't 'attack' Zarathustra; the values that Nietzsche seeks to break and annihilate are the Christian [European] Nihilistic values.

The Persian Zarathustra's revaluation of Aryan Master Morality was an error; an error which led to Judaism/Christianity. It was this grand error which led to Nihilism. N. only wants to undermine the branch, not the Aryan root itself - hence his using of HIS Zarathustra as a mouthpiece to rectify the error of the Persian Prophet. {end}

Reply (Peter M):

Is not Buddhism also a system of morality, even though non-theistic? Why didn't Nietzsche attack Buddha as he attacked Zarathustra and Jesus?

On an earlier occasion, you quoted the following:

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy tr. Francis Golffing, Doubleday Anchor, NY 1974. {p. 94} ... we cannot help viewing Socrates as the vortex and turning point of Western civilization. ... ever since Socrates the mechanism of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms has come to be regarded as the highest exercise of man's powers, nature's most admirable gift. Socrates and his successors, down to our own day, have considered all moral and sentimental accomplishments - noble deeds, compassion, self-sacrifice, heroism, even that spiritual calm, so difficult of attainment, which the Apollonian Greek called sophrosyrle - to be ultimately derived from the dialectic of knowledge, and therefore teachable. {end}

Here, Nietzsche speaks approvingly of "moral ... accomplishments". How do you reconcile this with him trying to destroy all morality? {end}

Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2003 23:15:23 +0000 From: SK:

> But you endorsed Oliver's statement that Zoroastrianism replaced race
> with a church.

I think Christianity (as with Judaism/Islam) appropriated Zoroastrian elements to its own ends - there was a reversal of values here. Zoroastrianism was an Aryan religion and so emphasised purity, cleanliness, blood, fire and Distance. It was not a 'slave morality' like those religions it perversely spawned; "Zarathustra's second name, 'Spithama' ('The White') indicates that he belonged to the Nobility". (A.Vogel, 'Parsees', Quoted in the Scorpion 13)

The whole practise of the religion marks the importance of 'Distance'; between the inner and outer; between the higher and lower; "Zoroastrianism has 'outer' ceremonies, which can be performed in any clean place, and 'inner' ones, which can be solemnised only in a ritual precinct. To be able to perform the 'inner' ceremonies, priests undergo an ancient purification rite, followed by nine days retreat". (J.Hinnels, 'Handbook of Living Religions', Penguin)

"Since the 7th century, the Parsee have maintained ther Distance from other peoples and have only married among their own people". (Vogel; The Pharsees)

There is hierarchy and segregation here. Nietzsche writes in BGE, 30 - "... the Indians, Greeks, Persians and Muslims believe in Order of Rank, and NOT in equality."

Clearly, to equate early Zoroastrianism with Christianity that preaches equality for all, etc. is setting about an incorrect picture.

Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2003 23:12:55 +0000 From: From: SK:

> But what about Hellenism, as introduced by Alexander? It featured the
> blending of peoples and religions. Did Nietzsche make any comment on this?

Nietzsche's comments on this can be found in his 'Birth of Tragedy' (look it up at http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/). But I'll quote a few excerpts from there; basically he calls for the retying of the Gordion knot again that Alexander had untied. His main criticism on the Alexandrian culture was the Socratic morality of declaring and imposing 'reason' as the highest value above all else - he felt this undermined what was natural - the instincts. Socratism was anti-Dionysian, anti-natural.

'Let us now look more closely at the Socratic tendency by means of which Euripides fought and conquered Aeschylean tragedy. What, under the most auspicious conditions, could Euripides have hoped to effect in founding his tragedy on purely un-Dionysian elements? ...

'Having now recognized that Euripides failed in founding the drama solely on Apollinian elements and that, instead, his anti Dionysian tendency led him towards inartistic naturalism, we are ready to deal with the phenomenon of aesthetic Socratism. Its supreme law may be stated as follows: "Whatever is to be beautiful must also be sensible" --a parallel to the Socratic notion that knowledge alone makes men virtuous. ...

'Euripides set out, as Plato was to do, to show the world the opposite of the "irrational" poet; his aesthetic axiom, "whatever is to be beautiful must be conscious" is strictly parallel to the Socratic "whatever is to be good must be conscious." We can hardly go wrong then in calling Euripides the poet of aesthetic Socratism. ... ' (Birth of Tragedy, 12)

'Whereas in all truly productive men instinct is the strong, affirmative force and reason the dissuader and critic, in the case of Socrates the roles are reversed: instinct is the critic, consciousness the creator. Truly a monstrosity! Because of this lack of every mystical talent Socrates emerges as the perfect pattern of the non-mystic, in whom the logical side has become, through superfetation, as overdeveloped as has the instinctual side in the mystic. Yet it was entirely impossible for Socrates' logical impetus to turn against itself. In its unrestrained onrush it exhibited an elemental power such as is commonly found only in men of violent instincts, where we view it with awed surprise. ...That he himself was by no means unaware of this relationship appears from the grave dignity with which he stressed, even at the end and before his judges, his divine mission. It is as impossible to controvert him in this as it is to approve of his corrosive influence upon instinctual life. ... ' (Birth of Tragedy, 13)

'All that we call culture is made up of these stimulants; and, according to the proportion of the ingredients, we have either a dominantly Socratic or artistic or tragic culture; or, if historical exemplifications are permitted, there is either an Alexandrian or a Hellenic or a Buddhistic culture.

'Our whole modern world is entangled in the net of Alexandrian culture. It proposes as its ideal the theoretical man equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge, and laboring in the service of science, whose archetype and progenitor is Socrates. All our educational methods originally have this ideal in view: every other form of existence must struggle on laboriously beside it, as something tolerated, but not intended. In an almost alarming manner the culture man was for a long time found only in the form of the scholar: even our poetical arts have been forced to evolve from scholarly imitations, and in the main effect, that of rhyme, we still recognize the origin of our poetic form from artificial experiments with a nonindigenous, really scholarly language. ...

'Now we must not hide from ourselves what is concealed in the womb of this Socratic culture: optimism, with its delusion of limitless power. ...

'Let us mark this well: the Alexandrian culture, to be able to exist permanently, requires a slave class, but with its optimistic view of life it denies the necessity of such a class, and consequently, when its beautifully seductive and tranquilizing utterances about the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of labor" are no longer effective, it gradually drifts toward a dreadful destruction. There is nothing more terrible than a class of barbaric slaves who have learned to regard their existence as an injustice, and now prepare to avenge, not only themselves, but all generations. In the face of such threatening storms, who dares to appeal with any confidence to our pale and exhausted religions, the very foundations of which have degenerated into scholarly religions? Myth, the necessary prerequisite of any religion, is already paralyzed everywhere, and even in this domain the optimistic spirit, which we have just designated as the germ of destruction in our society, has attained the mastery. ... ' (Birth of Tragedy, 18)

'By way of comparison let us now picture the abstract man, untutored by myth; abstract education; abstract morality; abstract law; abstract state; let us imagine the lawless roving of the artistic imagination, unchecked by any native myth; let us think of a culture that has no fixed and sacred primordial site but is doomed to exhaust all possibilities and to nourish itself wretchedly on all other cultures--there we have the present age, the result of that Socratism which is bent on the destruction of myth. And now the mythless man stands eternally hungry, surrounded by all past ages, and digs and grubs for roots, even if he has to dig for them among the remotest antiquities. The tremendous historical need of our unsatisfied modern culture, the assembling around one of countless other cultures, the consuming desire for knowledge--what does all this point to, if not to the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home, the mythical maternal womb? Let us ask ourselves whether the feverish and uncanny excitement

'Since the reawakening of Alexandrian-Roman antiquity in the fifteenth century we have approximated this state in the most evident manner, after a long interlude that is difficult to describe. On the heights we encounter the same overabundant lust for knowledge, the same unsatisfied delight in discovery, the same tremendous secularization, and beside it a homeless roving, a greedy crowding around foreign tables, a frivolous deification of the present, or a dully dazed retreat--everything sub specie saeculi [Under the aspect of the times, or the spirit of the age.], of the "present age." And these same symptoms allow us to infer the same lack at the heart of this culture, the destruction of myth. It scarcely seems possible to be continuously successful at transplanting a foreign myth without irreparably damaging the tree by this transplantation. In one case it may perhaps be strong and healthy enlugh to eliminate this foreign element in a terrible fight; usually, however, it must consume itself, sick and withered or in diseased superfoetation.' (Birth of Tragedy, 23)

> I notice that he talks of "the Greeks", whereas Rousseau talks of
> "Sparta". Did Nietzsche differentiate the Greeks?

Not really, but when he did so, it was to show "Every natural gift must develop itself by competition. ...Every Athenian, for instance, was to cultivate his ego in competition, so far that it should be of the highest service to Athens and should do the least harm. ...Athens, which had destroyed the independence of her allies and avenged with severity the rebellions of her subjected foes, Sparta, which after the battle of Ægospotamoi used her preponderance over Hellas in a still harsher and more cruel fashion, both these, as in the case of Miltiades, brought about their ruin through deeds of the Hybris, as a proof that without envy, jealousy, and competing ambition the Hellenic State like the Hellenic man degenerates. He becomes bad and cruel, thirsting for revenge, and godless; in short, he becomes "pre-Homeric"--and then it needs only a panic in order to bring about his fall and to crush him. Sparta and Athens surrender to Persia, as Themistocles and Alcibiades have done; they betray Hellenism after they have given up the noblest Hellenic fundamental thought, the contest, and Alexander, the coarsened copy and abbreviation of Greek history, now invents the cosmopolitan Hellene, and the so-called "Hellenism."

{from the Preface to Homer's Contest: http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/hc.htm}

> Did he prefer the Greek city-states, or the later Hellenistic empires?

He affirmed the former structure, but recognized the progression of both as an inevitable part of the culture/civilization cycle. For instance, in 'The Greek State', he writes approving of Plato's State Model -

"In the case of many states, as, for example, in the Lycurgian constitution of Sparta, one can distinctly perceive the impress of that fundamental idea of the state, that of the creation of the military genius. ... Be it then pronounced that war is just as much a necessity for the state as the slave is for society, and who can avoid this verdict if he honestly asks himself about the causes of the never-equalled Greek art-perfection?"

> What does he say about the Roman Empire?

Can you be more specific, sorry? Because he coovers a lot of areas, how do you mean? His direction, in a crux, is found in his stating - 'Rome vs. Judea', or 'Dionysos vs. the Crucified' ... he takes the pagan side against the NT Christainity. He held Caesar as a type of Blond-Beast, and modelled his Overman as a synthesis in the foll. manner - he termed it "Roman Caesar with the soul of a Christ". The Empire as a whole, he saw it as being masculine (opposed to Greece as being divine, nurturing feminine) in its expansionism, in its courage to assimilate without eliminating, synthesize, create itself out from conquests. Some excerpts from his works on Rome in a general sense -

"The Romans, we know, were the strong and the noble, so that stronger and nobler men had never existed on earth before, nay, had not even been dreamt of. Every relic of them, every inscription delights, granted that one feels WHAT is writing therein. The Jews, on the contrary, were that priestly people of ressentiment par excellence, which was possessed of an unparalleled, popular ingenuity of morals". (Nietzsche GM I,16)

"The symbol of this struggle is called 'Rome against Judaea, Judaea against Rome' ". (Nietzsche Genealogy of Morals I,16)

"Primeval forest creatures, the Romans". (Nietzsche WM 959)

"For institutions to be possible there must exist a sort of Will, Instinct, Imperative, which cannot be otherwise than anti-liberal to the point of wickedness: the Will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for Centuries to come, to SOLIDARITY in long family lines forward and backward 'in infinitum'. If this Will is present, something is founded which resembles the 'imperium Romanum' ". (Nietzsche 'Twilight' IX 39)

The 'imperium Romanum', the most magnificent form of organisation, under difficult conditions, that has ever been achieved, and compared with which everything that preceded, and everything which followed it, is mere patchwork, gimcrackery, and dilettantism". (Nietzsche 'The Antichristian' 58)

"The great YEA to all things materialised in the 'imperium Romanum', become visible to all the senses, Grand Style no longer manifested in mere art, but in reality, in truth, in LIFE". (Nietzsche 'The Antichristian' 59

You can find the essay on The Greek State here - http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tgs.htm.

Birth of Tragedy (12-23) here - http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bt3.htm http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bt4.htm.

{end}

Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2003 00:10:26 +0000 From: SK

Regarding Nietzsche, you write -

> He has some important insights, but his effect is destructive. The
> Protocols of Zion names him as dangerous ...

You need not have gone to so much trouble Peter, Nietzsche himself claims this of him. But let us understand what the word "destructive" means from N.'s own mouth; below are two excerpts from his Ecce Homo -

"I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous - a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience, a decision that was conjured up against everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no man, I am dynamite. - Yet for all that... I want no "believers"; I think I am too malicious to believe in myself; I never speak to masses. - I have a terrible fear that one day I will be pronounced holy: you will guess why I publish this book before; it shall prevent people from doing mischief with me. ...the truth speaks out of me. - But my truth is terrible; for so far one has called lies truth. & of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded ­ all of them are based on lies: there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics. " (Ecce Homo, Why I Am A Fatality, 1)

"That is to be found in my Zarathustra: "And whoever wants to be a creator in good and evil, must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the greatest goodness: but this is ­ being creative." [Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, 34.]

(There  is a statement further after that - "I am by far the most terrible human  being that has existed so far; this does not preclude the possibility that I  shall be the most beneficial. I know the pleasure in destroying to a degree that accords with my powers to destroy ­ in both respects I obey my Dionysian  nature which does not know how to separate doing No from saying Yes. I am  the first immoralist: that makes me the annihilator par excellence." (EH,  WIAAF, 2).

> Is not Buddhism also a system of morality, even though non-theistic?
> Why didn't Nietzsche attack Buddha as he attacked Zarathustra and
> Jesus?

Nietzsche does attack Buddhism, in fact his whole essay - the Antichrist is a comparative polemic on both Buddhism/Christianity vs. Aryanism/Paganism. In his Will to Power, N. alludes to Buddhism as an "Aryan religion in decline". But Buddhism does not suffer N.'s wrath as does NT Christianity, because whilst the former only wallowed in Nihilism, NT Christainity was a reversal of all Noble Aryan values - it was directly life-descending.

"Christianity is called the religion of pity.-- Pity stands in opposition to all the tonic passions that augment the energy of the feeling of aliveness: it is a depressant. ...Pity thwarts the whole law of evolution, which is the law of natural selection. It preserves whatever is ripe for destruction; it fights on the side of those disinherited and condemned by life; by maintaining life in so many of the botched of all kinds, it gives life itself a gloomy and dubious aspect. Mankind has ventured to call pity a virtue (--in every superior moral system it appears as a weakness--); going still further, it has been called the virtue, the source and foundation of all other virtues--but let us always bear in mind that this was from the standpoint of a philosophy that was nihilistic, and upon whose shield the denial of life was inscribed. ...Let me repeat: this depressing and contagious instinct stands against all those instincts which work for the preservation and enhancement of life"

Compare that with his take on Buddhism now -

"In my condemnation of Christianity I surely hope I do no injustice to a related religion with an even larger number of believers: I allude to Buddhism. Both are to be reckoned among the nihilistic religions--they are both decadence religions--but they are separated from each other in a very remarkable way. ... Buddhism is a hundred times as realistic as Christianity--it is part of its living heritage that it is able to face problems objectively and coolly; it is the product of long centuries of philosophical speculation. The concept, "god," was already disposed of before it appeared. Buddhism is the only genuinely positive religion to be encountered in history... It does not speak of a "struggle with sin," but, yielding to reality, of the "struggle with suffering." Sharply differentiating itself from Christianity, it puts the self-deception that lies in moral concepts behind it; it is, in my phrase,beyond good and evil." (AC, 20)

"Buddhism is not a religion in which perfection is merely an object of aspiration: perfection is actually normal.--Under Christianity the instincts of the subjugated and the oppressed come to the fore: it is only those who are at the bottom who seek their salvation in it." (AC, 21)

"...unlike in the case of the Buddhists, the cause of discontent with self, suffering through self, is not merely a general sensitiveness and susceptibility to pain, but, on the contrary, an inordinate thirst for inflicting pain on others, a tendency to obtain subjective satisfaction in hostile deeds and ideas. Christianity had to embrace barbaric concepts and valuations in order to obtain mastery over barbarians: ...Buddhism is a religion for peoples in a further state of development, for races that have become kind, gentle and over-spiritualized (--Europe is not yet ripe for it--): it is a summons 'that takes them back to peace and cheerfulness, to a careful rationing of the spirit, to a certain hardening of the body. Christianity aims at mastering beasts of prey; its modus operandi is to make them ill--to make feeble is the Christian recipe for taming, for "civilizing." Buddhism is a religion for the closing, over-wearied stages of civilization.  Christianity appears before civilization has so much as begun--under certain circumstances it lays the very foundations thereof.

"Buddhism, I repeat, is a hundred times more austere, more honest, more objective. It no longer has to justify its pains, its susceptibility to suffering, by interpreting these things in terms of sin--it simply says, as it simply thinks, "I suffer." To the barbarian, however, suffering in itself is scarcely understandable: what he needs, first of all, is an explanation as to why he suffers. (His mere instinct prompts him to deny his suffering altogether, or to endure it in silence.) Here the word "devil" was a blessing: man had to have an omnipotent and terrible enemy--there was no need to be ashamed of suffering at the hands of such an enemy." (AC, 23)

> On an earlier occasion, you quoted the following: Friedrich Nietzsche,
> The Birth of Tragedy tr. Francis Golffing, Doubleday Anchor, NY 1974.
> {p. 94} ... we cannot help viewing Socrates as the vortex
> and turning ... teachable.

> Here, Nietzsche speaks approvingly of "moral ... accomplishments".
> How do you reconcile this with him trying to destroy all morality?

Nietzsche actually speaks about the danger posed by Socratism, and its 'optimistic cheerfulness'. (By the way, N. only called for the subjugation of the ruling slave morality, not ALL morality. He therefore calls for the revaluation of all moralities.) While Nietzsche says he can understand why Socrates appeals ("Yet it was entirely impossible for Socrates' logical impetus to turn against itself. In its unrestrained onrush it exhibited an elemental power such as is commonly found only in men of violent instincts, where we view it with awed surprise." (BOT, 12)), you need to understand the quote you present in its context. -

The whole of that quote you present here is as follows -

'Once we see clearly how after Socrates, the mystagogue of science, one philosophical school succeeds another, wave upon wave; how the hunger for knowledge reached a never-suspected universality in the widest domain of the educated world, became the real task for every person of higher gifts, and led science onto the high seas from which it has never again been driven altogether; how this universality first spread a common net of thought over the whole globe, actually holding out the prospect of the lawfulness of an entire solar system; once we see all this clearly, along with the amazingly high pyramid of knowledge in our own time--we cannot fail to see in Socrates the one turning point and vortex of so-called world history. For if we imagine that the whole incalculable sum of energy used up for this world tendency had been used not in the service of knowledge but for the practical, i.e., egoistic aims of individuals and peoples, then we realize that in that case universal wars of annihilation and continual migrations of peoples would probably have weakened the lust for life to such an extent that suicide would have become a general custom ...

'By contrast with this practical pessimism, Socrates is the prototype of the theoretical optimist who, with his faith that the nature of things can be fathomed, ascribes to knowledge and insight the power of a panacea, while understanding error as the evil par excellence. To fathom the depths and to separate true knowledge from appearance and error, seemed to Socratic man the noblest, even the only truly human vocation. And since Socrates, this mechanism of concepts, judgments, and inferences has been esteemed as the highest occupation and the most admirable gift of nature, above all other capacities. Even the most sublime ethical deeds, the stirrings of pity, self-sacrifice, heroism, and that calm sea of the soul, so difficult to attain, which the Apollinian Greek called sophrosune, were derived from the dialectic knowledge by Socrates and his like-minded successors, down to the present, and accordingly designated as teachable.

'Anyone who has ever experienced the pleasure of Socratic insight and felt how, spreading in ever-widening circles, it seeks to embrace the whole world of appearances, will never again find any stimulus toward existence more violent than the craving to complete this conquest and to weave the net impenetrably tight. To one who feels that way, the Platonic Socrates will appear as the teacher of an altogether new form of "Greek cheerfulness" and blissful affirmation of existence that seeks to discharge itself in actions--most often in maieutic and educational influences on noble youths, with a view to eventually producing a genius.

'But science, spurred by its powerful illusion, speeds irresistibly towards its limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence of logic, suffers shipwreck. For the periphery of the circle of science has an infinite number of points; and while there is no telling how this circle could ever be surveyed completely, noble and gifted men nevertheless reach, e'er half their time and inevitably, such boundary points on the periphery from which one gazes into what defies illumination. When they see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail--suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and remedy.

'Our eyes strengthened and refreshed by our contemplation of the Greeks, let us look at the highest spheres of the world around us; then we shall see how the hunger for insatiable and optimistic knowledge that in Socrates appears exemplary has turned into tragic resignation and destitute need for art--while, to be sure, the same hunger on its lower levels can express itself in hostility to art and must particularly detest Dionysian-tragic art...

'Here we knock, deeply moved, at the gates of present and future: will this "turning" lead to ever-new configurations of genius and especially of the Socrates who practices music? Will the net of art, even if it is called religion or science, that is spread over existence be woven even more tightly and delicately, or is it destined to be torn to shreds in the restless, barbarous, chaotic whirl that now calls itself "the present"? '(BOT, 15)

In essence, he is speaking of the struggle between "between insatiable optimistic knowledge and the tragic need of art" (BOT, 16), and siding himself with the Tragic world conception, he is speaking of Socratism as its noblest opposition - "...the noblest opposition to the tragic world-conception--and by this I mean science, which is at bottom optimistic, with its ancestor Socrates at its head." (ib.) i.e., while Socratism may look optimistic and commendable, it is ultimately illusionary, because it believes the nature of things is fathomable.

To Nietzsche, Socrates begins the ignoble movement to set reason above the instincts;

"What indeed did Socrates do all his life long but laugh at the clumsy incapacity of his noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and were never able to supply adequate information about the reasons for their actions?". (BGE,191)

{end}

I don't believe in racial hierarchy. If life is misery, then, in part, it's because we make it that way for each other. Even so, I find Nietzsche useful for delineating the issues.

Nietzsche opposed Christianity, but supported Aryanism and Judaism. Nietzsche and Jewish culture: nietzsche.html.

Nietzsche compared to Rousseau and Marx: rousseau.html.

The struggle between the Dionysian and Apollonian cultures:

Marija Gimbutas on the Goddess cultures and Aryan (Indo-European) invasions, with the counter-argument of Colin Renfrew, and the assessment of Geneticist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza: gimbutas.html.

Alain Danielou and Camille Paglia on the struggle between the Dionysian (Shivaite, Goddess) and the Patriarchial cultures (Apollonian, Monotheistic) in the last 5 millenia: danielou-paglia.html.

Alain Danielou on the similarities between Shivaism, Taoism, & the Cynic philosophy, and the contest between them and the rationalistic, moralistic religions: danielou2.html.

Is there a connection between Judaism and Shivaism/Tantrism/Taoism? jewish-taoist.html.

F. Gerald Downing argues that the early Christians were like Cynic philosophers (like Taoists): downing.html.

Write to me at contact.html.

HOME