Globalisation and Higher Tribalism - Peter Myers, December 7, 2002; update January 15, 2006. My comments are shown {thus}.

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(1) Introducing Higher Tribalism (2) Joel Kotkin on Higher Tribalism

(1) Introducing Higher Tribalism

Is Globalisation making us "one", or are we divided by tribal allegiances?

Joel Kotkin's book Tribes is a study of five such tribes - Jews, British (which includes "white "Australians & Americans of English/Irish ancestry), Japanese, Chinese and Indians. Each has a homeland core, a diaspora spread around the world, and a cultural sense of uniqueness. More from Kotkin below.

Amy Chua, a Filipino of Chinese "tribe", wrote a book called World On Fire, about "market-dominant minorities," groups like the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Jews in Russia, whites in Zimbabwe and Indians in East Africa and Fiji.

Michelle Goldberg wrote in her review of it:

'Market-dominant minorities control hugely disproportionate percentages of their countries' resources. Filipino Chinese comprise just 1 to 2 percent of the Philippines' population, but control all of the country's major supermarkets, fast-food restaurants and large department stores, and all but one of the nation's banks. A similar situation obtains in Indonesia. Jews make up a similarly tiny proportion of Russia's population, but of the seven "oligarchs" who control virtually all of the country's business, six are Jewish. Lebanese dominate the economies in Sierra Leone and Gambia, while Indians dominate the economy in Kenya, along with a smaller, indigenous minority tribe called the Kikuyu. Similar examples abound worldwide. ...

'In Indonesia ... By 1998, Chua writes, Chinese made up 3 percent of the population but controlled 70 percent of the private economy.'

Yuri Slezkine's book The Jewish Century is also about higher tribalism. He wrote: '... The most common way to describe the role and the fate of Indonesia's Chinese is to call them "the Jews of Asia."' (p. 39); Slezkine himself, like Kotkin, is Jewish slezkine.html.

In the US, Benjamin Ginsberg, a Jewish Professor, wrote in his book The Fatal Embrace: "Today, though barely 2% of the nation's population is Jewish, close to half its billionaires are Jews. The chief executive officers of the three major television networks, and the four largest film studios are Jews, as are the owners of the nation's largest newspaper chain and most influential single newspaper, the New York Times. In the late 1960s, Jews already constituted 20% of the faculty of elite universities and 40% of the professors of elite law schools; today, these percentages doubtless are higher." (p.1) ginsberg.html.

When the Vikings invaded Europe, they brought Aryanism (European tribalism and militancy) back into pacifist Europe, and it was blended into Christianity. The Church, unable to resist them militarily, baptised them as Normans. The Norman aristocrats ruled as the First Estate, and the Church as the Second. Pressed by Islam, the Church launched the Crusades, led by the Normans, and the same combination conquered the New World.

This was not the first expansion of Indo-European-speaking (Aryan) peoples. They had originated in the steppes of Eastern Europe and Central Asia - at that time they cannot be called "Europeans", so "Aryans" must do - and from there conquered India (destroying the Harappan civilization: rig-veda.html), parts of the Middle East (including participating in the Hyksos invasion of Egypt), and Western Europe.

The chariot appears to have been invented by Aryans in Central Asia, and to have spread both West & East from there. The chariot was the tank of the day, and allowed blitzkrieg invasions. Those invaded had to acquire the technology, one way or the other.

Old Kingdom Egypt had no chariots. The Hyksos had chariots, which would have helped them to defeat Egypt. Later pharoahs had them, and the Jewish god Yahweh is depicted, in the Bible, sitting on a Merkabah (Merkavah), which means "throne-chariot".

The chariot reached China from Central Asia. Silk road archeological findings substantiate cultural exchange between East & West.

The word "Aryan" is today preserved in the names of the countries "Iran" and "Ireland", i.e. "Eire" = "Aryan", showing the extent of the Aryan conquest. Marija Gimbutas, below, shows the reality of Aryan "nobility".

When we consider the way that Pizarro, with his small band of conquistadores, conquered the Inca empire, with deception and brutality, we ask ourselves, do we support or reject such behaviour. I personally feel very uncomfortable about it. Yet here we are, inheritors of Australia due to similar behaviour of our own ancestors.

This history of the two waves of Indo-European expansion is embarrassing, in our Internationalist age, and not well covered in history books, so I have included a number of readings from experts, plus links for follow-ups.

(Reading 1}
Jared Diamond wrote in his book The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee (Vintage Books, London 1991), later published as The Third Chimpanzee:

{p. 225} More than 4,000 years before the recent expansion of Europeans over all other continents, there was an earlier expansion within Europe and western Asia that sired most of the languages spoken in that region today. Although those earlier conquerors were illiterate, much of their language and culture can be reconstructed from shared word roots preserved in modern Indo-European languages.

{p. 226} Of all the processes by which the modern world lost its earlier linguistic diversity, the Indo-European expansion has been the most important. Its first stage, which long ago carried Indo-European languages over Europe and much of Asia, was followed by a second stage that began in 1492 and carried them to all other continents.

{p. 232} The sole such vestige surviving in Western Europe today is the Basque language of Spain ... All such vanished non-lndo-European languages were part of the debris left from the Indo-European expansion.

{p. 235} ... linguists have been able to reconstruct much of the grammar and nearly 2,000 word roots of the mother tongue, termed proto-Indo-European but usually abbreviated as PIE.

{p. 242} PIE is strikingly deficient in words for the crops that defined the first farmers. Hittite, the oldest known Indo-European language of Turkey, is not the Indo-European language closest to pure PIE ... but is instead the most deviant language and the one least Indo-European in its vocabulary. ... Everything else suggests that farming instead brought to Europe the older languages that PIE overran, like Etruscan and Basque. ...

The first evidence of horse domestication is for the Sredny Stog culture around 4000 BC, in the steppes just north of the Black Sea, where archaeologist David Anthony has identified wearmarks on horses' teeth that indicate use of a bit for riding. ...

{p. 245} As archaeologist Marija Gimbutas, from the University of California, Los Angeles, has argued, the Russian steppe peoples who lived west of the Ural Mountains in the fourth millenium BC fit quite well into our postulated picture of proto-Indo-Europeans. They lived at the right time. Their culture included the important economic elements reconstructed for PIE (like wheels and horses), and lacked the elements lacking from PIE (like battle chariots and many crop terms). They lived in the right place for PIE: the temperate zone, south of Finno-Ugric peoples, near the later homeland of Lithuanians and other Balts. ...

However ... the steppe culture could not spread intact to Ireland. The steppe itself reaches its western limit in the plains of Hungary. That is where all subsequent steppe invaders of Europe, such as the Mongols, stopped. To spread further, steppe society had to adapt to the forested landscape of Western Europe - by adopting intensive agriculture, or by taking over existing European societies and hybridizing with their peoples. Most of the genes of the resulting hybrid societies may have been the genes of Old Europe. {end}

For more see diamond.html.

(Reading 2}
The Origin of Horseback Riding, by David Anthony, Dimitri Y. Telegin and Dorcas Brown


{p. 48A} It is possible that the first riders spoke a language we would now call proto-Indo-European. Linguists have reconstructed that language, now long extinct, from the evidence of its descendant tongues. These include Sanskrit, Homeric Greek and Latin, as well as such modern languages as English, French, Russian and Persian. ...

An Eastward dispersion by the first riders would have encountered only small and scattered human resistance. Dispersal to the west would have been much more complex because it would have encountered the well-established agricultural societies of Copper Age Europe. Archaeological data and theoretical models of migration tend to support the theory that such movements took place, first in the east, and then to the west, between 3500 and 3000 B.C.

In all these developments the horse played a critical role, as it would continue to do in human events for the next 5,000 years. But it is now clear that it took a very long time for the custom of riding to diffuse southward into the Middle East. When horses finally did appear there, around 2200 to 2000 B.C., they were used in a role previously played by asses or ass-onager hybrids, as draft animals attached to battle carts. The superior size and speed of horses and perhaps new control methods based on the bit contributed to the refinement of the war chariot by 1800 B.C. It was as a chariot animal that the horse trotted onto the pages of history, two millennia after it had first been broken to the bridle. {end}

For more on this topic, see needham-anthony.html.

(Reading 3}
Marija Gimbutas, The Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe 3500 - 3500 BC, updated edition, Thames and Hudson, London 1982.

{p. 9} The term Old Europe is applied to a pre-Indo-European culture of Europe, a culture matrifocal and probably matrilinear, agricultural and sedentary, egalitarian and peaceful. It contrasted sharply with the ensuing proto-Indo-European culture which was patriarchal, stratified, pastoral, mobile and war-oriented, superimposed on all Europe, except the southern and western fringes, in the course of three waves of infiltration from the Russian steppe, between 4500 and 2500 B.C. During and after this period the female deities, or more accurately the Goddess Creatrix in her many aspects, were largely replaced by the predominantly male divinities of the Indo-Europeans. What developed after c. 2500 BC was a melange of the two mythic systems, Old European and Indo-European. ...

(Reading 4}
Marija Gimbutas, The Civilization of the Goddess, edited by Joan Marler (HarperSanFrancisco, New York 1991):

{p. 352} The collapse of Old Europe coincides with the process of Indo-Europeanization of Europe, a complicated transformative process leading to a drastic cultural change reminiscent of the conquest of the American continent. ... The Proto- or Early Indo-Europeans, whom I have labeled "Kurgan" people, arrived from the east, from southern Russia, on horseback. Their first contact ... began around the middle of the 5th millennium B.C. A continuous flow of influences and people into east-central Europe was initiated which lasted for two millennia.

Following this collision of cultures, Old Europe was transformed, and later European prehistory and history became a "marble cake" composed of non-lndo-European and Indo-European elements. ...

The Kurgan tradition represents a stark contrast to the civilization of Old Europe which was, in the main, peaceful, sedentary, matrifocal, matrilineal, and sex egalitarian. The Kurgans were a warlike, patriarchal, and hierarchical culture with distinctive burial rites ...

The livelihood and mobility of the Kurgan people depended on the domesticated horse, in sharp contrast to the Old European agriculturalists to whom the horse was unknown. {end}

More at gimbutas.html.

(Reading 5}
Cyrus H. Gordon on the Aryan Invasions

Cyrus H. Gordon wrote in his book Before the Bible: the Common Background of Greek and Hebrew Civilisations (Collins, London, 1962):

{p. 25} The influx of Indo-European immigrants into the Near East during the second millennium B.C. revolutionised the art of war. The newcomers introduced the horse-drawn war-chariot, which gave a swift striking power hitherto unknown in the Near East.

{p. 26} The elite charioteer officers, who bear the Indo-European name of maryannu, soon became a new aristocracy throughout the entire area, including Egypt. With them appears also a new type of royal epic, which we may call the Indo-European War Epic. Embedded in it is a motif that has become commonplace in world literature: the Helen of Troy theme, whereby a hero loses his destined bride and must wage a war to win her back. Greek and Indic epic illustrate this theme {The Indian one is the Ramayana}, and it is from the Iliad that it has become popular in the modern West. However, it is completely absent from the romantic literatures of early Mesopotamia and Egypt, and it appears in the Semitic World only in the wake of the Indo-Europeans with their maryannu aristocracy. The Helen of Troy theme first appears at Ugarit of the Amarna Age, in a community where the Indo-European elements are present, including a firmly entrenched organisation of maryannu. As we shall note later, the theme permeates the early traditions of Israel, particularly the saga of Abraham. {end}

For more from Gordon see gordon.html.

(Reading 6}
Martin Bernal on the Aryan Invasions, in Black Athena

Bernal, despite his pugnacious style, is surely right when he writes, in Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization Volume II The Archaeological and Documentary Evidence (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick NJ, 1991):

{p. 321} Interest in the Hurrians and their kingdom of Mitanni, which flourished in Northern Mesopotamia and Eastern Syria in the middle of the second millenium, became still more intense when it was discovered that the Mitanni swore by Indian gods, some of their kings had Aryan Indian names and, even more sensationally, some of their charioteering terms - the Mitanni were famous for their horses and chariots - were found to be very close to those in Sanskrit. The most plausible explanation of this situation was to suppose that speakers of Indo-Aryan, that is to say of the Indo-Iranian language that resembled Indian not Iranian, had conquered the Hurrians and retained

{p. 322} a dominance over Hurrian society, which gave the latter the dynamism to sweep through Southwest Asia. ...

Hurrians and Indo-Aryans have also been linked to the development and use of the light war chariot, and diffusionists have tended to see this as the secret of their military success. This seemed plausible as there is little or no trace of horses and chariots in Middle Kingdom Egypt, while they played an important role in the 15th and later Dynasties. Against this attempt to link the Hurrians and Hyksos scholars were able to argue, until recently, that, as chariots were first mentioned in Egypt at the end of the Hyksos period, there is no reason to suppose that they had been present at its beginning. In the 1960s, however, horses or at least 'equids' were found buried in association with Hyksos graves dating from the second half of the 18th century BC. Thus, there would seem no reason to deny the inherently plausible notion that horses and chariots came in with the Hyksos, and that the Hyksos 'invasion' was directly or indirectly connected to the Hurrian expansion and further that there may have been Indo-Aryan speakers involved in the movement.

{p. 323} ... the material and linguistic culture introduced by the Hyksos into Egypt seems to have been overwhelmingly that of the neighbouring Canaanites and it was this Egypto-Levantine civilization with some 'barbaric' elements that dominated Lower Egypt between 1750 and 1570 BC. {end}

More from Bernal at diop.html.

(Reading 7}
A.L. Basham on the Aryan Invasions, in The Wonder That Was India

A. L. Basham wrote in The Wonder That Was India (Grove Press, New York, 1959):

{p. 27} Sporadic traces of contact can be found between the Indus cities and Sumeria, and there is some reason to believe that these contacts continued under the First

{p. 28} Dynasty of Babylon, which produced the great lawgiver Hammurabi. This dynasty was also overwhelmed by barbarians, the Kassites, who came from the hills of Iran and conquered by virtue of their horse-drawn chariots. After the Kassite invasion no trace of contact with the Indus can be found in Mesopotamia, and it is therefore likely that the Indus cities fell at about the same time as the dynasty of Hammurabi. Earlier authorities placed the latter event in the first centuries of the 2nd millennium B.C., but new evidence, which appeared shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, has resulted in a revised chronology. The fall of the First Babylonian Dynasty is now thought to have taken place about 1600 B.C.

... Many competent authorities, led by Sir R. Mortimer Wheeler, now believe that Harappa was overthrown by the Aryans.

The invaders of India called themselves Aryas, a word generally anglicized into Aryans. The name was also used by the ancient Persians, and survives in the word Iran, while Eire, the name of the most westerly land reached by Indo-European peoples in ancient times, is also cognate. {end}

More at gimbutas.html.

(Reading 8}
Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Genes, Peoples, and Languages, tr. Mark Seielstad, Penguin, New York, 2000.

{p. 109} To our great astonishment, we saw that the first principal component {of the European gene map} ... perfectly matched the map plotting the arrival dates of cereals in Europe according to radiocarbon estimates (figure 5).

{p. 110} {text at figure 6} there was an expansion of farmers from the Middle East into Europe, who, in the course of expansion, mixed with local hunter-gatherers, who had different gene frequencies. {end of text at figure 6}

{p. 117} The third principal component is extremely interesting. ...

{p. 118} It shows an expansion originating in all area north of the Caucasus and the Black and Caspian Seas, which the archeologist Marjia {it should be Marija} Gimbutas had already proposed as the homeland of Indo-European speakers.

We shall discuss the evolution of languages in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that much discussion has centered on the geographic origins of the Indo-European languages, with suggestions spanning from central Europe to Central Asia. Marjia Gimbutas has suggested that the Indo-European languages spread from a region north of the Caueasus and south of the Urals, where numerous tombs called kurgan have been found. These tombs were filled with sculptures, precious metals, bronze weapons, and the skeletons of both warriors and horses. Ecologically, the area belongs to the Eurasiatic steppe, which extends almost without interruption from Romania to Manchuria. Horses were common in the area, and the archeologist David Anthony has recently shown that they were probably domesticated in the vicinity of this Kurgan culture, where chariots and bronze weapons were made more than 5,000 years ago. Without written documents, it is very difficult for archaeologists to say what language was spoken in this region at the time.

{p. 159} The Indo-European Family

... Not long ago, one of the most popular theories was proposed by the archeologist Marjia Gimbutas, who postulated an origin above the Black Sea and associated the earliest speakers of Indo-European with the Kurgan culture of the Asian steppes. But when Gimbutas published her hypothesis, the Kurgan lates were poorly known. She assumed 3,000 to 3,500 years B.C., a date which was rejected as too old by English archeologists. Gimbutas's dates appear to have been vindicated by new excavations, which have also shown that horses were probably domesticated and mounted at that time and that war chariots were built in this area. {end}

More at gimbutas.html.

(Reading 9)
Kevin McDonald wrote in his book The Culture of Critique  (Praeger, Westport, CT, 1998):

{p. 319} ... immigrants from East Asian countries are outcompeting whites in gaining admission to universities and in prestigious high-income jobs. The long-term result will be that the entire white population (not including Jews) is likely to suffer a social status decline as these new imnmigrants become more numerous. (Jews are unlikely to suffer a decline in social status not only because their mean IQ is well above that of the East Asians but, more importantly, because Jewish IQ is skewed toward excelling in verbal skills. The high IQ of East Asians is skewed toward performance IQ which makes them powerful competitors in engineering and technology. ... Presently white gentiles are the most underrepresented group at Harvard, accounting for approximately 25 percent of the students, while Asians and Jews constitute at least half of the student body while constituting no more than five percent of the population (Unz 1998). The United States is well on the road to being dominated by an Asian technocratic elite and a Jewish business, professional, and media elite. {end}

More at macdonald.html.

(2) Joel Kotkin on Higher Tribalism

Joel Kotkin, Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy, Random House, New York, 1993.

{p. 4} ... global tribes are today's quintessential cosmopolitans, in sharp contrast to narrow provincials. As the conventional barriers of nation-states and regions become less meaningful under the weight of global economic forces, it is likely such dispersed peoples - and their worldwide business and cultural networks - will increasingly shape the economic destiny of mankind.

Global tribes combine a strong sense of a common origin and shared values, quintessential tribal characteristics, with two critical factors for success in the modern world: geographic dispersion and a belief in scientific progress. Such cosmopolitan groups - from the Jews and British of the past to today's ascendant Asian global tribes - do not surrender their sense of a peculiar ethnic identity at the altar of technology or science but utilize their historically conditioned values and beliefs to cope successfully with change.

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War further boost the prospects for global tribes. As ideologies such as "scientific socialism" have collapsed, the world has experienced a renaissance of interest in the symbols of the tribal past. Like desert flowers after a rain, churches, mosques, synagogues, Buddhist temples and family shrines across the former communist empire have come back to life. Other icons of national sentiment, such as the Russian tricolor, have been unfurled as symbols of a rebirth of renewed popular identity.

This remarkable historical reversal leads to our critical point: ethnicity as a defining factor in the evolution of the global economy. In the post-Cold War era, where ideology has faded and peoples seek definition from the collective past, dispersed groups such as global tribes seem particularly well adapted to succeed within today's progressively more integrated worldwide economic system.

In defining global tribalism, I have set out to examine five principal groups - the Jews, British, Japanese, Chinese and Indians - all of whom powerfully illustrate this phenomenon. Although each of these five tribes possesses a vastly different history, they all share the following three critical characteristics:

1. A strong ethnic identity and sense of mutual dependence that helps the group adjust to changes in the global eco-

{p. 5} nomic and political order without losing its essential unity.

2. A global network based on mutual trust that allows the tribe to function collectively beyond the confines of na tional or regional borders.

3. A passion for technical and other knowledge from all possible sources, combined with an essential open-mindedness that fosters rapid cultural and scientific development critical for success in the late-twentieth-century world economy.

Of course, these five groups are not alone in displaying some or all of the above traits. Dispersed ethnic groups, in one form or another, have existed since the beginnings of history. Often originating as small, highly distinct tribes, some ultimately extended their influence over wide swaths of territory. Their unmistakable imprint on distant lands at times lingered for centuries following their departure or even their own society's ultimate collapse. In Western antiquity, Babylonians, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans, for example, played such critical formative roles. Similarly the ancient Native Americans - the Incas, Mayans and Aztecs of meso-America - and the great Chinese and Islamic empires left profound marks upon the language, religion, custom, architecture, agriculture and science of cultures well beyond their formal borders.

Later, other groups, armed with a strong sense of self-identity and a passion for knowledge, established themselves in the byways of global economy. During the centuries after the Middle Ages, Italians, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish and Germans extended their cultural and technological influence over various portions of the world. More recently, other peoples, including the Armenians, Palestinians, modern Greeks, Ibos, Cubans and Koreans, among others, have also spread across national lines, often with potent economic and cultural effects.

All these, and no doubt many others as well, can be defined as sharing some of the characteristics of global tribes. But for the purposes of this book, I have chosen to concentrate on the five major ethnic groups that today most powerfully demonstrate the effectiveness of global tribalism. Among the Euro-

{p. 6} pean-derived groups, for example, I concentrate on the Anglo-Americans because their worldwide sway expressed in global investments, multinational corporations and cultural and political influence remains far greater than that of the Germans, Italians or French, who, for all their economic or cultural prowess, are now concentrated in a European-centered sphere of influence. Similarly I have chosen the Japanese, Chinese and Indians among the Asians due not only to their growing influence on the contemporary world but also their potential to impact massively the course of history in the next century.

{But the Anglo-American sphere includes much of the Jewish sphere, in the sense that the latter operates within the former. Kotkin pays no attention to this overlap}

It is not my intention to argue for, nor do I believe in, the essential moral or racial superiority of any of these groups. In each case, the global tribe has grown as much through intimate contact with other civilizations as through any intrinsic cultural superiority, much less any supposed racial purity. In fact, global tribes such as the British or Japanese have variously been known as imitators par excellence. Similarly, the Jews, British and Indians, far from being pure examples of a particular genetic stock, are among the most racially diverse of peoples.

Certainly fate, often the prime genetrix of history, has played a critical part in assigning these groups their role as global tribes - and then compelled them to play it. This is clearly evident in the case of the Jews, my own people, who in many ways represent the archetype of global tribalism. From the time of Abraham - or so goes the mythology - the Jews have been defined by their own historic sense of uniqueness, based largely on their identification with God. Their stubborn adherence to this belief both led to their millennia of dispersion and sustained their particularly strong sense of identity.

Isolated in their own communities among strangers who were frequently hostile, the Jews were forced to develop both a powerful tradition of self-help and a particular skill at adjusting to changing economic and social conditions. Empires rose and fell, economies collapsed, great religious waves swept across continents, yet the Jews - their social institutions, their laws and family traditions - survived.

As a dispersed people with a widespread network of communities, the Jews benefited greatly from the early emergence of an

{p. 7} increasingly globalized economy. From the last days of Rome until the end of the Middle Ages, Jews endured not only by trading goods but also through the acquisition of knowledge in areas such as medicine or mathematics from regions as diverse as India and Spain. Later, when the European ascendancy created a far more advanced international economy, the Jews, as a people stretched beyond national boundaries, were ideally suited to take advantage.

If the Jews represent the archetypical global tribe, easily the most consequential one to this point in history has been the British and their progeny. Originating on a small and relatively infertile island in antiquity's northwest fringe, the British and their empire molded the pattern of modern technologic development and commerce far more than any of their European rivals.

As writers such as Max Weber and R. H. Tawney have observed, this British ascendancy was propelled largely by the powerful moral and cultural influence of Calvinism. Much like the Jews, the British Calvinists - and other dissenting, but theologically distinct groups such as Quakers - were animated by a sense of specialness through the discipline of their faith. Calvinism, as both Tawney and Weber pointed out, also fostered attitudes conducive both to trade and to an interest in the acquisition of technical knowledge.

The dissenting culture, first in Britain and later in their American diaspora, helped create many of the forms of capitalist organization that still prevail throughout the world economy. Even where American or British power has all but evaporated, Anglo-American standards of business behavior and cultural forms, as well as the English language, remain preeminent.

The gradual erosion of the Anglo-American hegemony over the past few decades stems largely from the erosion of many of the core values that previously drove its ascendance. Like the late Soviet empire, the Anglo-Americans, and European capitalism in general, now suffer from the growth of corrupt and lethargic elites, a loss of competitive will, rising criminality, decay in basic values such as thrift, and the importance of hard work.

Many of these vital ethical principles and attitudes are today

{p. 8} more evident among the emerging global tribes from Asia. These ascendant ethnic groups - notably the Japanese, Chinese and Indians - have successfully exploited the commercial pathways created by the Anglo-Americans with often devastating success.

The Japanese - the most prominent of these new Asian tribes - are, like the British, an island people animated by a peculiar ethos, reflected in the extraordinary organization and industriousness that have been critical to their success in the modern world-system. Yet unlike the British or the Jews, whose dispersions were carried out essentially through permanent settlement, the Japanese diaspora, as I will argue, has been largely by design, characterized by the dispatch of temporary corporate sojourners to the various corners of the globe. Aided by new technologies of communications and transportation, the Japanese tribe has employed this unique system to challenge the centuries-old economic hegemony of the Anglo-Americans.

Yet even as the world, particularly the West, trembles at Japan's advance, the quickening pace of internationalization and technology has spawned the emergence of other, potentially even more potent tribal groups. The Chinese, the world's most populous race and possessors of one of the most venerable ethnic traditions, have in recent decades reemerged as a power on the world stage after centuries of decline.

Like the Jews or the British, the Chinese have developed a powerful global diaspora, with strong communities stretched from the Southeast Asian tropics to the great cities of North America. Today this diaspora - centered in Taipei, Hong Kong and Singapore - constitutes one of the world's wealthiest, most technically sophisticated and highly entrepreneurial groups. The Chinese already have carved out an economic empire along the edges of the Pacific Basin, the world's most vibrant region; more important, they also now increasingly direct the monumental task of building China's own enormous industrial potential.

As communism fades and linkages among the Chinese become ever closer, the diaspora's influence will likely grow more critical. Able to combine their cosmopolitan resources in North

{p. 9} America and Southeast Asia with a revived mainland, the Chinese seem the best positioned of any group to challenge the insular Japanese for preeminence in the increasingly Pacific-dominated world economy. By the early twenty-first century, the Chinese global tribe likely will rank with the British-Americans and the Japanese as a driving force in transnational commerce.

Further in the future lies the possible emergence of yet another great Asian tribe, the Indians. The Indians - meaning here not only Hindus but Muslims, Parsis and Sikhs as well - also boast a long historical memory and a well-developed cultural sense of uniqueness. Though currently burdened by deep fratricidal divisions and the desperate poverty of hundreds of millions, they have in recent decades developed their own increasingly potent global diaspora, from North America and the United Kingdom to Africa and Southeast Asia.

The Indians boast one of the world's deepest reservoirs of scientific and technical talent. If their homeland can be liberalized and reformed, they have the potential to develop into the next powerful global economic force. Viewed in the light of today's often destitute and corrupt reality, such an assertion might yet seem a product of fancy. Yet only a century ago similar doubts were cast about the potential of the Japanese and the Chinese.

The end of the Cold War opened a new era of opportunity for the cosmopolitanism embodied by these global tribes. The consequent fading of military force as the prime element in determining economic position naturally reduces the traditional power of nation-state structure that long has served as the essential counterweight to globalism. Similarly, the collapse of the socialist model makes moot much of the traditional ideological debate over rival economic systems, focusing attention instead on those cultures and attitudes most effective within the global economic system.

In this respect, the history and development of global tribes is particularly enlightening. Clearly identifiable values - such as a strong ethnic identity, a belief in self-help, hard work, thrift, education and the family - have proved universally successful

{p. 10} in all these different groups; stripped of the burdens of Cold War ideology and racism, the relationship between such values and group success is simply too self-evident to ignore.

This perspective already has produced, among other things, a critical debate among groups such as African-Americans. In contrast to the legalistic, civil rights-oriented traditions of the black establishment, African-American leaders as different in temperament and approach as Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, Louis Farrakhan and Tony Brown have emphasized the importance of developing a more self-affirming, economically and intellectually self-sufficient social culture as the primary means of overcoming racial oppression. Similarly, as the appeal of Marxism wanes in Africa, Latin America and other parts of the developing world, the focus on the development of such values has also shifted - as peoples look for clues to the success of the Japanese or the overseas Chinese rather than mimic the old Soviet model.

Yet tribalism, to be successful in the modern context, must also be leavened with a willingness to learn from and accept others or it will prove ultimately self-destructive. Each of the global tribes featured in this book retains, along with its cosmopolitan characteristics, aspects of a more hostile and primitive clannishness as well. As Japanese social theorist Hidetoshi Kato has observed: "A culture is an aggregate of divergent and contradictory pictures, and each picture is true."

Among Jews, for example, a dogged desire to repel outside influences has at times fostered narrow and exclusive perspectives within the tribe. Such attitudes, according to Max Weber, nurtured among Jews a kind of "pariah capitalism," motivated largely by resentment of others, with one set of rules for members of the tribe, another for the Gentiles. This, Weber believed, made the "traditionalistic" Jewish businessman prone to some forms of double-dealing and "speculatively oriented capitalism."

Such negative images of Jews - for example, as penny-pinching slumlords, con men and financial manipulators - have within them a certain element of historical truth, up to and including the involvement of a number of Jews in both tradi-

{p. 11} tional organized crime and some of the more monumental securities scandals of the late 1980s. Yet similar claims have been made about many other immigrant groups and some global tribes - from the Scots in early New England to the Indian owners of dilapidated apartment complexes in contemporary San Francisco - and Korean shopkeepers in numerous American cities who also developed reputations for making profits in ways that are often seen as less than "respectable."

More disturbing, with the recovery of the historic homeland in Palestine, some Jews have reverted to a racially tinged kind of tribalism. At times, the advocates of such measures as the "removal" of Arabs from the West Bank, or even pre-1967 Israel, reintroduce the most brutish aspects of the biblical conquest of Palestine under Joshua. {see samuel-saul.html} Religious fundamentalism, hostility to outsiders and racism within contemporary Israel represent the dark obverse of the cosmopolitanism characteristic of the diaspora; unchecked, they could lead not only to the continued cycle of endless war, but will impair the Jewish experience as a cosmopolitan global tribe.

The British-American tribe also faces its own moral crisis, one that may determine its long-term future. In many English-speaking countries the increased presence of outside groups - as immigrants, competitors and investors - has tapped a deep reservoir of resentment and racial loathing. The descendants of the Anglo-American heritage - particularly in such ethnically hybrid cities as New York, Los Angeles, Toronto, Sydney and London - must still overcome a deeply held assumption of racial superiority that, shaped over centuries of worldwide hegemony, simply does not fit with contemporary realities.

Such a shift in attitudes may prove critical in determining whether the British tribe and indeed the entire European-descended peoples can thrive in a world where other ethnic groups play increasingly important, even leading, roles. By learning from the experience of the Japanese as well as by drawing upon the energies of their recent immigrants, Europeans and Americans can hope to resuscitate their own lagging industrial and commercial skills. The alternative - to cower behind the confines of a white "fortress Europe" or "fortress

{p. 12} America" would simply repeat the tragic mistakes that, in the past, fostered the decline of these same Asiatic societies and their subsequent domination by Europeans.

{Kotkin implies that "Free Trade" is the only way. For a contrary view, see James Goldsmith's book The Trap: goldsmith.html}

For the Japanese, as well, the challenge of balancing a highly effective ethnic ethos with an understanding for other cultures represents a particularly daunting task. Arguably the most insular of the global tribes, the Japanese may be the least prepared one for an increasingly multiracial economic reality. In their rapid expansion over the past four decades, they have been notable in their failure to adequately accommodate others within their organizations, supply networks and industrial development strategies.

In this book, I have devoted a great deal of time to discussing this particular issue. This is not to suggest that Japanese racism is any worse inherently than that of the Jews, the British or any other ethnic group. If I were writing this book in 1950, for example, the racial attitudes of Anglo-Americans, then the world's clearly predominant force, would have commanded similar attention. A successor volume - written, say, in 2030 - might concentrate instead on the racial exclusivity of the Chinese, or even the Indians, who might then appear as the most expansionist of global tribes.

Despite such inherent problems, these cosmopolitan groups - dispersed, armed with a strong belief in themselves and the power of knowledge - will almost inevitably flourish within an increasingly denationalized and demilitarized world economy. This increased power, in most cases, will not be expressed through the traditional medium of the nation-state, but through more cosmopolitan mechanisms such as the multinational corporation or financial conglomerate; it is as globalized ethnic group that Japan, Inc., or its Anglo-American, Jewish, Chinese or Indian analogues, will find their fullest future expression.

As the global economy evolves, we soon may approach a situation in the advanced countries where, as one Tokyo executive once put it, "there will be no Japan, only Japanese." In this new cosmopolitan society, the primacy of global tribes will likely only increase, each tribe adding its own peculiar influence in each of the world's primary cities. Already - in such

{p. 13} emerging global centers as Singapore, Toronto, Los Angeles, New York and London - one can discern the outlines of a new pattern of human coexistence that reflects not an enforced sameness but the entire enormous richness and range of the numan experlence.

{p. 18} In the ensuing centuries, other largely commercial empires, perhaps most prominently the Portuguese and the Dutch, also played important economic roles, developing trade and political spheres of influence from Europe to the furthest reaches of Africa, Asia and the Americas. Yet no global tribe in history has endured longer than the Jews. Forerunner of all other global tribes, from the British to the modern Asian diasporas, the Jews developed a unique set of attitudes toward themselves and the world. In a pattern seen today most noticeably with the Japanese or the Chinese, the Jews maintained a ferocious loyalty to their own identity even as their power reached its fullest expression through dispersion. Mormon historian Spencer Palmer has observed:

{quote} A sense of insularity that the Japanese and the Jews nurtured was combined with openness to the outside world. This has made the Jews and the Japanese very conservative, but at the same time very innovative. {endquote}

Serving as middlemen, traders and arbitrageurs of information and products on a global basis, much like today's Japanese, they appeared in most of the major cities of the known world, representing, in Oswald Spengler's somewhat derogatory phrase, "a new kind of nomad cohering unstably in fluid masses, the parasitical city-dweller ... "Yet for their host countries these "nomads" became indispensable not only as traders but as transmitters and translators of knowledge among at least three major cultures - Christian, Arabic and Indian. Indeed, according to at least one medieval account, it was a Jewish scholar, sent to India by an Arabic ruler, who brought back the Indian numerical inscriptions thereafter widely known as "arabic" letters.

In Spain, first under the Moors and later under the Christian kings, Jews rose to intellectual heights perhaps unequaled in modern times. But with the expulsion of 1492, as Spanish social critic Angel Gavinet has observed, Spain emptied itself of much of its scientifically curious population. The Ottoman sultan, who received much of this gifted population, with its cadre of cartographers, swordsmiths and metallurgists, was astounded by his good fortune. "And you call this man, the King of Spain, a politically wise King, he who impoverishes his kingdom to enrich ours?" asked Bejazet II, whose descendants would use Jewish physicians extensively over the next several centuries. "I receive the Jews with open arms."

{A tale oft repeated; but Jews took over the finances of the Ottoman Empire, eventually leading to its bankruptcy. See note below}

Later these same Jews from Spain and Portugal would play critical roles in the emergence of new world cities, such as Amsterdam, London and, eventually, New York. Meanwhile the Hispanic peninsula, after a century of rapid conquests, fell into a long period of decline.

When the Jews left their ghettos and entered European society, even sympathetic observers supposed that the Jews would lose their separate identity. In the early 1830s, for instance, the poet Heinrich Heine, a German-Jewish apostate, foresaw the inevitable assimilation of Jews in France as the "witty acid" of rationalism demolished all traces of ethnic identification. Similar views were held by Karl Marx, son of a Jewish convert to Christianity, who believed that in the struggle for a socialist rational universe all such ethnic distinctions would fade away, replaced by the overarching imperatives of class.

{Yet the USSR was not free of Tribalism. Despite its Universalist image, it was set up by non-theistic Jews, for whom Universalism was their project or mission. To non-Jews, this looked like a new type of Jewish Tribalism; this was what the conflict between Trotsky and Stalin was all about. Communism in East Asia lacked this internal struggle between "Jewish" and "non-Jewish" factions: zioncom.html}

{p. 30} For Indians, their origination myths derive from the ancient stories of the Vedas, "the first Bible of the Hindus"; the legends associated with the rise of the first "Yellow Emperor" serve as the mythological basis for the unique sense of venerable and noble beglnnings of the Chinese; the Japanese concept of the "divine" origin of their land and the Yamato race underlies a particularly well developed sense of their tribal uniqueness.

Origin myths can even include those borrowed from others. In the case of the British, much of the mythology of uniqueness - including the myth of King Arthur and the Holy Grail - draws on themes derived from the Jewish Holy Land. Perhaps more important, Old Testament stories dominated the ideology and imagination of the Puritans, who, historian Barbara Tuchman observes, "were the self-chosen inheritors of Abraham's covenant with God, the re-embodied saints of Israel, the 'battle axe of the lord.'" Later on, at the height of empire, this messianic urge was expressed in poet Rudyard Kipling's concept of the "White Man's Burden," with the British divinely chosen to bring religion and civilization to the nonwhite masses.

This same sense of mission developed early as well in Britain's North American colonies. The Puritans, notably, envisioned themselves as builders of "the new Jerusalem. Today Anglo-American messianism is reflected by Mormonism, North America's fastest growing major religion. Although initially consisting overwhelmingly of English and other North Europeans the Mormons trace their origins from Hebrews who allegedly migrated to North America ot coincidentally, when they escaped their persecutors to their haven

{p. 31} near the Great Salt Lake, they named their theological center Zion, after the Jewish homeland.

For the archetypical global tribe, the Jews, the descent myth - beginning with the story of the patriarch Abraham and his progeny - has had peculiar significance. For the Jews, the Old Testament, as the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche noted, was more than a religious text; it was a national epic. Nietzsche, who despite his later usurpation by the Nazis despised anti-Semitism, saw the Jews' adherence to their biblical legacy not as religious piety but as a demonstration of "the toughest life-will that has ever existed in any people on earth."

{Nietzsche on Judaism: nietzsche.html}

The force of this "life-will" became noticeable early in the history of the dispersion. In the period after the conquests of Alexander, as the cultures of other peoples faded before the brilliance of Hellenistic civilization, the Jews, even those speaking the language and enjoying the culture of the Greeks, remained, in the phrase of classical historian Michael Grant, "not only unassimilated, but unassimilable."

Even then, the links between scattered Jewish communities remained remarkably strong. The Israel restored by the Maccabees - much like the modern state founded in 1947 - depended heavily upon aid from more affluent Jews from the diaspora, then largely concentrated in Alexandria and Babylon. The ties forged by this "vocation of uniqueness" may help to explain why the Jews, virtually alone amongst the peoples conquered by Rome, continued to struggle against their imperial masters for over two centuries after the initial conquest, including some Jews living in the diaspora communities.

And even after the loss of their homeland to the Romans, the scattered Jewish communities retained their unique identity, to the wonderment and frequently the annoyance of other peoples. Mass conversions, often at the threat of death, reduced their numbers to a pitiable fraction of their former population, yet the surviving remnants kept their covenant with their ancient religious traditions as well as their sense of obligation to other Jews.

With the homeland lost, preservation of "the vocation of

{p. 32} uniqueness" quickly became a struggle, particularly in the increasingly intolerant environment of early Christian Europe. To preserve the economic self-sufficiency of Jewish families, the holding of slaves was denounced as onerous. The preference, wherever possible, was for hiring other members of the tribe as free laborers. "He who increases the number of his slaves increases sin and iniquity in the world," wrote the Spanish sage Maimonides, "whereas the man who employs poor Jews in his household increases merits and religious deeds." This sensibility of self-help helped the medieval and early modern European Jewish communities survive such natural di sasters as the Black Death; a combination of ritual sanitary injunctions and the practice of providing professional medical care to the impoverished sick, known as Bikur Holim ("visiting the sick"), helped quarantine the tiny communities across Europe from devastation.

But perhaps the most remarkable feature of this self-help was that it extended beyond local communities. In 1627, when Dutch Jews learned through the Venice ghetto about the depredations on the small community in Jerusalem, they arranged payment to the local Turkish despot to mitigate "the great calamity and misery" of their distant brethren. Similar efforts were made by Italian and Dutch Jews on behalf of Jewish captives in the central European cities of Prague, Budapest and Belgrade.

When Jews began to achieve a greater measure of economic power, the were not loath to use it for the protection of even the most distant branches of the tribe. In 1904 and 1905, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, the New York investment bank of Kuhn, Loeb, led by its German-born president, Jacob H. Schiff, extended a critical series of loans to Japan as a means of taking revenge for the anti-Semitic outrages of the Tsarist regime.

As Jews began their first mass migrations from Russia, the tradition of self-help brought critical assistance to newcomers from the already established communities, particularly in Britain, France, Cermany and the United States. In 1914, there were over 514 different Jewish benevolent societies in the United

{p. 33} States alone, providing everything from insurance and burial plots to summer camps for children.

And when Alain de Rothschild, descendant of the great French Baron James de Rothschild, died in 1982, the shopkeepers of the poorest Jewish district in Paris - largely immigrants from North Africa who had benefited from his philanthropy - closed their doors for an hour in mourning. Leon Masliah, director of the Consistoire General of the French Jewish communities, who himself emigrated from Tunisia in 1961, recalls:

{quote} When we came, we had help with money, with housing, with the synagogue. We had a whole administration dedicated to our people. When a Jew comes to France, he knows where to go, where to worship. I am a North African - I know what fraternite really means. It means people waiting for you at the airport. {endquote}

Perhaps more important, newly arriving Jews, whether in France or America, developed their communities by building their own, largely self-contained economy. Following Maimonides's advice, Jews tended to hire as well as buy from their own community. In early-twentieth-century New York, notes author Irving Howe, Jews went to their own doctors, butchers, dry goods dealers, shoe stores, coalmen and grocers; both their apartments and their places of employment were owned largely by fellow Jews.

But perhaps nothing reflects the remarkable bonding of the Jewish tribe more than the establishment and successful maintenance of the state of Israel. The revived Jewish state was conceived, financed and led from the diaspora. Virtually all the great names of Jewish business - Rothschild, Kadoorie and Warburg, among others - contributed to the building of the state.

{What of the taxes levied from non-Jews, via US "foreign aid"?}

During crises, the diaspora's support for Israel has often taken dramatic forms. In the initial struggle for the establishment of the state, French Jews, with the tacit support of their government, helped provide training facilities for thousands of young Jewish military recruits streaming in from Europe, Canada and the United States. In 1967, at the onset of the Six-Day

{p. 34} War, over ten thousand American Jews volunteered for service in Israel.

{p. 42} The critical Jewish role in the early growth of the New World capitalism has led some people, such as the German writer Werner Sombart, to identify the Jews as prime architects and initiators. {sombart.html} Perhaps more reasonably, the Jews' dispersion and relative lack of national roots helped them to identify and exploit more quickly the most lucrative emerging markets.

Jewish merchants were operating in Venice, destined to become the first great epicenter of Europe's economic revival, long before it emerged into prominence in the thirteenth century. They played critical roles in the expansion of Spain and Portugal, where Hispanic Jews, known as sephardim, numbered roughly 200,000. Even after the Inquisition, Jews as both marranos and as sincere new Christians emerged as prominent investors and participants in the opening of what Europe saw as "the New World." Some participated directly as sailors while others drew maps for the earliest voyages of exploration.

Later, as repression in Spain grew and economic power shifted to the north, Jewish merchants and financiers drifted first toward Amsterdam, later to London and finally toward New York. As the great French historian Fernand Braudel explained:

{quote} The Jews, being experienced businessmen, naturally gravitated towards prosperous economies. Their arrival in a country generally meant that business was good there or improving. If they withdrew, it did not always mean business was bad, but it was probably not so good. {endquote}

{More of Braudel on this theme: braudel.html}

Jewish advantages were particularly telling where they could exploit the frontiers of trade - whether on the Brazilian frontier or in Muslim nations off-limits to most Christian traders. The "secret" of the Jews was not simply greater mobility but an essential opportunism born of the cosmopolitan spirit. Faced with frequent threats to their trades by the majority popula-

{p. 43} tions, Jews, as Poliakov points out, "took refuge in the dynamic security of acquiescence in change."

Jews often found themselves excluded or overwhelmed by the stronger resources of the Gentiles. Unable to compete in the higher circles of industrial capitalism, they fixed their attention on many of the emerging niches of the developing world economy, for which they are now best known, such as diamonds, communications, fashion, retailing, entertainment and the professions.

These occupational choices also conformed to a cultural preference for self-employment. As the old rabbinic watchword had it: "Skin a carcass on the streets, rather than be dependent on other people." Simply put, Jews usually could not look toward the state, or the wider society, for a "security blanket." Jobs on the land, in the government bureaucracy, or in state-sponsored institutions were frequently off-limits.

For them, the path of self-help and the private sector became the only reasonable alternatives. Throughout late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century Europe, Jews emerged as prominent entrepreneurs and innovators. In the German empire in 1913, for example, they represented roughly one quarter of all directors of public companies, while constituting barely 1 percent of the total population. Perhaps even more remarkable was the overall rate of self-employment among German Jews, which by the early 1930s stood at a remarkable 46 percent, more than three times the national average. Jews were particularly active in the Berlin Stock Exchange, where they accounted for as many as four fifths of leading members.

{Benjamain Ginsberg on this theme: ginsberg.html}

A similar situation existed in other European countries. By the late 1930s Hungarian Jews, roughly 5 percent of the population, owned over 36 percent of the retail stores, warehouses and offices. Without the Jewish presence, complained Hungary's Fascist and thoroughly anti-Semitic regent, Admiral Miklos Horthy, the country's banks, communication infrastructure and commercial establishment would become "bankrupt" virtually overnight.

Jews also used their legendary savvy and cosmopolitan connections in less respectable ways. From Arnold Rothstein and Meyer Lansky to their modern-day successors in the Americas,

{p. 44} Israel or the former Soviet Union, Jewish criminals have succeeded in everything from murder-for-hire to smuggling and the founding of Las Vegas.

{p. 64} Like other Jewish sojourners, the Israelis come to the United States mainly for economic opportunity, often for a chance to participate more fully in those activities - from filmmaking and finance to garment manufacturing - that have been mainstays of the Jewish economy for generations. Yet, in contrast to the Russians, most will likely not settle permanently in America. By 1990, only one third of the estimated Israeli residents have applied for immigrant status. "For most kibbutzniks - though not a few decide to stay on - Los Angeles is like a gas station," comments one, Danny iskind, a thirty-year-old Israeli immigrant. "We come here, en route to extended visits to the Far East, to fill up."

This movement parallels the increasing mobility of the global tribes generally, most particularly those with high levels of education, skill in highly globalized industries or capital resources. Like thousands of their Irish, British, Indian, Chinese, Palestinian or other counterparts, the "wandering Israelis" of today, for example, have achieved positions within the more elite ranks of technical and other professional workers. Engineers alone account for nearly 20 percent of the total, with an estimated 13,000 laboring as scientists, engineers and other professionals

{p. 65} in California's high-technology industries alone, a population roughly one third the size of Israel's native-born technical work force.

These new Jewish wanderers also include a disproportionate number of former government officials, garment manufacturers and film production artists, as well as several thousand similarly skilled and highly educated recent Russian emigres to Israel. Itzhak Kol, a recent immigrant to Los Angeles and as former president of three of Israel's leading studios a two-time Academy Award nominee, explains:

{quote} The secret truth is you meet Israelis wherever you go - in New York, Thailand, Europe. You sometimes wonder how many of the old guys are left in Israel. When my mother made a cake, you need the right amount of yeast. If it's the right amount, the cake is good. But in Israel there's too much yeast. When Jews are a minority they are great - producers, directors, writers, successful people. When there are too many in a small place, its ruined, a little bit like Israel. {endquote}

The continuing appeal of the diaspora, most notably to Israelis themselves, reveals the bankruptcy of some of the most fundamental portions of traditional Zionist dogma. Once the state was formed, many Zionists assumed that Jews in the diaspora would sooner or later either migrate to Israel or accept absorption into their adoptive countries. To Golda Meir, the children of dispersion constituted objects of "pity," not equal beings to the vital young Israelis "growing up in the desert." Along similar lines, French sociologist Georges Friedmann predicted in his 1962 book End of the Jewish People? that the very existence of Israel had destroyed the essential "Jewish personality," which he defined as the product of anti-Semitism and faith built around the Law. "The 'Jewish people,'" he predicted, "is disappearing and giving way to the Israeli nation."

Yet, the continuing out-migration of Israelis as well as the enormous costs created by absorbing recently arrived Russian and Ethiopian refugees suggests that Israel will unlikely be able to reduce its longstanding dependence on the diaspora. This

{p. 66} reflects, to some extent, the fears of the early Jewish pioneers in Palestine, including those left-wing Zionists who as early as the 1930s feared their embryonic Jewish state would become little more than a "colony" of "the rich Jews of America and Europe." Fearful of such a result, many Zionist pioneers sought to create, in the words of A. D. Gordon, one of their leading ideologists, "a new re-created Jewish people, not a mass colony of diaspora Jewry, not the continuation of diaspora Jewish life in a new form.

In the process the "old Jew" trading, whether in rags, pounds sterling, diamonds or fantasies - would disappear. The new "re-created Jews" would gravitate instead toward "natural" work, most notably farming. To many mainstream Zionists this also meant that instead of embracing capitalism, which first had liberated Jews from their medieval bondage, Israel should devote itself to the ideals of mamlachtiut, or statism, an approach that even today leaves two fifths of the industrial economy controlled by either the state or the national labor co-operative, Histadrut. In the place of entrepreneurs, the economy became dominated by an overarching bureaucratic state that Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling has described as "a paternalistic body deciding what was good for the citizens and the collectivity as a whole."

{More on this theme: nat-soc-isr.html}

Ironically, the pursuit of socialism - and later the Likud's ultranationalistic and ultraorthodox religious policies - created an Israel ever more economically dependent on the diaspora and its power abroad. By 1991 Israel had emerged as the single largest recipient of charity, grants and assistance per capita in the world, the bulk of it from America. {US foreign aid, directed to Israel instead of poor countries}

{p. 89} The unsurpassed industrial power of Britain and the vastness of the empire made London - as early as 1700 the largest city in the world - the natural center for the development of a global finance and commercial empire far larger, and arguably more powerful, than the one run from Whitehall. As Nathan Rothschild observed in 1832:

{quote} The whole world ... all transactions in India, in China, in Germany, in Russia, and in the whole world, are all guided here and settled through this country. {endquote}

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Britain's industrial machine dominated on a global basis, accounting for

{p. 90} one third of all the world's commerce. Control over access to new technology - most particularly steamships, trains and telegraphs - gave the British almost insurmountable advantages over competitors, most notably in Asia. And therefore the British, and later the Americans, forged the rules by which men traveled, communicated, financed and managed their enterprises across the globe.

When Britain did not itself manufacture or export, it frequently served as intermediary, insurer and financier. By the eve of the First World War, Britain held two fifths of the world's international debt, owned roughly half the world's cargo tonnage and controlled more than 60 percent of all the trade passing through the Suez Canal. As British economist Lilian Knowles noted in 1921: "... the United Kingdom was organized for world trade when other countries were only developing national unity."

{Why the British Empire promoted Free Trade: cobden.html]

As the unchallenged financial hegemons, the British naturally set the standards of the world monetary regime, with a solid sterling, backed by the Bank of England. The "Old Lady of Threadneedle Street" not only set the rules for London but for much of the world. After the First World War, this role was shared in tandem with the Federal Reserve system, particularly its New York-based bank. At the end of the Second World War, the Americans asserted the decisive world leadership until the emergence of the more collaborative "G-7" mechanism in the 1980s.

{end of quotes from Kotkin}

The Ottoman Empire welcomed Jews expelled Jews from Spain, but they ended up taking over the Empire's finances. Benjamin Ginsberg wrote in The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State:

"After the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, the Ottomans accepted thousands of refugees because they valued the financial, administrative, and manufacturing skills that the Jews brought with them. ... Jews were particularly useful to the Ottomans because they lacked ties to any of the subject populations of the multiethnic empire and, thus, could be entrusted with unpopular tasks such as tax collection. Jews dominated the imperial revenue system, serving as tax collectors, tax farmers, tax intendants, and tax inspectors. Jews also created and operated the imperial customs service. Indeed, so complete was Jewish control over this segment of the Ottoman state that Ottoman customs receipts were typically written in Hebrew. ..." (p. 15).

"In the latter days of the empire, when provincial governorships became hereditary or quasi-independent, local Jewish financiers continued in this capacity." (p. 16). More at ginsberg.html.

and J. L. Talmon wrote in Israel Among the Nations:

"Turkey had a cord around her neck in the form of her international debt. Her main sources of revenue were not merely pawned, but actually supervised and run by representatives of foreign creditors, backed by their respective powerful governments. The expression, 'the Public Debt of Turkey', was never absent from the newspaper columns of the day and constituted an international issue for many decades. In a sense, Turkey could call nothing her own." (p. 118).

" ... state bankruptcy invited European loans, and of course interference. ... The idea of the Jews' offer to redeem Turkey's international debt in exchange for a concession of Palestine, under some form of Turkish suzerainty - provided the money could be raised - was not at all fantastic" (p. 119). More at talmon.html.

Where Joel Kotkin see Tribes, Samuel Huntington sees Civilizations: "Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a grand scale." (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, p. 207). (huntington.html)

The dusk-jacket displays three civilizational symbols: the Christian cross, the Islamic star-& crescent, and the Taoist yin-yang symbol as featured on the South Korean flag. These three symbols are present on both the front and rear covers of the dust-jacket.

In the footnote on p. 48, Huntington assesses Judaism as a civilization, too.

"* What about Jewish civilization? Most scholars of civilization hardly mention it ... With the creation of Israel, Jews have all the objective accoutrements of a civilization: religion, language, customs, literature, institutions, and a territorial and political home."

then he continues in that footnote (on the same page):

"But what about subjective identification? Jews living in other cultures have distributed themselves along a continuum stretching from total identification with Judaism and Israel to minimal Judaism and full identification with the civilization within which they reside, the latter, however, occurring primarily among Jews living in the West."

Given Benjamin Ginsberg's evidence that the United States is dominated by its Jewish minority (ginsberg.html), one must ask whether that can be reconciled with "full identification with the civilization within which they reside".

The more so, in the light of Ben-Ami Shillony's admittance that

"It is significant that Americans of Japanese ancestry call themselves Japanese-Americans, whereas the Jews living in America refer to themselves as American Jews." (The Jews and the Japanese: the Successful Outsiders, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Rutland, Vermont, 1991. p. 87). (japan.html)

Professor Shillony bills himself as "a Jew, an Israeli" (p. 10).

Ginsberg, too, uses the expression "American Jews" throughout; try searching his writing for "Jewish Americans".

Yet Huntington, so oblivious to this domination at the top level, lashes out at Islam, which, being in the way of an expanding Israel, is less blind. The upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism began in the 1920s, and was directly a result of the West's "contract with Jewry" to create the state of Israel. Lord Northcliffe, proprietor of The Times of London, wrote about it in his diary in 1922.

Lord Northcliffe returned in February 1922 from a world trip. He had kept a diary, which was published in 1923 as My Journey Round the World (ed. Cecil & St. John Harmsworth, London, John Lane The Bodley Head Ltd); he recorded in that book:

"{p. 275} There will be trouble in Palestine. ... {p. 276} ... I see trouble, much trouble between 70,000 Jews and 700,000 Canaanites and Christians. ... {p. 277} People daren't tell the Jews the truth here. They've had some from me. I didn't come uninvited. The size of our Army here is not known to people at home. Why is the Army necessary? Because of the Moslem-Christian versus Jew feeling." toolkit3.html.

Huntington criticises the idea that a "Universal Civilization" is emerging, and argues that Western Civilization is unique, not universal (The West: Unique, Not Universal, in Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996). Huntington is following in the footsteps of the theoreticians of the British Empire.

Whereas Cecil Rhodes brashly defined the Empire in terms of English superiority (rhodes-will.html), more subtle leaders such as Arnold Toynbee recast it as the defender and promoter of Freedom: quigley.html.

Lionel Curtis, Huntington's intellectual ancestor, proclaimed that the Empire had a duty to rule peoples who were incapable of ruling themselves:

"Whilst enlarging its bounds in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific so as to include hundreds of millions who must for centuries remain incapable of assuming the burden of government" (The Commonwealth of Nations, MacMillian, London, 1916, p. 700) curtis1.html.

Yet in a more candid moment he proclaimed that Australia's Aboriginees, "were too primitive to offer any serious resistance to colonisation ... They retired in rapidly dwindling numbers into the arid and tropical interiors where Europeans were unable to settle" (Civitas Dei: The Commonwealth of God, MacMillian, London, 1938, p. 533) curtis2.html.

Does this not look like European Tribalism (Aryanism), in the guise of promoting Civilization? More on Aryanism at transciv.html.

Has Cecil Rhodes' secret society, set up for promoting the Empire, been hijacked by Zionists? l-george.html.

Should Nation-States protect their people from the Higher types of Tribalism? If the Nation-State can't or won't do this, who can?

To buy Joel Kotkin's book Tribes second-hand:

Write to me at contact.html.