The Death of Stalin: a Coup d'Etat

- Peter Myers

Date March 26, 2002; update March 17, 2024.

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On March 5, 1953, the Soviet media announced the death of Stalin.

There is overwhelming evidence that he was murdered. He died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced.

Stalin's opponents were in two factions: a "Zionist one" (Beria, Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov), who had been involved with the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and its plan to make Crimea an autonomous Jewish republic, and a "Russian" one (Khrushchev and probably Lazar Kaganovich), who did not have involvement. Stuart Kahan says Kaganovich participated: kaganovich.html.

Beria seized power, but was overthrown a few months later by Khrushchev with the help of Malenkov; they had managed to win the other leaders over.

The fall of Beria was announced on 10 July, 1953: beria.html.

Voroshilov and Molotov were in the Jewish faction. In Special Tasks, Pavel Sudoplatov, whose own wife was Jewish, says that their wives were Jewish too, p. 288 footnote 4: sudoplat.html.

On Beria's belonging to the Jewish faction, see Sudoplatov, pp. 287-8, 296, 298, 306. On Kaganovich being Jewish, see Sudoplatov, p. 300.

Mikoyan was also in the Jewish faction; he had been involved in the plan for a Jewish republic in the Crimea: Sudoplatov, p. 288 n4.

Khrushchev himself had a Jewish son-in-law; he criticised Stalin's 'anti-semitism', but was mindful of popular resentment at the Jewish role administering Stalin's terror.

Stalin himself had a Jewish wife, Rosa Kaganovich (see wives-of-stalin.html); so Jewish ethnicity was not the operative factor, but rather Zionist politics.

Stalin died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced. The successor Government, run by Beria, denounced the Doctors' Plot as bogus.

On the successor-governments following the death of Stalin, see Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich UTOPIA IN POWER: the History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, translated by Phyllis B. Carlos (Hutchinson, London, 1985): beria.html.

Stalin killed, directly and indirectly, millions of people; there is no question of making him a hero. But the murder of such a powerful man, and its cover-up, raise even more questions about who was controlling Communism.

(00) Email from Dr Miguel A. Faria on the Death of Stalin
(0) New Study Supports Idea Stalin Was Poisoned­NYT
(1) Stalin died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced
(2) Georges Bortoli, The Death of Stalin
(3) The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR'
(4) Ludo Martens' online book Another view of Stalin
(5) Beria vs. Stalin
(6) Stalin's Body Removed From Lenin's Tomb
(7) Nikita Khruschev on Stalin's "Anti-Semitism"
(8) Stalin was poisoned on the feast of Purim, 1953

(00) Email on the Death of Stalin from Dr Miguel A. Faria, retired Clinical Professor of Surgery

This email is at Stalin-death-Faria.html.

(0) New Study Supports Idea Stalin Was Poisoned­NYT

New Study Supports Idea Stalin Was Poisoned

By Michael Wines

March 5, 2003

Fifty years after Stalin died, felled by a brain hemorrhage at his dacha, an exhaustive study of long-secret Soviet records lends new weight to an old theory that he was actually poisoned, perhaps to avert a looming war with the United States.

That war may well have been closer than anyone outside the Kremlin suspected at the time, say the authors of a new book based on the records.

The 402-page book, "Stalin's Last Crime," will be published later this month. Relying on a previously secret account by doctors of Stalin's final days, its authors suggest that he may have been poisoned with warfarin, a tasteless and colorless blood thinner also used as a rat killer, during a final dinner with four members of his Politburo.

They base that theory in part on early drafts of the report, which show that Stalin suffered extensive stomach hemorrhaging during his death throes. The authors state that significant references to stomach bleeding were excised from the 20-page official medical record, which was not issued until June 1953, more than three months after his death on March 5 that year.

Four Politburo members were at that dinner: Lavrenti P. Beria, then chief of the secret police; Georgi M. Malenkov, Stalin's immediate successor; Nikita S. Khrushchev, who eventually rose to the top spot; and Nikolai Bulganin.

The authors, Vladimir P. Naumov, a Russian historian, and Jonathan Brent, a Yale University Soviet scholar, suggest that the most likely suspect, if Stalin was poisoned, is Beria, for 15 years his despised minister of internal security.

Beria supposedly boasted of killing Stalin on May Day, two months after his death. "I did him in! I saved all of you," he was quoted as telling Vyacheslav M. Molotov, another Politburo member, in Khrushchev's 1970 memoirs, "Khrushchev Remembers." ...

Russian officials granted them access to some documents for their latest work, which primarily traces the fabulous course of the Doctors' Plot, a supposed collusion in the late 1940's by Kremlin doctors to kill top Communist leaders.

The collusion was in fact a fabrication by Kremlin officials, acting largely on Stalin's orders. By the time Stalin disclosed the plot to a stunned Soviet populace in January 1953, he had spun it into a vast conspiracy, led by Jews under the United States' secret direction, to kill him and destroy the Soviet Union itself.

That February, the Kremlin ordered the construction of four giant prison camps in Kazakhstan, SiBeria and the Arctic north, apparently in preparation for a second great terror -- this time directed at the millions of Soviet citizens of Jewish descent.

But the terror never unfolded. On March 1, 1953, two weeks after the camps were ordered built and two weeks before the accused doctors were to go on trial, Stalin collapsed at Blizhnaya, a north Moscow dacha, after the all-night dinner with his four Politburo comrades.

After four days, Stalin died, at age 73. Death was laid to a hemorrhage on the left side of his brain.

Less than a month later, the doctors previously accused of trying to kill him were abruptly exonerated and the case against them was deemed an invention of the secret police. No Jews were deported east. By year's end, Beria faced a firing squad, and Khrushchev had tempered Soviet hostility toward the United States. In their book, Mr. Naumov and Mr. Brent cite wildly varying accounts of Stalin's last hours as evidence that -- at the least -- Stalin's Politburo colleagues denied him medical help in the first hours of his illness, when it might have been effective.

Khrushchev and others recalled long after Stalin's death that they had dined with him until the early hours of March 1. His and most other reports state that Stalin was later found sprawled unconscious on the floor, a copy of Pravda nearby.

Yet no doctors were summoned to the dacha until the morning of March 2. Why remains a mystery: one guard later said that Beria had called shortly after Stalin was found, ordering them to say nothing about his illness. Khrushchev wrote that Stalin had been drunk at the dinner and that his dinner companions, told of his illness, presumed that he had fallen out of bed -- until it became clear things were more serious.

More telling, however, is the official medical account of Stalin's death, given to the Communist Party Central Committee in June 1953 and buried in files for almost the next 50 years until unearthed by Mr. Naumov and Mr. Brent. It maintained that Stalin had become ill in the early hours of March 2, a full day after he actually suffered a stroke.

The effect of the altered official report is to imply that doctors were summoned quickly after Stalin was found, rather than after a delay.

The authors state that a cerebral hemorrhage is still the most straightforward explanation for Stalin's death, and that poisoning remains for now a matter of speculation. But Western physicians who examined the Soviet doctors' official account of Stalin's last days said similar physical effects could have been produced by a 5-to-10-day dose of warfarin, which had been patented in 1950 and was being aggressively marketed worldwide at the time.

(1) Stalin died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced

From The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR' (p. vi, below):

January 13th 1953: The 'Doctors' Plot' Exposed - nine Kremlin physicians arrested.
March 4th: Moscow radio announces Stalin's illness.
March 5th: The death of Stalin announced.
March 6th: Beria's tanks surround Moscow.
March 9th: Stalin's funeral.
April 3rd: Kremlin doctors freed.

January 13, 1953: Tass announced the discovery of a terrorist group of poisoning doctors. (Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 539) radzinsk.html

February 8, 1953: Pravda published the names of Jewish saboteurs etc. ( Radzinsky p. 542)

February 11, 1953: the USSR severed diplomatic relations with Israel (Yosef Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations 1953-1967, pp. 3-4). moscow-vs-jerusalem.html

End of February, 1953: rumors went around Moscow that the Jews were to be deported to Siberia (Radzinsky, p. 542), with March 5 rumoured to be the date when this would happen (p. 546}. Radzinsky claims that Stalin was inviting war with America, the home of Zionism and world finance, over this issue, because America was dominated by Zionist financiers (p. 543).

March 5, 1953: Stalin declared dead.

(2) Georges Bortoli, The Death of Stalin, tr. Raymond Rosenthal, Praegar Publishers, New York 1975.

{p. 175} On March 9, Soviet newsreel cameramen filmed the funeral in all of its details. The results of their labors would never be seen. All of the cameramen's work was consigned to the film arehives, where it remains to this day, unavai]able for foreign or domestic consumption. For, before the film of the funeral was ready, the wind had changed and it was already time to forget Stalin.

F.L., a literary critic, received an urgent commission from a Moscow magazine to write an essay on Stalin's place in Soviet literature. The entire April issue of the magazine would be devoted to the deceased leader. About two weeks after the assignment, the cditor-inchief telephoned: "No point in continuing. You will be paid for the essay, of course. But the table of contents for April has been changed."

Pravda remained Stalinist-tinged for about thirteen days: From the mourning issue of March 10, which was devoted entirely to the funeral ceremonies, to March 22 inclusive. During this time, Stalin continued to be quoted in many articles. Poems inspired by him still appeared, and his name was still accompanied by glowing superlatives. One also found the themes that had filled the paper before his death: "doctor-assassins" "hidden enemies of our people," "henchmen of the Zionist Jews," as well as the usual appeals for spying on

{p. 176} one's neighbors and the usual denunciations of "slackness and naivete."

With spring, everything changed. The great man's name appeared only two or three times in each issue of the newspaper; sometimes it was completely absent.

On April 7, the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ceased to be "Stalinist Constitution," and became, quite simply, the "Soviet Constitution." On the same day, Yekaterina Furtseva, quoting Stalin's last work, already failed to qualify it as "inspired."

On and after March 23, the word "vigilance" seemed to have been forgotten as all the commentators began discussing the "prosperity of the people." The plots of land given to the workers to grow potatoes became a subject of great concern to the organ of the Central Committee.

At the same time, the articles against Jews ceased. The last big anti-Semitic feature article - one of the most violent published - appeared in the March 20 issue of Krokodil. Vasily Ardamatsky, the author of this ill-timed article, would have the unpleasant experience of being shunned by his colleagues and of hearing himself nicknamed Vasya Timashuk, after the woman doctor who had denounced and caused the arrest of the "men in white."

Tears had not yet been dried, but the process of de-Stalinization got under way enthusiastically, and, in the leading circles, one could almost hear an enormous but discreet sigh of relief.

For the old guard, it was a matter of preserving the advantages of succession while elirninating its dangers - of maintaining power but diminishing tensions. After thirty-five years of existence, the Party could flatter itself that it bore, in the eyes of Soviet citizens, the mysterious seal of legitimacy. But now the leaders were going to disassociate the Party from Stalin, even though the habit of identifying it with him had become deeply rooted.°

° A convincing example of this can be found by comparing two writings of Mikhail Sholokhov published in Pravda at an interval of less than five months. The first was the great funeral chant which appeared on March 8, after Stalin's burial:
Farewell, father! Farewell, dear father, whom we shall love until our last breath. You will always be with us and with those who are born after us. We hear your voice in the rhythmic rumble of the turbines of the gigantic hydro-electric power plants, and in the crash of the waves of the seas created by your will, and in the cadenced step of the invincible Soviet infantry and in the soft soughing of foliage on the well-timbered plains which stretch to infinity.

The second text, which appeared on July 30, was entitled: "Live eternally our dear Party." In this article, Sholokhov did not mention Stalin's name even once.

{p. 177} The transition would be difficult. On March 14, Malenkov, who appeared to be the chief heir on March 6, abandoned part of his heritage. Keeping only the presidency of the government, he left the secretariat, and the small wave of adulation which he had enjoyed during those eight days vanished. A month later, a new formula rose on the political horizon: "Collective leadership, supreme principle of the leadership of our Party."

Officially, the collectivity had three heads. Malenkov was actually surrounded by Beria and Molotov, who, besides their titles of first vice-president of the Council, had received, respectively, portfolios as the heads of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Behind them were other illustrious figures: Bulganin, Kaganovich, and Mikoyan. The West, which was not very sensitive to obscure maneuvers inside the Party, continued to pay little attention to Nikita Khrushchev. Yet it was he who became First Secretary of the Central Committee when Malenkov was "relieved" of his post. Quietly, without a fuss, he began to gather into his hands the real reins of power.

Malenkov, meanwhile, was doing what he could to occupy the front of the stage, to be, if not the boss, at least a bossling. He decided to display his managerial skills. He decided to raise the Soviet standard of living.

The reduction in prices which he had decreed on April 1 was far greater than the reductions announced, ritually, each year under Stalin. To cope with this mass of liberated money, the government feverishly imported consumer goods; it even went so far as to buy 30,000 tons of butter in Denmark, Holland, Australia, and New Zealand. Yet it goes without saying that most of the imports came from the satellite countries, where the U.S.S.R. could have certain quantities of products set aside in advance and could buy at super-preferential prices. The workers of East Berlin, whose production "norms" were greatly increased, would make it clear, with paving stones and Molotov cocktails, that they were not quite ready to foot the bill for raising Soviet citizens' standard of living.

{p. 186} Professors M. G. Kogall and Etinger figured among the people who had been mistakenly arrested, but they could not be found among those who had been freed.

"Well," said the lieutenant. "Those two went into prison but they did not come out."

With their congenital feeling for the implied unstated, Soviet readers understood what the communique had failed to explain: The "inadmissible methods of investigation" utilized "by the workers in the investigative service" - those horrible workers - had transformed two of the accused into corpses.

Right below the communique, Pravda had run a big article on fruit trees. Looking carefully, a little lower down, attentive readers discovered a very short paragraph announcing that the Supreme Soviet had annulled the decree which conferred the Order of Lenin on Dr. Lidia Timashuk, the woman who had denounced the "assassins in white coats."

The Israeli delegation to the United Nations immediately made it known that it would bring the problem of anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. before the international organization. The entire Soviet press had begun to condemn "all propaganda for racial or national discrimination." It rehabilitated, posthumously but with special and warm emphasis, the actor Solomon Mikhoels, "this honest citizen, this great artist of the people of the U.S.S.R." The same person who, just two months before, had been labeled a paid agent of American Zionists.

In the world at large, those who for the last twenty years had denounced the Moscow trials as faked, the confessions extorted, now triumphed. But Communist militants, as a group, did not even flinch. For them, crimes unmasked in the inner circles of the Soviet police were mere accidents. "We belong to an army - and to an encircled army," said an old member of the French Communist Party. "When some lance corporal gets the clap, an entire army should not feel dishonored."

Yet Beria, with his blunt communique, had put a crack - still almost invisible - in the principle of infallibility.

Stripped of the Order of Lenin but still on the job, Dr. Timashuk pursued an inglorious career as X-ray technician at the Kremlin Hospital, where she met again the colleagues she had had arrested - at least those who had survived. But not everyone was treated with the same gentleness as she. Ryumin, the former Deputy Minister of State

{p. 187} Security, who had personally directed the investigation of the "men in white," was arrested together with a number of his colleagues. This little man with the look of a pink cherub was actually a frightful torturer. Moreover, it was convenient to make him rather than the former Minister Ignatyev shoulder the heaviest responsibility for the affair. Ignatyev was loyal to Khrushchev, and Khrushchev defended him tooth and nail. So, for the moment, he was only criticized for "political blindness and credulity." He did not follow his ex-subordinate to jail, but he lost his new and prestigious position of Secretary of the Central Committee, to which Khrushchev had just assigned him.

Behind the pompous words, the new scandal fouled up the settlement of accounts. For three months, Ignatyev had given Beria's men in the heart of the security organization some bad moments. Now it was his turn. Furthermore, what most struck the political class about the news of the freeing of the doctors was the signature: "Communique of the Ministry of the Interior." In other words, Beria. This sounded like a challenge to the completely new practices of the collective leadership. By mounting all alone this operation from which he gained a certain popularity, the Georgian showed that he could outmaneuver his colleagues. Would he try to get rid of them tomorrow?

To denounce the torturers of yesterday, one had to borrow phrases from their dreadful vocabulary: "Spies and diversionists, bearers of bourgeois ideology, degenerates.... Against these true enemies, open and recognized, of the people, these enemies of the Sovict State it is always necessary to keep our powder dry." Again, the style of the purges. Who would be the "enemies of the people" tomorrow?

(3) The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR', pub. Allen Wingate, London 1958.

{p. vii} THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS is the subject of our investigation:-

January 13th 1953 The 'Doctors' Plot' Exposed - nine Kremlin physicians arrested.

March 4th " Moscow radio announces Stalin's illness.

March 5th " The death of Stalin.
March 6th " Beria's tanks surround Moscow.
March 9th " Stalin's funeral.
March 20th " Malenkov released from his duties as Secretary General of the Communist Party.
April 3rd " Kremlin doctors freed.
July 10th " Beria dismissed from the Communist Party.

September 12th " Khrushchev elected First Secretary of the Communist Party.

December 23rd " Beria tried, found guilty and shot.
February 8th 1955 Malenkov released from his duties as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.
February 24th 1956 Khrushchev's 'Secret' Speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party.

February 29th " Khrushchev appointed Chairman of the newly created Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for the affairs of the Russian Federal Republic.

June 2nd 1957 Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich disgraced.
August 16th 1958 Bulganin exiled from Moscow.

{p. viii} It is a paradox that while the details of his final illness were broadcast to the whole world, the atmosphere of mystery shrouding the circumstances of the death of Stalin has never been dispersed.

A number of people, satisfied with the information given, accept the fact that Stalin died of cerebral haemorrhage. Many, suspecting that his end was altogether too opportune, speak of it as a miracle that saved Russia from a new reign of terror. Some are of the opinion that the 'course of nature was assisted'. Others, dismissing his illness as fictitious, believe that Stalin was murdered.

The purpose of our investigation is to discover from the evidence available whether or not Stalin died a natural death.

{p. 1} Chapter I THE SETTING

ON JANUARY 13TH, 1953, the TASS News Agency reported the 'arrest of a terrorist group of physicians, uncovered by the State Security Organs of the USSR'.

Why physicians? And Kremlin physicians at that? Was it possible that Stalin, once again, suspected that he was being poisoned? And was he? Let us investigate these questions.

Amongst those arrested were Doctor G. 1. Mayorov, and the Profecssors M. S. Vovsi, V. N. Vinogradov, M. B. Kogan, B. B. Kogan, P. 1. Yegorov, Y. G. Etinger, A. 1. Feldman and A. M. Grinstein.

According to the report 'most of the members of this terrorist group were in the pay of the American intelligence service, and received their instructions through the medium of JOINT, the international Jewish bourgeois nationalist organization set up by the American intelligence service, allegedly for rendering material aid to Jews in other countries, but which actually conducts espionage, terroristic, and other subversive activities in a number of countries including the Soviet Union.

'Other members', said the statement, 'have proved to be British intelligence agents of long-standing. All the criminals have confessed to causing the deaths of Zhdanov by false diagnosis and injurious treatment, and investigation has shown that they shortened the life of Shcherbakov, and had tried to disable Marshals Vassilevsky, Govorov and Koniev, General Shetemenko, Admiral Levenchko and others.

'Their aim was first of all to undermine the health of Soviet leading military cadres, to disable them, and so weaken the defence of the country. They have failed in this purpose but

{p. 2} have succeeded in murdering A. A. Zhdanov and A. S. Scherbakov ...'

Zhdanov was regarded as one of the most powerful members of the Politburo after Stalin. Up to the time of his death in 1948, due to angina pectoris and cardiac asthma,* it was widely considered that he would succced Stalin as President of the Council of Ministers.

Shcherbakov, who died in 1945 of 'paralysis of the heart', was Director of the political administration of the Soviet Army.

All those named to be 'disabled' were elderly and very senior officers with the exception of one, General Shetemenko, a comparatively young man, who in 1948 had succeeded Marshal Vassilevski as Chief of Staff to the Soviet Army.

On the same day, Pravda wrote: 'The fact that this group of cheap monsters, recruited amongst scientists, was able to go about unpunished shows that some of our Soviet authorities and lcaders have forgotten about vigilance'. This article referred to the 'shortcomings' of the State Security services.

Five days later, on January 18th, Pravda wrote in an editorial of: 'the fight for the fulfilment of the tasks laid down in Stalin's work of genius, Economic Problems of the USSR', and called for 'stricter discipline, high political vigilance, and an irreconcilable attitude towards shortcomings'. The article quoted the new Party Statutes obliging 'all members to keep Party and State Secrets'. 'A carefree, smug, and complacent mood has penetrated the Party ranks', Pravda stated. 'Vigilance has been blunted and such unpleasant facts as capital encirclement and plots have begun to be forgotten. Party members are losing sight of the fact that the imperialists, especially the Americans, in developing preparations for the new war, attempt to send into our country and other countries of the sociallst camp twice and three times more agents, spies and diversionists, than into the rear of any bourgeois country'.

* Author's italics. See Menzhinsky trial: Chapter III.

{p. 3} On the last day of January Pravda published a list of officials said to have been guilty of criminal carelessness or deliberate espionage. An editorial on the same day stated that important documents were being badly guarded in the Economic Bank, the Ministry of Health, and the State Supply System, and that the imperialist countries were spending huge sums of money in their efforts to gather secret information. It announced that 'a group of rootless cosmopolitans and Jewish-bourgeois nationalists have been unmasked in Lithuania'.

On February 6th, Pravda announccd the arrest of four Russians for spying for foreign powers.

Three days later, the main offices of the Soviet Legation at Tel Aviv were wrecked by a bomb thrown through a window, and the Minister's wife and two members of the legation staff were injured. As a result of this outrage, a note was sent from Moscow severing diplomatic relations with Israel. The note declared that the bomb explosion had been engineered with the obvious connivance of the Israeli police, and that, in spite of the Israeli Government's condemnation of the outrage, 'the participation of Israeli Government members in the systematic fannling of hatred and enmity towards the Soviet Union and in incitement to hostile actions against the Soviet Union, is universally known and indisputable'.

An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the decision to break off diplomatic relations was the culminatioll of a campaign of 'open animosity and poisonous slander by the USSR against Israel, Zionist organisations, and the Jews which had been carried on by the Soviet bloc for a long time, and had increased during the past two months, the real aim of which is to isolate and frighten the Jews in Soviet Russia, whose fate arouses dcep concern'.

On February 13th, the day following the incident at Tel Aviv, Moscow Radio reported the death 'after a long and serious illness' of Lev Zaharovich Mekhlis, one of the

{p. 4} two Jewish members of the Communist Central Committee.

On February 21st, the invitations issued for the Soviet Army Day reception revealed that Marshal Sokolovsky had replaced General Shetemenko as Chief of Staff to the Army. The latter was one of those whom the 'doctor-plotters' had allegedly 'tried to disable'.

In the early hours of March 4th, Moscow Radio broadcast the news that Stalin had been elected to the Moscow City Soviet. That morning, the usual light music programme was replaced by a women's choir and a Beethoven concert. Pravda and the other newspapers were four hours late.

At 8 a.m. (Moscow time) the following announcement was made over the radio:- 'The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union notify the misfortune which has overtaken our Party and our people - the serious illness of Comrade J. V. Stalin.

'In the night of March 1st-2nd, while in his Moscow apartment, Comrade Stalin suffered a cerebral haemorrhage affecting vital areas of the brain. Comrade Stalin lost consciousness and paralysis of the right arm and leg set in. Loss of speech followed. There appeared to be serious disturbances in the functioning of the heart and breathing.

'The best medical brains have been summoned for Comrade Stalin's treatment: Professor-Therapeutist P. E. Lukomsky, permanent member of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR; Professor-Neuropathist N. V. Konovalov; Professor-Therapeutist A. L. Miasnikov; Professor-Therapeutist E. M. Tareyov; Professor-Neuropathist I. N. Filimov; Professor-Neuropathist R. A. Tkachev; Professor-Neuropathist I. S Glazuhov; Reader-Neuropathist V. I. Ivanov-Neznamov.

'Comrade Stalin's treatment is being carried out under the guidance of the Minister of Health, Dr. A. F. Tretyakov,

{p. 5} together with L. I. Kuperin, Chief of the Medical Health Board of the Kremlin.

'The treatment is conducted under the constant supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet and the Soviet Government.

'In view of the serious condition of Comrade Stalin's health, the Council of Ministers of the Union of the SSR have recognized the necessity of publishing medical bulletins on the condition of Joseph Vissarionovitch Stalin's health as from today.

'The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Union of the SSR as well as our whole Party and the whole Soviet people fully recognize that the serious illness of Comrade Stalin will lead to his more or less prolonged absence from the activities connected with his leadership.

'The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers leading the country take with all seriousness into consideration all the circumstances connected with the temporary withdrawal of Comrade Stalin from the leadership of the Government and Party activity.

'The Central Committce and the Council of Ministers express their conviction that our Party and the whole Soviet people will in these difficult days display the greatest unity, solidarity, fortitude of spirit and vigilance; that they will redouble their energy for the building of Communism in our country and rally round the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union even more closely than hitherto.'

There followed this announcement, the first medical bulletin, which was rcpeatedly broadcast throughout the day:-

'In the night of March lst-2nd, 1953, Joseph Vissarionovitch Stalin suffered from a sudden cerebral haemorrhage, affecting vital areas of the brain, as a result of which there set in paralysis ...

{p. 52} No one really knows how many died or disappeared without trace as the result of the Moscow trials. But by July 30th, 1938 it was estimated that some seven million prisoners were held in the concentration camps alone. Many more were exiled and sentenced to life imprisonment. Such figures would appear incredible until one recalls the mass deportations from Leningrad, Georgia and the Ukraine where, first Yezhov, and later, Beria 'mowed in large armfuls of political prisoners' under Stalin's orders.

In the last year of the trials, 1938, there died or disappeared almost all the eighty members of the Council of War constituted four years before to assist the Commissar of Defence. Marshals and Generals, Admirals and Vice-Admirals were sentenced to death, as were thousands of other officers of all ranks. In that single year, there were more than 30,000 victims of the purge in the 'Red' Army and Navy. In his 'Secret' speech Khrushchev stated that '5,000 of Russia's best officers were murdered during the blood-baths that followed the secret trial for treason of Marshal Tukhachevsky.' There perished, too, Assistant Commissars of Foreign Affairs, as well as ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and consul-generals. Almost the entire staffs of Pravda and Izvestia disappeared, together with hundreds of authors, critics, directors of theatres and actors and actresses, as step by step Stalin methodically passed from the Party to the Armed Forces, from the diplomatic corps to the secret police, from industry to agriculture and commerce, and from commerce to the arts.

Now, in 1953, history repeated itself. Every day the newspapers throughout the country announced new arrests, fresh exposures of groups of diversionists, saboteurs and capitalist spies. In January, most of the victims were Jews, businessmen, writers, lawyers and doctors. Once again, the Ukraine, Khrushchev's country, was the centre of an outbreak of anti-Semitism. Then, the Ukrainian Party organization was

{p. 53} attacked for 'corruption and subversion'. Other provincial Party organizations were brought into disrepute, and in every case their leaders came under suspicion.

Pogrom is a Russian word meaning the organized massacre of a body or class of pcople. With the arrest of the doctors - six of whom were Jewish - the dismissals, sudden deaths by heart failure, suicides, and disappearances of Jews all over Russia, it was easy to see which way the seering wind of this new pogrom was sweeping. Three years later, shortly after he had made his 'secret' speech, Khrushchev told a smaller Party meeting how after the 'Doctors' Plot', Stalin became inflamed with hatred against the Jews. His rage grew until, shortly before his stroke in March, 'he told a meeting of Soviet leaders that he had decided to gather all the community together and transport them to a northern region within a new pale'. Khrushchev told his audience that when Mikoyan and Voroshilov protested and said that such conduct was worthy of Hitler, Stalin worked himself into a fury.

By February, it was Moscow's turn again to be gripped by the new 'terror'. Palgunov, the head of the Tass News Agency, vanished without trace. There were arrests in Molotov's Foreign Office, members of which 'confessed' to having connections with the bourgeois-imperialists. Even Madame Molotov was arrested for no other reason than that she was a Jewess. Professors disappeared from the Moscow University and the Academy of Science. Doctor Frumkin, famous for his regenerative grafting of male sex organs, suffered a severe heart attack, and there were fresh rumours that a number of other physicians had been arrested in connection with the 'Doctors' Plot'.

In that same month, Doctor Saiffrudin Kitchlu, the Stalin Peace Prize winner, visited the Kremlin and reported Stalin to be in vigorous health and carrying his seventy-three years lightly. Senor Bravo, the Argentinian Ambassador, and other

{p. 54} diplomats presenting their credentials, also remarked that Stalin looked fit and well. Mr. K. P. S. Menon, the Indian Ambassador, who went to the Kremlin on February 17th, reported finding Stalin in the best of health. But throughout his interview, he remarked that Stalin kept doodling on a pad of paper, as was his habit. Mr. Menon noticed that he was drawing wolves one after another. And after a while, Stalin spoke about wolves. He said that the Russian peasant knew how to deal with these beasts by exterminating them. Wolves, Stalin said, realised this and behaved accordingly. The Ambassador stated that he thought perhaps Stalin was referring to American capitalist 'wolves'. There were those who, when they heard this story, interpreted it differently.

The trouble was that during those first months of 1953, nobody knew who were the 'wolves' destined to be exterminated. The Jews, of course. But who else? The members of the disbanded Politburo? The Marshals named as the prospective victims of the doctor-assassins? The men in the Kremlin? Men like Kaganovich who was a Jew, and even Beria, whose mother was said to have been Jewish?

On March 5th, when the first bulletin of Stalin's illness was published, the new 'terror' was momentarily forgotten. On that day, Alexis, Patriarch of All Russia, Solomon Schiffer, the Chief Rabbi, and the clergy of all denominations bade the people pray for Stalin's recovery. And during those anxious hours the churches were crowded with the faithful. One wonders whether all their prayers were offered up with the same intention?


THE SOVIET NEWSPAPERS, possibly to please Stalin, to whom the idea of death was said to be anathema, frequently published articles concerning the longevity of Georgians, many of whom were reported as living to a hundred and twenty and more years of age. Scientists and doctors of medicine - men like Dr. Frumkin mentioned in the preceding chapter - devoted much time and energy towards the prolongation of human life. And in the past twenty-five years the Soviets claimed to have made great strides with their experiments in this direction.

At seventy-three, Stalin was not old. Older than Lenin when he had suffered a stroke, but still not old, certainly by Georgian standards. If Lenin had recovered, then why should not Stalin, particularly as medicine had progressed so much since Lenin's day? If there was any truth in the rumour that Stalin had survived a stroke in 1947, there was no reason why he should not recover from this latest attack. Such were the immediate reactions of many to the first news of Stalin's illness.

Even western medical specialists, while agreeing that his condition as described in that bulletin was serious, commented that his excellent physical condition, rugged constitution, and his great will to live, would help his doctors. And the fact that he had survived the initial attack, greatly impressed western experts. However, some of them expressed surprise that not one of the nine doctors mentioned as attending Stalin appeared to be Jewish, although the Russian medical journals frequently gave the names of Jewish doctors as the recognized brain specialists in the Soviet Union.

{p. 56} Before writing this book, the author submitted all the bulletins issued during Stalin's illness to a distinguished English doctor for comment. The latter reported as follows:-

'I have studied the bulletins. My opinion is that these are perfectly consistent with the view that Stalin died primarily of the results of a cerebral haemorrhage complicated by the effects of coronary disease (the coronary arteries are those which supply the heart itself with blood). The irregularity of his pulse may have suggested that an electro-cardiogram be done (this test was apparently performed at 11 a.m. on March 5th). The unfavourable results were apparently broadcast at 8 p.m. on that day.

'Earlier (apparently at 2 a.m. on March 5th) it had been reported that the cerebral haemorrhage had not been arrested; in addition to lesions in the cortex (affecting speech and the right side of his body) new signs were appearing which suggested that the medulla was being affected (what they call the truncus cerebri). Here are located what are termed vital centres regulating respiration and circulation. The disturbances of circulation may have suggested the desirability of doing an electro-cardiogram.

'The treatment reported as having been carried out seems to me logical and appropriate. They gave him oxygen (to aid respiration), camphor, strophanthin and caffeine (to aid and strengthen the heart) and penicillin because he had a raised temperature and an excess of leococytes (white corpuscles) in his blood. (There is always a risk of a blood clot in the brain or anywhere else becoming infected).

'The use of leeches strikes us as archaic, but is is remarkable till how late these were kept in stock in London hospitals. Their intended effect is to reduce congestion and in the past they were used in congested heart failure. They could not possibly have done him any harm, and the doctors may have decided to use leeches (or announce that these had been used)

{p. 57} because this form of treatment may still be regarded in the USSR (especially amongst the rural populations) as a time-honoured remedy, the omission of which might conceivably have provoked adverse comment among the people to whom the description of modern treatments would be meanillgless. It may well be that lecches were thought to wield some magical effect such as sucking the poison out of one's system.'

It is inconceivable that this doctor, or any other, for that matter, would be able to fault the medical bulletins. For even if, as some suspect, these bulletins were without foundation because Stalin did not die of a cerebral haemorrhage, they would still have been irrefutable. The Russians, who as liars are without peer, would never have been so clumsy as to issue any 'facts' about Stalin's fatal illness that could be suspect.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note one similarity between the treatment given to Stalin, and that administered to Menzhinsky by Dr. Levin and Dr. Kazakov, as described by the former at his trial for murder.* This similarity is the use of the drug strophanthus or strophanthin. This drug, which is derived from the Nombe plant of Central Africa, and, incidentally, used by the natives for arrow poison, acts as a cardiac tonic and a diuretic (an agent which increases the flow of urine). It is one of the most highly poisonous drugs known to the medical profession, and, consequently, can only be injected in the minutest quantities. An overdose, however small, would prove lethal.

Stalin's body, like that of Lenin, was embalmed and the viscera cremated. But unlike Lenin's, his remains were the subject of a post mortem. On March 7th, Moscow radio announced that 'the examination established a large centre of haemorrhage in the left hemisphere of the brain, and this haemorrhage had destroyed vital parts of the brain and

* See Chapter III

{p. 58} affected breathing and blood circulation. The examination confirmed that the doctors' diagnosis was correct and all the measures taken could not have prevented the fatal outcome of Marshal Stalin's illness.'

This announcement, like the bulletins that had gone before it, was without precedent, as also was the carrying out of the post mortem.

In order to make such an autopsy, the pathologists would have had to remove the top of the skull so that the brain could be extracted and dissected. Such, however, must have been the skill of the embalmers that no traces of this major surgical operation were visible to those viewing Stalin's body as it lay in state in the Hall of Columns forty-eight hours later.

Mr. Harrison Salisbury, the Moscow correspondent to the New York Times, in his book, Stalin's Russia and After, described his visit to the Hall of Columns on March 7th, as follows: '... together with the Diplomatic Corps, I joined the fantastic procession that was hurried and jostled, sixteen abreast, past the open coffin where Stalin lay, his face as waxen as a calla lily. I stumbled in the blinding glare of the klieg lights as I was forced at a half-trot past the bier, and, now, when I try to bring back the picture in my mind I see only the masses of flowers, the guard of honour half-hidden by the greenery, and the face of Stalin, blanched as an almond, and his old hands which seemed still clutching, in pain or terror, at the edge of his coverlet.'

{p. 59} Chapter VIII THE NEW ORDER

IF THIS INVESTIGATION was concerned with the political trend in Russia after March 5th, 1953, our task would have been easy, for in a matter of weeks, if not days, after Stalin's death, the clues were thick upon the ground. At the same time, too, it would have been almost as simple to have gathered enough circumstantial evidence - in Soviet Russia there is seldom any other kind - to prove which side would eventually win the battle for power being waged in the Kremlin.

With almost indecent haste Stalin's name disappeared from the newspapers. It was replaced, not by the name of any one man, but by those of Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev and Bulganin. Curiously - or so it seemed at the time - Beria's name was not so prominent as the others, although he was again back as head of State Security and Internal Affairs, merged together once more.

If one member of the Party appeared slightly more in the foreground than any other, it was Malenkov, with the result that the western world talked of 'the new Malenkov Government.' But that, of course, was a misnomer, for from its very outset the opposition to Malenkov was as strong as it was sure of its success.

On March 14th, after holding office for less than ten days, Malenkov, whom Beria in his funeral oration had called 'the talented pupil of Lenin and loyal colleague of Stalin', resigned his post as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR.

On March 20th, the following communique confirming this was issued:-

{p. 60} At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held on March 14th, 1953, the following decisions were adopted:

1. To accede to the request made by Comrade G. M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, that he be released from his duties as Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

2. To elect as the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrades N. S. Khrushchev, M. A. Suslov, P. N. Pospelov, N. N. Shatalin, S. D. Ignatyev.

3. In accordance with paragraph 32 of the Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to transfer Comrade N. N. Shatalin from the status of an alternative member to that of a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

So, on March 14th, Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Party, although he was not referred to yet as Secretary General or General Secretary, since that had been Stalin's title. But that, in fact, is what he became when he took over the key position by means of which Stalin had consolidated his power after Lenin's death.

On March 15th, the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held in the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow. It was opened by Deputy M. A. Yasnov, Chairman of the Soviet Union. He proposed that the deputies rise in tribute to the 'bright memory of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin'. In sorrowful silence, in tribute to the great Stalin, the deputies and guests rose in their places.

A little later in the session, Comrade Khrushchev moved that Comrade Voroshilov be elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Comrade Khrushchev's motion was unanimously adopted.

Then, Beria submitted the proposal that Comrade Malenkov be appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the

{p. 61} USSR, and requested Malenkov to submit to the Supreme Soviet his proposal for the composition of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

In his speech Beria repeated almost word for word what he had said about Malenkov at Stalin's funeral, and again referred to his candidate as 'the talented pupil of Lenin and loyal colleague of Stalin.'

The session unanimously resolved to appoint Comrade Malenkov Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, amidst tumultuous applause.

The new Chairman then submitted the names of the Council of Ministers to the assembly as follows: First Vice-Chairman and Minister of Internal Affairs - Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria; Minister of Foreign Affairs - Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov; Minister of Defence-Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin; President and Chairman of the Supreme Council Presidium - Marshal Voroshilov; Minister of Home and Foreign Trade-Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan.

There then followed a list of the remaining ministers appointed, including the Minister of State Control, Vsevolod Merkulov.

The newly elected Presidium lost no time in declaring its policy of leniency towards many of those who had been harshly punished by the former regime. On March 27th, a Decree of Amnesty was adopted which stated: 'As a result of the consolidation of the Soviet social and State system, the rise in the material and cultural standards of the population, the growth of consciousness of the citizens, and their honesty in carrying out their civic duty, law and order have been strengthened and crime has considerably declined in the country.'

These flattering remarks were an overture to a decision to release 'from places of detention persons who have committed crimes which do not represent a great danger to the State'.

A week later, there occurred an event of the greatest possible

{p. 62} significance to our investigation. On April 3rd, the Soviet Press published a communique issued by Lavrenti Beria's Ministry of Internal Affairs, which read:

'The Ministry has made a thorough investigation of all the materials of the preliminary investigation and other data in the case of a group of physicians accused of wrecking, espionage and terrorist activities against leaders of the Soviet State.

'As a result of verification it has been established that Professors M. S. Vovsi, V. N. Vinogadov, M. B. Kogan, B. B. Kogan, P. I. Egorov, A. I. Feldman, Y. G. Etinger, V. H. Vasilenko, A. M. Grinstein, V. F. Zelenin, B. S. Preobrazhensky, N. A. Popova, V. V. Zakusov, N. A. Shereshevsky and Doctor G. I. Mayorov implicated in this case were wrongly arrested by the former Ministry of State Security of the USSR through the use of methods of investigation which are inadmissible and most strictly forbidden by Soviet law.

'On the basis ofthe finding ofthe investigation commission specially set up by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to verify the case, the above-mentioned and others implicated in this case have been fully cleared of the charges preferred against them and, in conformity with Article 4, Point 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, have been released from custody.

'The persons guilty of the improper conduct of the investigation have been arrested and are criminally held responsible.'

The communique also stated that the award of the Order of Lenin to Doctor Lidya Timashuk, the woman doctor who had accused the physicians, had been annulled.

It should be noted that the fact that the communique gave the name of fifteen professors and doctors and referred to 'others implicated in this case' confirmed the rumours that other doctors had been arrested in connection with the 'plot'.

The release of the doctors and the official pronouncement

{p. 63} that they had been wrongfully arrested, inspired Pravda to publish a leader headed 'Soviet Socialist Law Is Inviolable'. In this the onus of the scandal was laid on 'the former leaders of the Ministry of State Security', amongst them Ignatyev and Ryumin. The former was dismissed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, while the latter, who had been Deputy Minister and Chief of the Investigation Section of the Ministry, was arrested.

Pravda denounced Ryumin as 'a contemptible adventurer' who had framed the Kremlin physicians, and then went on to declare that the new regime's courage in unmasking such villains was proof of its internal unity and strength.

From having been "hired assassins of JOINT, 'spies', and 'saboteurs', the released doctors were once more 'honest Soviet citizens' and 'eminent scientists", the 'victims of criminals who dared to ride rough-shod over the inalienable rights of Soviet citizens inscribed in our Constitution'.

Thus, the doctors were set free and exonerated from their alleged crimes. Yet, the 'Doctors' Plot' which was the spark that set alight the new purge that threatened the lives of countless numbers of Russians, is a mystery and is likely to remain such for generations.

Who was its instigator ? Who conceivcd this tortuous intrigue that incited Stalin's rage to the pitch when he vowed to exterminate the entire Jewish community in Russia?

When Khrushchev referred to the plot in his 'secret' speech, he threw his huge audience into a state of consternation.

'Let us recall the "Affair of the Doctor-Plotters",'* he said. 'Actually, there was no "affair" outside the declaration of the woman doctor, Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that the doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.'

* Author's italics

{p. 64} It is incredible that those ambiguous words were used by the best-informed man in Russia to explain away a scandal that had shaken the Soviet Party and the USSR to its foundations.

Again, it may be asked: 'Who was that someone to whom the First Secretary referred in such vague or evasive terms?'

Someone, it is logical to assume, of importance in the Party and close to Stalin, since Khrushchev admitted: 'Such a letter was sufficient* for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion* that there were doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders at once to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally gave advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that Academician Vinogradov should be put in chains; another beaten. Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Sccurity, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him: 'If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head !'

So Stalin was sufficiently convinced by the letter of the woman doctor 'who was probably influenced or ordered by someone' to reach the immediate conclusion that these distinguished physicians, who were personally known to him since they attended upon the Kremlin, were a gang of murderers. It does not make sense.

And what of Comrade Ignatiev, the man whom Pravda had accused of riding rough-shod over the inalienable rights of Soviet citizens? Surely he could have thrown some light on the mystery or even identified the nebulous someone who appeared to have been responsible for the affair that never existed outside the declaration of Lidya Timashuk? But, perhaps, once again he had saved his head from being shortened by obeying the orders ofthe First Secretary? Was silence the price he had paid for his reinstatement to the membership of the Party?

Khrushchev's explanation of the 'Doctors' Plot' was no ex-

* Author's italics.

{p. 65} planation at all. He merely blamed Stalin for everything.

'Stalin,' he said, 'personally sent for the investigation Judge, gave him instructions and advised him as to the methods he should use. These methods were simple - beat, beat, and, once again, beat !'

'This ignominious case was set by Stalin,' Khrushchev told his hushed audience. 'But,' he added, 'he did not have time to bring it to an end - as he conceived that end - and for that reason the doctors are still alive.'

It may well be asked: 'And how many others?'

{p. 84} It was not merely by coincidence that Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev addressed the same meetings, appeared together on the same platforms, visited the same factories, and stood side by side in the same photographs, one never more prominent than another, but sharing the limelight equally between them. And the backcloth was always Lenin's portrait.

Thus, after the curtain rose on the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in the white and gold assembly room of the Kremlin Palace, it seemed only natural to the thousand delegates present that one speaker after another should repudiate individualism.

The trend of the Congress was succinctly summed up by a resolution passed during the proceedings, which stated:

'The 20th Congress and the entire policy of the Central Committee of the Soviet Party of the USSR since Stalin's death clearly show that, within the Central Committee of the Party, there was a Leninist core of leaders who correctly understood the immediate requirements of both internal and foreign policies . . . And immediately after Stalin's death, this Leninist core of the Central Committee began a resolute struggle against the personality cult and its grave consequences.

At the same time, this resolution could have left no doubt in the minds of the delegates that the rumours of internal Party strife at the time of Stalin's death were well-founded. That reference to 'a Leninist core' plainly indicated the existence of turbulent factions within the Central Committee. It was obvious too from the wording of the resolution that these factions had become involved in a 'resolute strugglc' the moment Stalin died.

And as one speaker followed another, it became comparatively easy to judge who belonged to which faction. Comrades Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov were ranged

{p. 85} against First Secretary Khrushchev, Comrades Kikoyan and Pospelov, Pravda's editor, and the soldiers, represented by Marshals Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Zhukov. However, it was not quite so casy at the outset of the Congress to pinpoint the cause of the trouble.

On the face of it, it seemed absurd to divide the members of the Central Committee into 'Stalinists' and 'anti-Stalinists' They had all been 'Stalinists', at least, ostensibly, until March 5th, 1953. With the possiblc exception of Comrade Mikoyan they had all referred to one another as faithful 'pupils' 'disciples', and 'loyal supporters' of the great Stalin. One had only to recall those funeral orations to prove that. Unlike Lavrenti Beria, none of them could be an out-and-out individualist and, therefore, openly opposed to this new doctrine of collective-leadership for, unlike Bcria, they were all present at this Congress.

When Comrade Mikoyan rose to speak, he severely censored the old regime, condemning its architecture as obsolete; fit only to be demolished and rebuilt. In his suave manner Mikoyan, who always dressed likc a bourgcois capitalist rather than a Party worker, even ventured to criticise Stalin by name. And since his speech was reported in the newspapers and over the radio, it made history. For never before had Soviet citizens read or listened to Stalin's name in a critical connection. But those who read their papers intelligently were not wholly unprepared for such a shock, for shortly before the Congrcss opened, Pravda had come out with an editorial headed, 'The Cult of the Individual' that clearly showed which way the wind was blowing.

Ncvcrthclcss, even for those delegates who had suspectcd him of anti-Stalinist tendencies, Mikoyan's speech must have sounded surprisingly outspoken. Yet it could not have prepared them for what was to come.

On the last day, February 24th, the Congress went into

{p. 86} secret session, and it was after midnight when First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev rose to address the delegates. The speech he delivered is now known to the whole world as the 'secret' speech. We have already quoted from it in these pages. Now, we must examine it in detail. It was a long speech and lasted for three and a half hours. But since, to say the least, it is relevant to this investigation, we offer no excuse for quoting long passages from it. However, it is important they should be read in the light of what has already been written.

The First Secretary began:

'Comrades ! In the report of the Central Committee of the Party at the Twentieth Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, and also during recent plenary sessions of the Central Committee, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences.

'After Stalin's death, the Central Committee of the Party began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour.

'Such a belief about a man - and specifically about Stalin - was cultivated among us for many years.

'The object of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits, an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies have already been written in his lifetime . . . At present we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the Party now and for the future. With how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage

{p. 87} the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality.

'Because of the fact that not all as yet have fully realised the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual, the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective direction of the Party, and because of the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of a person - the Central Committee of the Party considers it absolutely necessary to make this material pertaining to this matter available to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.'

With these words Khrushchev began his indictment of Stalin, thus placing the responsibility for everything he was to say upon the Central Committee. He spoke in its name, with its connivance, as its First Secretary. What is more, as he told the delegates - not at the beginning but almost at the end of his speech - everything he had said was confidential and for their ears alone.

'We cannot', he warned them, 'let this matter get out of the Party, especially to the Press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes ...'

Incredible as it may seem, that is what he said! Could he really have been so naive as to believe that his indictment of Stalin would never be heard outside the gilded walls of the Kremlin Palace? Did he not realise that he was providing his enemies with a wholr arsenal of ammunition with which to sabotage Communism all over the world?


EARLY IN HIS SPEECH Khrushchev set about destroying 'the iconography' as Trotsky had called it, which portrayed Stalin in Lenin's company; in other words, the hyphenate of 'Stalinist-Leninism', which Stalin himself had invented and so skilfully used in his early days to impose himself upon the Central Committee. (It is worth noting that throughout his career, which has so faithfully followed the Stalin pattern, Khrushchev has shown a marked tendency to do exactly the same.)

'During Lenin's life', the First Secretary went on, ' the Central Committee of the Party was a real expression of collective leadership of the Party and the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince some; he patiently explained his opinions to others.

'In addition to the great accomplishments of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin ... His great mind expressed itself also in that he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences.*

'Fearing the future fate of the Party and of the Soviet nation, Lenin made a completely correct characterisation of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of the Secretary-General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude towards his comrades, that he is capricious and abuses his power.

* Author's italics.

{p. 89} 'In December, 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress Vladimir Ilyich wrote:-

"After taking over the position of Secretary-General Comrade Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power, and I am not certain whether he will always be able to use this power with the required care."

'This letter - a political document of tremendous importance, known in the Party history as Lenin's "Testament" - was distributed among the delegates to the Twentieth Party Congress.

'You have read it, and will undoubtedly read it again more than once.

'You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is given to Vladimir llyich's anxiety concerning the Party, the people, the State, and the future dircction of Party policy.

It must be remembered that the Lenin 'Testament' was banned during Stalin's lifetime, and it says much for the internal security in Russia under Stalin that there were many delegates to the Congress who had never heard of the famous document. If they had, it would not have been necessary for Khrushchev to break off in the middle of reading it to explain what it was. He went on reading it:-

"Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, bccomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary-General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude towards comrades, a less capricious temper, etc."

{p. 94} Chapter XV AN ENEMY OF THE PARTY

WHILE DESTROYING THE IDOL OF STALIN, the First Secretary went to great pains to restore that of Lenin to its former place. Like Stalin, he must have realised that the only way to supreme power was by declaring his abject devotion to Vladimir Ilyich.

'Our Party,' Khrushchev declared, 'fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of Socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the Party's devotion to principles been skilfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side - we would certainly not have had such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim ofthe method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.'

{Yet the Terror was set up by Lenin and Trotsky themselves}

Still delving deep into the past, Khrushchev harked back to the days of the October Revolution when two members of the Central Committee - Kamenev and Zinoviev - had opposed Lenin's plan for an armed uprising. Lenin, always the humanitarian, forgave them. Then, Khrushchev cited the case of the Trotskyites as another instance of Lenin's tolerance.

'At present, after a sufficiently long historical period,' Khrushchev said, 'we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyse this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be traced to

{p. 95} bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the Party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who in their time joined the Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an active part in the workers' movement before the Revolution, during the Socialist October Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of all revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that had Lenin lived such an extreme method would not have been taken against any of them.'

Almost in the same breath, Khrushchev posed another question to the Congress.

'But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the Revolution when this was actually necessary? No, no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the Revolution and of the working class, and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods.'

By this method of question and answer, Khrushchev struck a sinister note of warning. Evidently, there was a subtle difference between 'enemies of the people' and 'enemies of the Revolution.' And in the name of Vladimir llyich Lenin, it was right and proper to annihilate the latter by the most ruthless methods.

But what Lenin did in the name of the Revolution, Stalin continued to do when the Revolution had been won and domestic peace reigned over the Soviet State.

'Then,' said Khrushchev, 'Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilising the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annilation, not only against actual enemies

{p. 96} but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the Party or the Sovuet Govern,ent. Here we see no wisdom, but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once alarmed Lenin.'

{p. 115} [...] There followed the Berlin blockade, which because of the Air-lift, failed. At the same time, it brought Russia to the very edge of war. ...

Finally, in 1950, with a view to containing large American forces in the Far East, he instigated the Korean war, which continued without success until after his death, when the new regime immediately supported armistice negotiations.=

Why was it Khrushchev never mentioned these escapades of Stalin's, any one of which could have involved the USSR in a third world war? ...

{p. 116} Surely, to have proved to the Congress that Stalin's wilfulness and haughtiness was leading the country towards war would have given strength to Khrushchev's argument against the cult of the individual. Why, then, did he refrain from making this telling point? Was he afraid that by so doing he would over-play his hand and so foster the suspicion that Stalin's death was a 'miracle' that had saved the Soviet people from the horrors of a third World War?

Whatever his reasons, Khrushchev dropped the subject of Stalin's foreign policy after assuring his listeners as follows:

'We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia as well as by the working masses of all the people's democracies and by all progressive humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of Socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.'

Now, the wording of that last sentence cannot but strike the reader as odd. How better to liquidate that abnormal relationship than by liquidation of the man whose mania for greatness had created it?


WE HAVE NOW REACHED THAT POINT in Khrushchev's speech when he startled his audience by suddenly referring to 'the affair of the doctor-plotters.'

In Chapter 6 we have already quoted a part of the First Secretary's brief and extremely ambiguous explanation of this famous scandal. He continued as follows:

'Shortly after the doctors were arrested we members of the Political Bureau received protocols with the doctors' confessions of guilt. After distributing these protocols Stalin told us, "You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies".

'The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt.

'We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of these people personally because they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.

'This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to an end - as he conceived that end - for this reason the doctors are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are working in the same places they were working before; they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the

{p. 118} Government; they have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly as they did before.

'In organising the various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role was played by the rabid enemy of our Party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service - Beria, who had stolen into Stalin's confidence. In what way could this provocateur gain such a position in the Party and the State, so as to become the first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau? It has now been established that this villain had climbed up the Government ladder over an untold number of corpses.'

Let us dissect this statement and examine it thoroughly in the light of what has been written.

At the time of the doctor's arrest Stalin was in good health. Indeed, we have the evidence of Doctor Kitchlu, Senor Bravo, Mr. Menon and others to prove that he was perfectly well; in fact, in vigorous health and carrying his seventy-three lightly, in February, less than three weeks before he died. Seventy-three is no great age for a Georgian. Moreover, as we have said, it is a well-known fact that, like many old men, Stalin hated the mere thought of death, and it was never mentioned in his presence. Is it likely, then, that he would have spoken as Khrushchev states? Would this man, to whom the very word death was anathema, have said, in effect; 'What will happen to you all when I die? When I am dead you will perish.'

Remember, Khrushchev had said that 'Stalin was a very distrustful man - sickly suspicious ... This sickly suspicion caused him to distrust even eminent Party workers whom he had known for years.' Yet Khrushchev would have us believe that Stalin talked about what would happen when he was gone in front of members of the Political Bureau whom he did not trust further than he could see them.

{p. 119} Like the First Secretary's other anecdotes about Malenkov and Mikoyan, this story does not ring true. But, like those others, Khrushchev told it with an ulterior motive. He wanted to create the impression in the minds of the delegates that at the time of the 'Doctors' Plot' Stalin was an old man; a vain old man preoccupied with death, yet fearing what would happen to Russia when the blind young kittens ruled in his stead.

Why could the facts on which the investigation into the 'Doctors' Plot' were based not be verified? According to Khrushchev, neither he nor Mikoyan were cowards where Stalin was concerned. They had questioned his decisions and contradicted his opinions in the past. Yet, now, when the lives of these doctors, who had once treated them, were at stake, they never said a word. They believed in the innocence of these unfortunate men, but made no protest when they were handed the protocols of their 'confessions' which were in the familiar pattern of all those other 'confessions'. But, perhaps, Khrushchev really expected to be believed when he said that it was not until they examined the 'case' after Stalin's death that they found it was fabricated from beginning to end.'

Having found out, why not clean up such a dirty and shameful case once and for all by telling the whole truth about it? Why not tell the delegates that far from being murdered by the Kremlin physicians, Comrade Zhdanov had died of angina pectoris and cardiac asthma in 1948, and Comrade Shcherbakov of a 'paralysis of the heart' in 1945? Surely, since the doctors were once more treating top individuals and members of the Government, amongst whom these particular diseases appeared so prevalent, the true facts should have been made known ?

Would it not have cleared the air if Khrushchev had told his listeners that, amongst Stalin's other manias, and sickly suspicions, was the one that his enemies were trying to poison him? It would have been so easy to have laid the blame on

{p. 120} Beria for the whole business. It would have been so convincing - not to say reassuring for their patients - if the First Secretary had handed out protocols from the rehabilitated physicians stating precisely what had really happened. But since he did none of these things, the 'Doctors' Plot' must continue to remain a mystery.

It will remain a mystery, too, how Beria not only retained his position in the Party and the State after Stalin's death, but was given back his old job at the head of the Ministries of State Security and Internal Affairs. Khrushchev offers no explanation for that extraordinary situation. Yet, this is what he had to say about 'the rabid enemy of the Party':

'Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the Party? Yes, there were. Already in 1937 at a Central Committee plenum, former People's Commissar of Health Protection Kaminsky said Beria worked for the Mussavat intelligence service. But the Central Committee plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that was enough for him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anytlling, then - no one could say anything which was contrary to his opinion; any one who would dare express opposition would have met the same fate as Kaminsky ...'

It is only necessary to remark that this statement seems inconsistent with Khrushchev's previous statements about Stalin's suspicious and distrustful nature.

{In Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev says that Stalin was afraid of Beria, and elevated him (Khrushchev) to put a check on Beria and Malenkov (p. 250 and pp. 311-3). Also that Beria mocked Stalin (p. 318)}

As further proof of Beria's duplicity, Khrushchev followed his usual formula by quoting at length from the pages of Soviet Party History. He first read a long declaration made to the Central Committee by Snegov who, after being in prison for seventeen years, had been rehabilitated. This proved that in 1931 Beria had been directly responsible for the death of a certain Comrade Kartvelishvili.

{p. 121} Khrushchev cited at great length and with a wealth of detail two further cases; that of the old Communist and friend of Lenin, Kedrov, shot at Beria's orders, and Ordzhonikidze, once a close associate of Stalin's, who after attempting to expose Beria, committed suicide. These cases are only of interest to our investigation because they clearly illustrate how faithfully Khrushchev stuck to the formula of producing evidence from the distant past in proving his case. All that he had to say about Beria's recent criminal activitics - about those 'heinous crimes aimed at physically exterminating honest people' and his 'criminal anti-Soviet designs' is contained in the following two sentences:

'Beria was unmasked by thc Party's Central Committee shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly detailed legal proceedings it was established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes and Beria was shot.' *

That was all! Not a word of explanation. No mention of the seventy-six hour siege of Moscow. No reason given why Lavrenti Beria remained in high office for four months after the death of Stalin. Not a single quotation from those 'particularly detailed legal proceedings'. Nothing!

To paraphrase Khrushchev's own words: the question arises why Beria, who had liquidated tens of thousands of Party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked immediately after the death of Stalin?

That question still remains unanswered. And probably it always will.

* Author's italics.

{p. 122} Chapter XX TOWARDS THE MOTIVE

TIRELESSLY, RELENTLESSLY, the First Secretary's speech went on as the clock in the Spassky Tower of the Kremlin chimed out the hours of a new day.

'Comrades! The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person ... Was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected in the whole country - these "memorials to the living?" ... Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in Party work and in economic activity ... Comrades! If we sharply criticise to-day the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult, which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: "HOW could it be? Stalin headed the Party and the country for thirty years and many victories were gained during his lifetime! Can we deny this?" In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blind and hopelessly hypnotised by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet State, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the Party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet society ...'

Stalin was to blame for everything. That was the essence

{p. 123} of this part of the First Secretary's speech. And now that Stalin was dead, conditions were improving everywhere; on the collective farms, in the factories, and in Russia's relationship with foreign countrics. Then, Khrushchev said:

'Some comrades may ask us; where were the members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now'?

The questions were pertinent. But the answers could scarcely have been less apposite.

'First of all', Khrushchev explained, 'we have to consider the fact that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and Party work.

'It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, actively fought for Leninism against the enemies of the Lenin theory and against those who deviated ... Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent Party members and Government leaders and to use terrorist methods against honest Soviet people ... Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim to repression ... It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And when we also consider the fact that in the last years the Central Committee plenary scssions were not convened and that sessions of the Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then we will understand how difficult it was for any member of the Political Bureau to take a stand against one or another unjust or improper procedure against serious errors and shortcomings in the practices of leadership ...'

{p. 124} In other words, none of the Party hierarchy dared to stand up to Stalin at the risk of being liquidated.

Khrushchev then treated the delegates to another anecdote to illustrate the precarious position of members of the Central Committee at that time.

'In the situation which then prevailed', he told them, 'I have talked often with Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin. Once when we two were travelling in a car, he said, "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend, and when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will go next - home or to gaol".'

If, in fact, Bulganin really did say that, one wonders whether he recalls the remark now as he sits, a lonely exile, discredited and dishonoured for having wavered in his support of First Secretary Khrushchev in the latter's battle against Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich in 1957? Banished from Moscow, does the Marshal reflect upon how similar has been Khrushchev's rise to power with that of Stalin's? If so, he must feel grateful that the new Master prefers to banish his old comrades instead of liquidating them.

However, to return to Khrushchev's vindication of himself and his comrades for tolerating Stalin's monstrous behaviour.

'The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau,' he said, 'was reduced and its work was disorganised by the creation within the political Bureau of various commissions - the so-called "Quintets", "Sextets", "Septets" and "Novenaries". Here is, for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of October 3rd, 1946:- 'Stalin's proposal:-

1. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign Affairs (Sextet) is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and domestic policy.

2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the

{p. 125} State Commission of Economic Planning of the USSR, Comrade Vozesensky, and is to be known as a Septet. 'Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin.'

'What a terminology of a card player!' Khrushchev exclaimed, amidst laughter. 'It is clear that the creation within the Political Bureau of this type of commission - "Quintets", "Sextets", "Septets" and "Novenaries" - was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this way kept away from participation in reaching the most important State matters.

'One of the oldest members of our Party, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right to participate in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents. When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction.

'Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent.

This revelation was greeted with laughter.

'It is true - an English agent!' Khrushchev assured the delegates. 'A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there', he added.

At the time of writing, Voroshilov is still in power. But, when we consider what has since become of the subject of Khrushchev's other anecdotes, we cannot but ask: For how much longer?

'By unilateral decision', the First Secretary continued, 'Stalin had also separated one other man from the work of

{p. 126} the Political Bureau - Andrev Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of wilfulness.

'Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after* the Nineteenth Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, characterised Vyacheslav Ivanovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our Party were guilty of some baseless charges.

'It is not excluded that had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered any speeches at this Congress.

'Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau. He often statcd that Political Bureau members should be replaced by new ones.*

'His proposal, after the Nineteenth Congress, concerning the selection of twenty-five persons to the Central Committee Presidium was aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the bringing in of less-experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.

'We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation* of the old Political Bureau members and in this way the cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering.'

Let us consider these revealing words with the greatest care.

Firstly, let us examine Khrushchev's statement that at a plenum of the Central Committee after the Nineteenth Congress in October 1952, Stalin laid some 'baseless charges' against Molotov and Mikoyan. Since he did not say what these charges were, it is useless to speculate as to their character. However, according to Khrushchev, Stalin 'suggested that these old Party workers were guilty'. How is it then that they not only escaped punishment but retained their positions in the Government? Having made such accusations against them in

*Author's italics.

{p. 127} the presence of the Central Committee, it seems most unlikely that Stalin would have taken no further action.

Khrushchev states that these charges were laid at the plenum of the Central Committee; that is on October 17th, 1952. Therefore, his sinister speculation as to what might have happened to Molotov and Mikoyan had Stalin 'remained at the helm for another several months' is pointless.

Stalin, in fact, lived for more than four months after that meeting.

Secondly, let us examine Khrushchev's statements that Stalin 'evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau' and that he had 'a design for the future annihilation' of the old members of that body.

Since Khrushchev did not see fit to offer a shred of evidence in support of those astonishing accusations, let us accept them as they stand.

Khrushchev himself has aLready made it palpably clear that Stalin had rendered the members of the Political Bureau ineffectual by splitting them into 'Quintets' and 'Septets'. Their posts were mere sinecures. None of them had any voice in the Government of their country. None of them dared to express an opinion unless it echoed Stalin's views.

Yet, Stalin had planned to 'finish them off'.

If Khrushchev is to be believed, Stalin was determined to rid himself of the very men whom he had trained into submission and to replace them by others.


In all the years they had served him, these old members of the Political Bureau had never questioned his judgment or protested against his despotism. But now, suddenly, after the plenum of the Central Committee on October 17th, 1952, Stalin made up his mind to 'finish off' the 'blind young kittens' whose eyes were so conveniently shut to all his wilfulness and brutalities.

{p. 128} Why?

Khrushchev would have us believe that having gone to all the trouble of splitting them up into harmless little groups, Stalin immediately decided to annihilate them all.


Is it possible that those little 'Sextets' and 'Novenaries' were not so harmless? Could it have been that, smarting under the Secretary-General's open contempt, the old members of the Political Bureau had begun intriguing behind his back? Is it not within the bounds of probability that another several months after the plenum of the Central Committee, in January, 1953, to be precise, Stalin discovered that these slighted and moody men were planning to poison him with the connivance of certain doctors in attendance on the Kremlin?

{p. 129} Chapter XXI AN ANALYSIS

'COMRADES! The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our Party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building Communism.

'And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alie to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is evidence of the great moral and political strength of our Party.

'We are absolutely certain that our Party, armed with the historical resolutions of the Twentieth Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victones.

'Long live the victorious banner of our Party-Leninism!' With those words, amidst prolonged and tumultuous applause, ending in a standing ovation, Nikita Khrushchev concluded his speech.

It may well be asked, why did he ever make it?

The wishful thinking which he indulged in that it would remain a secret was short-lived. Less than a month after the Twentieth Congress, as a direct result of the shock of the 'secret' speech, there were riots in Tiflis. Within a matter of weeks, the speech was fully reported by the foreign Press, and having read it, thousands of loyal Communists all over the world, who until then had given blind allegiance to the Party, renounced Communism for ever.

To claim as Khrushchev did that in order to destroy the cult

{p. 130} of the individual it was necessary to make such a fearful indictment of Stalin, is not true. We have seen how quickly Stalin's name was forgotten in the USSR.

We have seen how calmly and with what few tears the Russian people received the news of his death. After their brief moment of mourning, they went about the State's business as if nothing had happened. Incredibly, Stalin's death made scarcely a ripple on the waters. Indeed, the new leaders who, as we have also seen, so greatly feared that the shock of Stalin's passing might cause popular demonstrations, had good reason to be thankful for the fact that nowhere in the whole of the USSR was there the slightest sign of unrest.

If more workers than usual queued patiently to enter the mausoleum in the Red Square now that Stalin lay beside Lenin, it was probably out of curiosity to see in the flesh the man known to them only through his photographs. The novelty would soon wear off.

Left to the Russian climate, the statues of Stalin would crack and crumble. Except culturally, they did no harm to the people.

In numerous ways, the new regime had already demonstrated that under collective leadership terrorism was ended. Beria, the arch-assassin, had been publicly discredited and shot. The wings of the dreaded secret police had been clipped. Under the Decree on Amnesty, the thousands released from places of detention had returned to their homes all over the country as living evidence of the tolerance of the new rulers of the USSR. After Stalin's death, the whole vast machinery of Soviet propaganda went to work to spread the doctrine of Leninism and colleaguality at home. While abroad, Lenin's own phrase 'peaceful co-existence' was freely used to express the new Government's foreign policy. And to foster this illusion, first Malenkov, and then Khrushchev and Bulganin set out on a round of visits to shake hands with bourgeois imperialists.

{p. 131} Then, suddenly and without a word of warning, three years after Stalin's death Khrushchev launches his bitter, recriminating attack.

To what purpose?

So far as the delegates to the Congress were concerned, the large majority must have been aware of the terror that had dominated Russia for thirty years, even if there were not many left who knew the awful details as revealed by Khrushchev.

If we accept the fact that Khrushchev was not really so naive as to think his speech would remain a secret from the outside world, why did he go to such lengths to confirm what Stalin's enemies had so long believed?

Why, then, and with what object did Khrushchev make his speech?

We believe he delivered it to prove a case of justifiable homicide - the killing of Stalin.

We believe that he delivered it so that if at any time he and his accomplices should stand accused of Stalin's murder, he could answer: 'I have proved to you all what manner of man he was. Had we not the right to kill him?'

It must be remembered that at the time when Khrushchev made the 'secret' speech, in February, 1956, the battle for power still raged in the Kremlin and, although he was gaining ground, his position was not yet secured. The opposition was still strong. Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Shepilov and Bulganin still had some fight left in them. And all of them knew what had happened to Stalin. Any one of them could have used that knowledge as a weapon to destroy Khrushchev. That is why in his specch he was at pains to implicate them all. That was the purpose of the little anecdotes, not only about the opposition but about his supporters as well - Mikoyan, Voroshilov and Zhukov - in fact, all the members of the old

{p. 132} Politburo. It was imperative to establish that every one of them had a motive for murdering Stalin.

Let us therefore consider the salient points of the secret speech together with what we have already written in this light.


WHENEVER POSSIBLE IN THIS CHAPTER we will use Khrushchev's own words together with the evidence previously presented in our endeavour to solve the mystery of the death of Stalin.

As far back as 1922, after he had suffered his first stroke, Lenin began worrying about his protege, Stalin. Since becoming General Secretary, Joseph Vissarionovich had accumulated immeasurable power into his hands, and it was not at all certain whether he always used that power with the required care. There were times - and they were becoming more frequent - when Stalin was not only excessivcly rude, but intolerant and capricious. So, Lenin thought fit to write a letter to the Tenth Party Congress, which he was too ill to attend, warning the members about Stalin's negative characteristics.

The Congress thought that Lenin's 'Testament', as they called it, would prove a sufficient warning to Stalin to mend his ways. Instead of replacing him by another kinder and more loyal man, as Lenin had suggested, they allowed him to continue as General Secretary.

But far from mending his manners, Stalin became more rude and more capricious as the years went by. He did not mellow with age. The negative characteristics which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient, developed steadily. And during the last years of his life they acquired an absolutely insufferable character.

Stalin ceased to tolerate colleaguality in leadership and began to practise brutal violence towards anyone who opposed his capricious and despotic character or who ran contrary to his

{p. 134} concepts. Anyone who tried to prove his viewpoint was doomed to removal from the leading executive and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation.

This despotism displayed itself at the Seventeenth Party Congress and after, when Stalin ordered no fewer than ninety-eight innocent members and candidates to be arrested and shot as 'enemies of the people' - a phrase he himself had originated.

From then on, Stalin, using his unlimited power, did not even trouble to inform the Central Committee of his decisions. Indeed, plenums of the Committee were hardly ever called. Not once during all the years of the patriotic war did a single meeting take place.

After the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became ever more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimcnsions, so that many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes. Worse still, Stalin separated himself from the Collective even more. Everything was decided by him alone, without any consideration for anyone or anything.

It is true to say that Stalin was sickly suspicious, and those who worked with him knew it. He would look at a man and say: 'Why are your eyes so shifty to-day? Why are you turning so much to-day and avoiding looking me directly in the eyes?

This sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even towards eminent party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and in everything he saw 'enemies', 'twvo-facers' and 'spies'.

Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed with the absurd and ridiculous idea that Voroshilov might be an English agent. A tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there. Voroshilov found himself in an almost

{p. 135} impossible position. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions.

Consider what happened at the meeting of the Political Bureau in 1946. It was then that the importance of the Ccntral Committee was reduced by the creation of various commissions - the so-called 'Quintets', 'Sextets', 'Septets' and 'Novenaries.' Stalin proposed these innovations, with the result that some members of the Political Bureau were kept away from participation in reaching most important State decisions.

Again, consider what took place just after the Nineteenth General Congress, in October, 1952, the first to be convened for thirteen years. Stalin's proposal concerning the selection of twenty-five persons to the Central Committee Presidium was aimed at the removal of the old members of the Political Bureau and the bringing in of less-experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.

Indeed, it can be assumed that this was also designed for the future annihilation of the old Political Bureau members.

At the first Central Committee plenum after the Nineteenth Congress, in his talk at the plenum, Stalin characterised Molotov and Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers were guilty of somc baseless charges. Indeed, had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months Molotov and Mikoyan would probably not have made speeches at the Twentieth Congrcss. It is evident that Stalin had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau.

That, then, was the situation in the autumn of 1952 according to Khrushchev, as he described it in his own words.

We now come to January, 1953, and the 'affair of the doctor-plotters'. It will be recalled that the woman doctor Timashuk who was probably influenced by someone, wrote Stalin a letter in which she declared that the doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

{p. 136} Having received this letter, Stalin reached an immediate conclusion that there were doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists, some of who had personally treated Khrushchev and others in the Kremlin. More than that, Stalin issued advice on the conduct of the investigating of the plot and the methods of interrogation to be used against the doctors. He instructed that one of them, Professor Vinogradov, was to be put in chains, and another beaten. He told the then Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev, curtly: 'If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head.'

Shortly after the arrest of the doctors, Stalin distributed protocols of their confessions of guilt to the members of the Politburo, including Khrushchev, and told them: 'You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognise enemies.'

Here, we will pause to ask the question: Does that anecdote ring true? We do not think that it does. Like Khrushchev's others, we believe it to be a lie. In this instance, its purpose was to draw a red-herring across the scent by suggesting that Stalin did not suspect any of the old members of the Politburo of being involved in the 'Doctors' Plot'. They were merely helpless creatures and because their eyes were shut, they had no idea there were evil workers in the Party who were planning to poison the General Secretary.

So far as Stalin was concerned, the 'Doctors' Plot' was not a matter for jest. The moment he heard about it, he acted immediately, and made it his personal business to find out the truth. He even threatened to hang his Minister of State Security if he did not obtain confessions from the doctors. And it is reasonable to suppose Ignatiev wasted no time in executing his orders.

{p. 137} Who was the mysterious 'someone' who influenced or ordered Lidya Tamashuk to write to Stalin.?

It will be recalled that when Khrushchev was discussing the Soviet war films, the theme of whose propaganda, he declared, was praising Stalin as a military genius, he said: 'Let us recall the film "The Fall of Berlin". Here Stalin alone acts, he issues orders in the hall in which there are many empty chairs and only one man approaches him and reports something­that is Poskrebyshev, his loyal shield-bearer.' Now, that remark caused laughter in the hall, as we believe Khrushchev intended. He wanted to de-bunk not only the film but Poskrebyshev; to turn him into a figure for ridicule, so that those few who knew him would forget what he had really been like. A sinister, shadowy figure, never far from his master's side-a grey, ghost of a man, who had disappeared like a ghost without trace the day that Stalin died.

We believe the loyal shield-bearer disappeared because he was liquidated by the very men whom he had unmasked as the instigators of the 'Doctors' Plot'.

What other reason could there have been for Poskrebyshev's disappearance except that he knew too much? Nor even Khrushchev questions his loyalty to Stalin, nor since the latter had chosen him as his personal aide-de-camp, could it possibly be doubted.

As we have already said, it is extremely unlikely that Stalin would have planned to finish off all the old members of the Politburo unless they had given him cause. And what better cause could they have given him than by plotting his murder aided by his own doctors? Can it be doubted that, having discovered such a plot, Stalin's persecution mania would not have reached such dimensions that he would attempt to annihilate the entire Politburo?

He had done it before, when he had ordered those ninety-eight members and candidates to the Seventeenth Congress to

{p. 138} be shot, and he would do it again - if he remained at the helm ...

And in January, 1953, there was no reasoning for supposing that Stalin would not. We have the evidence of Mr. Menon, Doctor Kitchlu and others to prove that the capricious, irritable, and distrustful old man of seventy-three was in vigorous health. The members of the Politburo had the evidence of their own eyes.

Seven weeks elapsed between the announcement of the 'Doctors' Plot' and that of Stalin's death. Time enough, it may be thought, to mete out summary justice to the plotters.

Yet Khrushchev had stated that Stalin did 'not have time' in which to bring the case of the Kremlin doctors to an end- 'as he conceived that end'. But even if Stalin had died a fortnight before March 5th, which is possible, he would still have had the time. On the evidence of Mr. Menon, we know that he was alive and well on February 17th, more than five weeks after the announcement of the exposure of the plot. During that period, it should be recalled, several prominent people had already died suddenly, suffered heart attacks, or disappeared into thin air, including Mekhlis, the Minister of Security, Doctor Frumkin, and General Shetemenko. The latter, mentioned as one of the proposed 'victims' of the doctor-assassins, was Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Twelve days before Stalin's death, he was relieved of his post, and then vanished. During that period, too, countless others had been arrested.

When Khrushchev said that time had saved the doctors' lives, he was deliberately confusing the issue. His conjecture that Molotov and Mikoyan might not have addressed the Congress had Stalin lived for 'another several months' was made with the same intent. He wanted to allay the suspicion lurking in the minds of many of the delegates that the members of the Politburo were involved in either the 'Doctors' Plot' or

{p. 139} Stalin's timely demise. His purpose was to justify Stalin's murder; not to reveal who did it.

In any attempt to solve the mystery of Stalin's death, time must play an important part. From the moment the doctors were arrested, time was running short for a great many people. Indeed, nothing could save them except a miracle - of time.

If the doctors had hatched their plot amongst themselves, let us suppose, to bring about such a miracle by poisoning Stalin, they would have been liquidated immediately. The very fact that they were not is proof that Stalin needed time to find out how many were actually implicated. And the greater the number, the more time he would have needed.

Paradoxically, Khrushchev's own words can be used to prove our point. Stalin did not have time to end the case - 'as he conceived that end.'

Stalin conceived not merely the deaths of a dozen or so Kremlin physicians who were ostensibly plotting to kill a number of ageing Marshals. He conceived the unmasking and finishing off of Beria, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, and the rest of the old members of the Politburo.

But they did not give him time.


AT THIS POINT we must state that on the evidence of Khrushchev's speech we can no longer accept the belief that Stalin died a natural death. We cannot even accept as true the statement that he suffered a cerebral haemorrhage, or the theory that his enemies seized upon his illness as a heaven-sent chance to hasten his end. If such had been the case, Khrushchev's speech would never have been delivered.

But it was delivered. If it is a damning indictment of Stalin, it is an equally damning indictment of Khrushchev and his confederates, for Stalin's murder. We have said that it was a plea of justifiable homicide. However, as such we are not concerned with it, for we are not concerned with the ethics of the case. Although we must confess in our opinion ethics played no part in the killing of Stalin. In the final analysis, if he had lived, his assassins would have died. It was their lives or his. That is a succinct summing up of the case.

Who killed Stalin? The answer can only be that it is improbable that we shall ever know the identity of his executioner. He must have been someone who was in the habit of visiting Stalin regularly and therefore unlikely to arouse his sickly suspicions.

A doctor? In the circumstances, we think not.

A close friend, whom he trusted? Lavrenti Beria, for example? Perhaps.

A genial companion, with whom he might sometimes drink a glass of vodka? Nitika Khrushchev, possibly? Again, perhaps.

Both men aspired to take Stalin's place. And while one

{p. 141} failed where the other succeeded, undoubtedly both were deeply involved in the murder.

How was Stalin murdered? Again, we shall probably never know. It may be assumed, however, that the method used was governed by the fact that the body would be embalmed and placed on exhibition. Therefore, it is likely that Stalin was poisoned.

To a lesser degree than either Beria or Khrushchev, a large number of others were involved, for the murder of Stalin, carried out with immediacy, was nevertheless perfectly organised. A trifle too perfectly, perhaps. In their anxiety to make their victim's death appear natural, we cannot help but feel that, as is so often the case, the murderers overplayed their hand. For, as we have said, with their many signatories, wealth of detail, and frequency, the bulletins did give rise to doubt in cynical minds.

It must be admitted, too, there was something suspicious about the timing and precision with which Beria's MVD troops surrounded Moscow. But even more dubious was the alacrity with which Beria was restored to office as head of the Secret Police.

Indeed, it is time to reconsider Beria's role in the light of the 'secret' speech.

There is no need to stress with what bitterness and savagery Khrushchev attacked Beria's memory. The speech was almost as much an indictment of the late Minister of State Security as it was of his master the General Secretary.

It remains to ask why?

Unlike his master's, Beria's name had been publicly blackened before death.

Why, then, the stream of invective and abuse? Why the recriminations? Why the use of such phrases as 'Beria who murdered thousands of Communists', 'this rabid enemy of our Party', 'this villain who climbed up the Government ladder

{p. 142} over an untold number of corpses', 'this abject provocateur', 'this vile enemy?'


In his determination that the evil that Beria did will live after him, we are left with the feeling that Khrushchev harbours a great personal hatred against the dead man. And we wonder why?

It is not impossible that Beria was restored to his former office in recognition for his part in Stalin's murder, after which he may or may not have attempted to seize power by surrounding Moscow with his troops. We are inclined to the theory that this was, in fact, a demonstration of strength staged to deter the Army from attempting a coup d'etat. However, there is not the slightest doubt that afterwards - and very soon afterwards - Beria began to use his immeasurable power for his own ends. The struggle between him and Khrushchev was to the death. At some point in that struggle - possibly when Khrushchev had won the alliance of the Army - realising he was losing, it may well be that Beria threatened to expose Khrushchev as Stalin's murderer and it would have been to his advantage whether the allegation were true or not. And for this reason, he was shot.

What evidence can we offer in support of this? The evidence of Khrushchev's own words. The evidence that he considered it necessary to go to such lengths in reiterating Beria's past crimes when they were well-known to all the delegates at the Congress. The evidence of Khrushchev's insistence that until the very end Beria was at one and the same time Stalin's faithful servant and evil genius.

'Why was not Beria unmasked during Stalin's life?' he cries in horror. And then immediately answers his own question: 'Because he utilised very skilfully Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything, and acted with his support'.

{p. 143} So, no man dared to lay a finger on Beria until Stalin was dead!

What else did Khrushchev say? Only this: 'Beria was unmasked shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly detailed legal proccedings it was established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes, and Beria was shot'.

More red herrings across the scent. More generalization about time! However, from this vague and unsatisfying statement it can be gathered that the lapse of time between Beria's arrest and his trial was intended to prove that the new Government's methods of justice were different from those of Stalin. Many months, therefore, were needed for the 'particularly detailed legal proceedings' in order that Beria's trial, heard in camera, should be a just one. No 'protocols' of these proceedings were, of course, supplied to the delegates.

If further evidence should be needed, we would cite the fact that of all those who were involved in any way as accomplices to the murder, Beria was the only one to be shot. His fate, as Khrushchev no doubt intended, acted as a deterrent to others who might have attempted to play his game.

Nevertheless, it is possible that in 1956, Khrushchev feared that in the heat of the struggle for power or in the moment of defeat, one or another of his opponents would emulate Beria. And so, to safeguard himself and, at the same time, to implicate his friends and enemies alike in Stalin's murder, he delivered his 'secret' speech.

He achieved his objective.

A few days after the 20th Congress, on February 29th, 1956, Khrushchev was appointed Chairman of the newly created Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for the Affairs of the Russian Federal Republic. Thus, his powers were extended far beyond those even of Stalin.

Fifteen months later, at a plenary session of the Central

{p. 144} Committee, it was found that 'the anti-Party group Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov had for the past three to four years run counter to the course of the Party policy. These comrades had entered upon a path of group struggle against the leadership of the Party. Having discussed among themselves on an anti-Party basis, they aimed to change the policy of the Party and to lead the Party back to those incorrect mcthods of leadership which were condemned by the 20th Party Congress'.

The Committee resolved, first, 'to condemn the factional activities of the anti-Party group of Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov, and of Shepilov who joined them, as incompatible with the Leninist principles of the Party. Second, to expel these comrades from membership of the Presidium and from the Central Committee ...

This resolution was passed unanimously by all members of the Central Committee, with one abstention - in the person of Comrade Molotov.'

Marshal Bulganin has since followed these comrades into the wilderness.

Having branded them all potential murderers, Khrushchev could afford to treat them with magnanimity now that he himself had climbed to the top of the Government ladder, not over an untold number of corpses, but certainly over that of Beria and, in all probability, that of Stalin as well.
{end of text}

The "anti-Party group", which tried to depose Khrushchev, had been part of the plot against Stalin; but they opposed Khrushchev's liberalisation of Soviet society.

(4) Ludo Martens, Another view of Stalin

Ludo Martens writes in his online book Another view of Stalin (Copyright © 1995 John Plaice) at

Stalin's death

A few months before Stalin's death, the entire security system that protected him was dismantled. Alexandr Proskrebychev, his personal secretary, who had assisted him since 1928 with remarkable efficiency, was fired and placed under house arrest. He had allegedly redirected secret documents. Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Vlasik, Chief of Stalin's personal security for the previous 25 years, was arrested on December 16, 1952 and died several weeks later in prison.

P. Deriabin,  Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars (1984), p. 321; cited in Bland,  op. cit. , p. 24.

{Bill Bland, 'The "Doctors' case'' and the death of Stalin' (London: The Stalin Society, October 1991)}

Major-General Petr Kosynkin, Vice-Commander of the Kremlin Guard, responsible for Stalin's security, died of a 'heart attack' on February 17, 1953. Deriabin wrote:

'(This) process of stripping Stalin of all his personal security (was) a studied and very ably handled business'.

Deriabin, op. cit. , p. 209; cited in Bland, op. cit. , p. 27.

Only Beria was capable of preparing such a plot.

On March 1, at 23:00, Stalin's guards found him on the floor in his room, unconscious. They reached the members of the Politburo by telephone. Khrushchev claimed that he also arrived, and that each went back home.

Deriabin, op. cit. , p. 300.

No-one called a doctor. Twelve hours after his attack, Stalin received first aid. He died on March 5. Lewis and Whitehead write:

'Some historians see evidence of premeditated murder. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov sees the cause in Stalin's visible preparation of a purge to rival those of the thirties'.

J. Lewis  and P. Whitehead, Stalin: A Time for Judgment (London, 1990), p. 279; cited in Bland, op. cit. , p. 34.

Immediately after Stalin's death, a meeting of the presidium was convened. Beria proposed that Malenkov be President of the Council of Ministers and Malenkov proposed that Beria be named Vice-President and Minister of Internal Affairs and State Security.

Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit. , p. 324. {Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: André Deutsch, 1971)}

During the following months, Beria dominated the political scene. 'We were going through a very dangerous period', wrote Khrushchev.

Ibid. , p. 331.

Once installed as head of Security, Beria had Proskrebychev, Stalin's secretary, arrested; then Ryumin, who had led the inquiry into Zhdanov's suspicious death. Ignatiev, Ryumin's boss, was denounced for his rôle in the same affair. On April 3, the doctors accused of having killed Zhdanov were liberated. The Zionist author Wittlin claimed that by rehabilitating the Jewish doctors, Beria wanted to 'denigrate ... Stalin's aggressive foreign policy against the West, the United States and Great Britain primarily'.

Wittlin,  op. cit. , p. 388. {Thaddeus Wittlin, Commissar: The Life and Death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (New York: Macmillan, 1972)}

Still in April, Beria organized a counter-coup in his native region, Georgia. Once again he placed his men at the top of the Party and the State. Dekanozov, later shot along with Beria, became Minister of State Security, replacing Rukhadze, arrested as 'enemy of the people'.

Bland, op. cit. , p. 46.

Fri Aug 25 09:03:42 PDT 1995 {end of text}

(5) Beria vs. Stalin

After Stalin's death, Malenkov became Premier, with Beria (of the Jewish faction) holding power in the shadows. New evidence on Beria's downfall:

From, the website of the (pro-Stalin) Progressive Labor Party:

{start} This political weakness was further aggravated by revisionist tendencies within the leadership of the Party that emerged at the end of the forties.

To direct the different sectors of the Party and the State, Stalin had always relied on his closest collaborators. Since 1935, Zhdanov had played an essential rôle in the Party consolidation work. His death in 1948 left a vacuum. In the beginning of the fifties, Stalin's health took a dramatic turn for the worse after the overwork incurred during the war. The problem of Stalin's succession posed itself for the near future.

It was around this time that two groups of revisionists within the leadership became visible and started to plot their intrigues, while preaching fidelity to Stalin. Beria's group and Khrushchev's contituted two rival revisionist factions that, while secretly undermining Stalin's work, were waging war with each other.

Since Beria was shot by Khrushchev in 1953, soon after Stalin's death, it might be supposed that he was an adversary of Khrushchevian revisionism. This is the position that Bill Bland took in a well documented study of Stalin's death.

Bill Bland, 'The "Doctors' case" and the death of Stalin' (London: The Stalin Society, October 1991), Report.

However, testimony from diametrically opposite sources concur in their affirmation that Beria held rightist positions.

For example, the Zionist author Thaddeus Wittlin published a biography of Beria in the nauseating style of McCarthyism. Here is an example: 'the Dictator of Soviet Russia looked down at his peoples as if he were the merciless new god of millions of his people'.

Thaddeus Wittlin, Commissar: The Life and Death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 354.

Literally. But, presenting the ideas developed by Beria towards 1951, Wittlin claimed that he wanted to authorize private enterprise in light industry and 'to moderate the collective farm system', as well as 'by returning to the approach of the pre-Stalin era, the NEP'. 'Beria ... was against the Stalin policy of Russification of non-Russian nations and republics'. Beria wanted 'Better international relations with the West' and 'also intended to restore relations with Tito'.

Ibid. , pp. 363--365.

This homage to Beria's 'reasonable politics' stands out, coming from such a sickening anti-Communist pen.

Tokaev, clandestine opponent, claimed that he knew Beria and others in the thirties, 'not of servants, but of enemies of the régime'.

Tokaev, op. cit. , p. 7.

Gardinashvili, one of Beria's close collaborators, had close relations with Tokaev.

Ibid. , p. 101.

Khrushchev, for whom it would be in his interest to depict Beria as being close to Stalin, wrote:

'In the last years of Stalin's life Beria used to express his disrespect for Stalin more and more baldly.'

Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: André Deutsch, 1971), p. 313.

'Stalin feared that he would be the first person Beria might choose'.

Ibid. , p. 311.

'It seemed sometimes that Stalin was afraid of Beria and would have been glad to get rid of him but didn't know how to do it.'

Ibid. , p. 250.

We should not forget Molotov's opinion. He and Kaganovich were the only leaders to remain faithful to their revolutionary past.

'I cannot exclude the possibility that Beria provoked Stalin's death. I felt it through what he was saying. May Day 1953, on the Tribune of the Mausoleum, he made such allusions. He was looking for complicity. He said, "I made him disappear". He tried to implicate me. "I saved you all".'

Chueva, op. cit. , p. 327.

'I consider Khrushchev as rightwing, but Beria was even more rightwing. Both were rightwing. And Mikoyan too. But they had different personalities. Khrushchev was to the right and completely rotten, but Beria was even more to the right and even more rotten.'

Ibid. , p. 335.

'Without question, Khrushchev was reactionary and succeeded in infiltrating into the Party. Of course, he believed in no form of communism. I consider Beria as an enemy. He infiltrated himself into the Party with destructive goals. Beria was a man without principles.'

Ibid. , p. 323.

During Stalin's last years, Khrushchev and Mikoyan clearly hid their political ideas to better place themselves after the succession.

Khrushchev's disdain for Stalin shows up clearly in his memoirs:

'In my opinion it was during the war that Stalin started to be {not - Peter M.} quite right in the head.'

Ibid. , p. 311.

At 'the end of 1949', a 'sickness ... began to envelop Stalin's mind'.

Ibid. , p. 246.

Enver Hoxha noted Khrushchev's impatience for Stalin to die. In his memoirs, he noted a discussion that he had had in 1956 with Mikoyan:

'Mikoyan himself told me ... that they, together with Khrushchev and their associates, had decided to carry out a "pokushenie", i.e., to make an attempt on Stalin's life, but later, as Mikoyan told us, they gave up this plan.'

Enver Hoxha, With Stalin: Memoirs (Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, 1980), p. 31.

{end of text}

(6) Stalin's Body Removed From Lenin's Tomb

Jennifer Rosenberg writes at

Stalin's Body Removed From Lenin's Tomb

After his death in 1953, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's remains were embalmed and put on display next to Vladimir Lenin. ...

At the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, an old, devoted Bolshevik woman, Dora Abramovna Lazurkina stood up and said:

{quote} My heart is always full of Lenin. Comrades, I could survive the most difficult moments only because I carried Lenin in my heart, and always consulted him on what to do. Yesterday I consulted him. He was standing there before me as if he were alive, and he said: "It is unpleasant to be next to Stalin, who did so much harm to the party." {endquote} {quoted in Robert Payne, The Rise and Fall of Stalin, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965, pp. 712-3}

This speech had been pre-planned yet it was still very effective. Khrushchev followed by reading a decree ordering the removal of Stalin's remains.

{quote} The further retention in the mausoleum of the sarcophagus with the bier of J. V. Stalin shall be recognized as inappropriate since the serious violations by Stalin of Lenin's precepts, abuse of power, mass repressions against honorable Soviet people, and other activities in the period of the personality cult make it impossible to leave the bier with his body in the mausoleum of V. I. Lenin.  {endquote} {quoted in  Payne, op. cit., p. 713}

A few days later, Stalin's body was quietly removed from the mausoleum. There were no ceremonies and no fanfare. About 300 feet from the mausoleum, Stalin's body was buried near other minor leaders of the Revolution. Stalin's body was placed near the Kremlin wall, half-hidden by trees.

A few weeks later, a simple dark granite stone marked the grave with the very simple, "J. V. STALIN 1879-1953." In 1970, a small bust was added to the grave.

(7) Nikita Khruschev on "Stalin's Anti-Semitism" and the proposal for a Jewish Crimea

Khruschev Remembers, translated by Strobe Talbot; with an Introduction, Commentary and Notes by EDWARD CRANKSHAW (Sphere Books, London, 1971)

{p. 258} Stalin's Anti-Semitism

{Crankshaw's comment} One of the most interesting aspects of this narrative is the way in which Khrushchev goes out of his way to condemn anti-Semitism. Guilt feelings must play their part here. There is no evidence to indicate that Khrushchev himself was ever committed actively to anti-Semitic policies, but time and time again he is on record as making disparaging remarks about Jews and insisting that they should be kept in their place. He may have been horrified by the pogroms of his childhood, but he did not like Jews, and as master of the Ukraine, he kept silent about the mass-murdering carried out by the Nazis (including the massacre at Babi Yar on the outskirts of Kiev). In accordance with Stalin's policy, which he later made his own, he refused to admit that Jews had suffered more than non-Jews on Soviet territory; he must also have connived at Stalin's own postwar deportation of Jews from the Ukraine into deep Siberta. Everything he has to say about the fate of individual Jews in this period is true; he might have said much more. It is interesting to get the story of Mikhoels' murder offcially confirmed and to have an illuminating sidelight on the fate of poor Lozovsky. None of this, incidentally, was mentioned in the Secret Speech. Nor was the a rest and imprisonment of Molotov's wife. On the other hand, the Secret Speech contained more information than occurs in this chapter on Stalin's destruction of whole peoples in the Crimea and the Caucasus (tartars, Chechens, Ingushes, and so on), as a punishment for "col-

{p. 259} laboration" with the Germans. Khrushchev's own slapdash attitude toward violence and arbitrary rule comes out in this chapter, as in the earlier chapters on the great purges. "I'm all for arresting people' he says, but with the implication that it should be done in the proper form.
{end Crankshaw's comment}

WHILE we were still pushing the Germans out of the Ukraine, an organization had been formed called the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of the Sovinformbureau [Soviet Bureau of Information]. It was set up for gathering materials - positive materials, naturally - about our country, about the activities of our Soviet Army against the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany, and for the distribution of these materials to the Western press, principally in America where there is a large, influential circle of Jews. The committee was composed of Jews who occupied high positions in the Soviet Union and was headed by Lozovsky, a member of the Central Committee and former chairman of Profintem [the Trade Union Intemational]. Another member was Mikhoels, the most prominent actor of the Yiddish theater. Yet another was Molotov's wife, Comrade Zhemchuzhina. I think this organization was first created at the suggestion of Molotov, although it may have been Stalin's own idea. The Sovinformbureau and its Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were considered indispensable to the interests of our State, our policies, and our Communist Party.12 {see footnote}

Lozovsky used to get in touch with me whenever I came to Moscow, and sometimes he would call me on the telephone asking for material to use as propaganda about the Hitlerite fascists. I gave orders for the preparation of such material over the signatures of various authors, and it was sent to America, where it was widely used to publi-

{footnote - Crankshaw's comment} 12. Lozovsky was well known to western correspondents and respected by them as the soviet official spokesman. He simply vanished in 1948 and was sadly missed. Soon it was known that he had been shot, along with a number of Jewish writers, after the sudden disbandment of the Jewish Anti-Fascist committee. Khrushchev's first reference to the "Crimean Affair" was in an interview with a delegation of Canadian Communists in 1956. The famous Jewish actor Mikhoels also vanished at this time. It was soon known, though not admitted, that he had been shot. He was the brother of one of the Kremlin doctors falsely accused of poisoning activities and as himself built into the-so-called plot by the NKVD. Madame Molotova (Zhemchuzhina) had been an important figure in her own right, at one time head of the State Cosmetic Trust (which introduced perfumes and lipstick to the Soviet young). Molotov had to stand by and suffer her arrest and exile without murmuring at the very time when he was turning his iron front to the West in the early days of the Cold war.
{end Crankshaw's footnote}

{p. 260} cize the successes of the Red Army and to expose the atrocities committed by the Germans in the Ukraine. On the whole, Lozovsky's activities were very worthwhile. He was an energetic person and sometimes almost annoyingly persistent. He used virtually to extort material from me, saying, "Give me more material! More! More!" We were busy with the reconstruction of the economy and didn't have much time for such matters. He wouldn't let up on me: "You must understand how important it is for us to show the face of our common enemy to the world, to expose his atrocities, and to show the process of reconstruction which is taking place in our cities and villages."

Once the Ukraine had been liberated, a paper was drafted by members of the Lozovsky committee. It was addressed to Stalin and contained a proposal that the Crimea be made a Jewish Soviet Republic within the Soviet Union after the deportation from the Crimea of the Crimean Tartars. Stalin saw behind this proposal the hand of American Zionists operating through the Sovinformbureau. The committee members, he declared, were agents of American Zionism. They were trying to set up a Jewish state in the Crimea in order to wrest the Crimea away from the Soviet Union and to establish an outpost of American imperialism on our shores which would be a direct threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Stalin let his imagination run wild in this direction. He was struck with maniacal vengeance. Lozovsky and Mikhoels were arrested. Soon Zhemchuzhina herself was arrested. The investigation of the group took a long time, but in the end almost all of them came to a tragic end. Lozovsky was shot. Zhemchuzhma was exiled. I thought at first she had been shot, too, because nothing of what had happened was reported to anyone except Stalin, and Stalin himself decided whom to execute and whom to spare.

I remember Molotov calling to ask my advice about this whole affair. Apparently Zbemchuzhina had pulled him into it. Molotov never did agree with Stalin about the necessity for arresting Zhemchuzhina. When the question of removing her from the staff of the Central Committee came up at a Central Committee plenum and everyone else voted aye, Molotov abstained. He didn't vote nay, but he still abstained. Stalin blew up at this, and the incident left its imprint on Stalin's attitude toward Molotov. He started kicking Molotov around viciously. Kaganovich's maliciousness was a particularly good barometer of Molotov's precarious position. Incited by Stalin, Kaganovich played the part of a vicious cur who was unleashed to tear limb from limb any

{p. 261} member of the Politbureau toward whom he sensed Stalin's coolness, and Kaganovich was turned loose on Molotov.

I didn't find out that Zhemchuzhina was still alive until after Stalin's death, when Molotov told me that she was living in exile. We all agreed she should be freed. Beria released her and solemnly handed her over to Molotov. Beria used to describe how Molotov came to his office at the Ministry of Internal Affairs to be reunited with Zhemchuzhina. Molotov was overjoyed that she was still alive and threw himself into her arms. Beria expressed his sympathy to Molotov and Zhemchuzhina at the time, but he made a point of reminding them that she had been freed on his initiative and he told this story with a touch of irony in his voice.

A question of substance: was it necessary to create a Jewish Union or autonomous Republic within the Russian Federation or within the Ukraine? I don't think it was. A Jewish autonomous Region had already been created which still nominally exists, so it was hardly necessary to set one up in the Crimea.13 But this question was never discussed in substance. We had been conditioned to accept Stalin's reasoning, and we gave in to his absolute authority. He contended that if a Jewish Republic were created in the Crimea, then Zionism, which is rampant in America, would gain a foothold in our country. That was all there was to it. He had made up his mind, and he had people arrested, arbitrarily and without any regard for legal norms, regardless of the important and positive role which the accused had played during the war in helping to bring to light the atrocities committed by the Germans. Theirs had been constructive work, but now it counted for nothing. They were deprived of their liberty and in many cases their lives. I consider the whole affair to have been a disgrace. Stalin could have simply rejected their suggestion and rebuked them. But no, he had to destroy all those who actively supported the proposal. It was only by some miracle that Zhemchuzhina stayed alive and got off with a long term of exile. More typical was the cruel punishment of Mikhoels, the greatest actor of the Yiddish theater, a man of culture. They killed him like beasts. They killed him secretly. Then his murderers were rewarded and tbeir victim was buried with honors. The mind reels at the thought! It was announced that Mikhoels had fallen in

{footnote - Crankshaw's comment} 13. This refers to the Autonomous Republic of Birobidzhan in Siberia, designated as a national home for soviet Jews It never came to much. Understandably the Jews took to it only in small numbers.
{end Crankshaw's footnote}

{p. 262} front of a truck. Actually he was thrown in front of a truck. This was done very cleverly and efficiently. And who did it? Stalin did it, or at least it was done on his instructions. After Stalin's death, when we opened the archives of the Ministry of State Security and interrogated Beria's men, we found out that they had planned to murder Litvinov [Molotov's predecessor as foreign minister] by a similar method. Litvinov was to have been ambushed and killed on the road while he was traveling from Moscow to his dacha. 14

Later, a group of Jews at the Stalin Automobile Factory were put on trial. In this case, too, Stalin was looking for schemes of American imperialism operating through Zionists. It was all pure nonsense, of course. But this was the sort of thing that happened as a result of Stalin's arbitrary rule and the absolute absence of any restraints on his authority.

It still seems inconceivable to me that this kind of thing happened in our time. I'm all for arresting people, but the accused should be given a fair trial and exiled or imprisoned only if an honest approach to their cases proves that they really are criminal or political offenders. A prosecution and a trial should proceed according to the norms of the law. Trials should be conducted in the open so there will be no doubt in anyone's mind that the accused actually are guilty. That way no one will come to the defense of people who have been punished, and public opinion will genuinely support the punitive agencies. In our day we had people lifting up their voices in court, vouching for the truth of accusations, beating their breasts, and swearing that the accused were enemies of the people - all without any real knowledge about what had happened. A witness would endorse the verdict and raise his hand, voting for the elimination of the accused without really knowing about the facts of the alleged crime, much less the role of the alleged criminal. These were not real trials anyway. They were closed courts in the hands of troikas. And who made up the troikas? Three men who arrested, prosecuted, and judged the accused all by themselves. Most of the people who lost their heads in Stalin's time were tried by this kind of court. ...

{footnote - Crankshaw's comment} 14. M. M. Litvinov, Soviet foreign minister, was replaced by Molotov after tho failure of his "collective security" drive in 1939. The story of his planned assassination is new. In the end he died a natural death.
{end Crankshaw's footnote}


(8) Stalin was poisoned on the feast of Purim, 1953

Stalin was suddenly paralysed on 1st March 1953, which corresponds to Purim 1953, and died 4 days later.

Due to Stalin's death, nation-wide pogroms against Jews throughout the Soviet Union were averted, as Stalin's infamous doctors' plot was halted.

This page was last edited on 16 May 2023, at 22:05 (UTC). ==

How Stalin's Rage Saved the Jews

By Larry Domnitch

from the March 2003 Edition of the Jewish Magazine

The following story was leaked to the press at a time when the Soviets, frequently accused of anti-Semitism, sought to improve their image. In 1956, two accounts appeared. One in the London Times, the other in France Soir, one year later, a similar account appeared in the New York Times. These accounts depicted the events surrounding the last living moments of Soviet premier Joseph Stalin. There is no certainty regarding the accuracy of these accounts, but there is no evidence to the contrary.

At the end of February 1953, a meeting took place between leaders of the Soviet regime. There, Stalin revealed his plans for Soviet Jewry. No Mordechai or Esther was present, but Haman was there. At the meeting, Stalin's pent up fury reached a crescendo and exploded into an uncontrolled rage, which resulted in his death and perhaps the salvation of millions.

Not even ten years after the Nazi destruction of European Jewry, Josef Stalin was bent upon the same course. Decades of purges, executions, imprisonment's and exiles of tens of thousands of Soviet Jews had escalated during the early years of the Cold War into a full-scale attack upon Soviet Jewry. By early 1953, the media launched daily attacks against the Jews under the pretext of the infamous "Doctors plot" in which Jewish doctors were accused of planning to poison government officials. As a result of the accusations, numerous doctors and other Soviet Jews were incarcerated, and executed. As in Nazi Germany, and so many other nations throughout history, they were used as scapegoats for all of their nation's woes. Hounded by both the media and the police, the Jews of the Soviet Union, lived in terror. The driving force behind the terror was Stalin.

Stalin's onslaught against the Jews was not something random; there was a calculated purpose to his madness. At the time, rumors had already become widespread that he was planning to deport thousands of Jews to Biro Bidzhan (an alleged Jewish autonomous region) and Siberia. A broadcast on Voice of America stated, "Biro Bidzhan the 'Jewish autonomous republic' has been transformed into a concentration camp. A surreptitious tendency is observed to deport to Biro Bidzhan all Jews arrested. It is difficult to establish the number of camps in Biro Bidzhan. Suffice it to say that one of the camps along the Biro River there are five to six departments; each department is reckoned to have 200-300 slaves."  Those rumors were soon the subject of a meeting between Stalin and his presidium.

Stalin pre-empted the meeting with the two-dozen leaders present by rehashing the usual accusations of "Zionist imperialist plots" and the "doctor's plot" and spoke of the need for collective deportation of the Jews to Central Asia and Biro Bidzhan. The implications were clear. A hushed silence followed the speech. Lazar Kaganovich, one of Stalin's loyal enforcers was the first to speak. He asked hesitantly, whether all Jews were to be deported. Stalin replied, "a certain section." Again there was silence.

Another presidium member, Vyacheslav Molotov, whose Jewish wife Paulina was exiled to the Kazakhastan wilderness a few years earlier, broke the silence and dared to object stating that the expulsion of Jews would have a negative impact on world opinion, while another longtime Politburo member, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, shook his head in agreement. The unusual display of opposition continued. Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov dared to defy the dictator. Just days earlier, four government agents arrived at his home to arrest his Jewish wife. More loyal to his wife than to the regime, Voroshilov, with gun in hand chased them away. In a dramatic gesture of defiance, he threw his party card on the table and resolutely stated that he no longer wanted to be a part of the Communist party. Enraged, Stalin bellowed in response that only he determined who remained within the party.

As Stalin's rage reached a crescendo, he collapsed on the floor suffering a massive stroke. As he lay stricken, no specialist arrived to help him. They were all executed and imprisoned during the "Doctor's plot." Fifteen to 20 minutes' later, doctors arrived. Stalin was brought to his private apartment where he lay gravely ill. Soviet party leaders surrounded him, many eagerly anticipating his imminent death and the end of his reign. In his final gesture, he pointed his finger towards those present at his bedside including his daughter suggesting their guilt or complicity in a conspiracy to kill him. Then he died.

Following Stalin's death, there was concern that his successors would be as evil or even worse. No one knew what to expect from the Soviets. Perhaps the next leader would blame the Jews for the Premier's death. An editorial from a contemporary Jewish periodical concluded its summation on Stalin's death; "The fate of Jews in the Red Empire hangs in the balance."

Stalin's death, which was announced on March 5, was actually cause for great relief. The purges almost immediately ended as did most of the media attacks against Jews and Israel. Soon, the surviving doctor's arrested were released. Soviet Jewry's struggles were far from over, but they were relieved of their greatest antagonist.

Stalin died as he was planning Jewry's destruction in the Soviet Union. The exact day of his death remains a mystery. Perhaps he died on Purim day (March 1) itself. But one thing could be said, in the safety of their private confines, Soviet Jews celebrated Purim marking the salvation of Jewry in ancient times and in their own as well.  ==

3.14.2006 9:08pm

(link)Lena Matis (mail):

Josef Stalin suffered a massive stroke on Purim Day 1953 He died two days later (the official date of death is March 5). Prior to that Purim Day, Stalin was executing his own mad well-calculated plan of deportation of the Soviet Jews into Far Eastern concentration camps. Thus Stalin's collapse on Purim Day, followed by his death, prevented the otherwise inevitable distruction of the Jews in the USSR. ==

Stalin and the Purim Present

A new book reveals that Stalin met his fate poised to launch a post-Holocaust holocaust of his own.

by Am Echad Resources

March 5 this year was the first day of the Jewish month Adar (actually the second of two Adars during this Jewish leap year). We are enjoined by the Talmud to "increase happiness" in Adar, the month of Purim, when we celebrate and express our gratitude to God for delivering the Jews in ancient Persia from their enemies.

On Purim, Jews give alms to the poor and gifts of food to one another. This year, March 5 brought us an early Purim present. It wasn't food, but it was definitely food for thought.

The previous day had been the 50th anniversary of the death of Iosef Vissarionovich Dzugashvili, better known as Joseph Stalin. A new book on the Soviet dictator and mass murderer, "Stalin's Last Crime," is set to be published shortly, and it was on the 5th that The New York Times ran a lengthy article about the book, including its suggestion that Stalin may have been poisoned. The Soviet leader had collapsed after an all-night dinner with four member of his Politburo at Blizhnaya, a north Moscow dacha, and languished for several days before dying. If indeed he was done in, as the book's authors suspect, the likely culprit, they say, was Lavrenti P. Beria, the chief of the Soviet secret police.

The book also recounts the story of the infamous "Doctors' Plot," a fabricated collusion by Kremlin doctors to kill top Communist leaders.

"By the time Stalin disclosed the plot to a stunned Soviet populace in January 1953," the article notes, "he had spun it into a vast conspiracy, led by Jews under the United States' secret direction, to kill him and destroy the Soviet Union itself."

The article goes on to relate something less widely known. "That February," it states, "the Kremlin ordered the construction of four giant prison camps in Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Arctic north, apparently in preparation for a second great terror -- this time directed at the millions of Soviet citizens of Jewish descent."

That terror, however, thankfully never unfolded. Two weeks after the camps were ordered built, Stalin attended the Blizhnaya dinner and, four days later, was dead at the age of 73.

The gift we have been given this Adar is the knowledge of what the killer of millions of his countrymen had apparently planned for the Jews under his control. That he met his fate (however that may have happened) poised to launch a post-Holocaust holocaust of his own, is something we might well add to our thoughts of gratitude at our Purim celebrations this year, a half century later.

And we might note something else as well, especially during this season of meaningful ironies, when God's hand is evident "between the lines" of history to all who are sensitive enough to see it.

Stalin, according to his successor Nikita Khrushchev, who was present at the dinner party, had apparently collapsed after the feast, at which, Khrushchev also recounted, the dictator had gotten thoroughly drunk. The feast ended in the early hours of March 1.

Which, in 1953, corresponded to the 14th day of Adar, otherwise known as Purim.

Pavel Sudoplatov on the proposal for a Jewish Crimea: sudoplat.html. Sudoplatov denied that Stalin planned to deport the Jews. He would have known, because of his position. Rumours abounded, but no evidence of such a plan has been produced. However, Stalin refused to allow a Jewish Lobby to operate in the Soviet Union as it did in the United States. Advocates of making the Crimea a Jewish republic within the Soviet Union alarmed Stalin because they were in talks with American Jewish Plutocrats about investing large amounts of money there. Jewish ties to other Jews in the US and Israel seemed stronger than their loyalty to the Soviet Union; that's what damned the project, especially after the Baruch Plan for World Government. Jews thus came to be seen as a security risk during the Cold War, and were kept out of sensitive posts. In the end, most Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union (see jewish-emigration-ussr.html), although a small percent stayed loyal to the end. Many of the Jews who emigrated were highly-skilled professionals.

Lazar Kaganovich on the Death of Stalin: kaganovich.html.

Edvard Radzinsky on the Death of Stalin: radzinsk.html.

Mao stayed loyal to Stalin. When he saw how Stalin had been treated, he inaugurated the Let 100 Flowers Bloom campaign, to draw his enemies out. He became destabilized, launching the Great Leap Forward. Its failure led to Mao's demotion; to regain his power, he promoted the disastrous Cultural Revolution. Finally he accepted Nixon's olive branch, delivered by Kissinger; the USSR thus gained Vietnam, but lost China.

In 1979, with Vietnam invading Cambodia, China invaded Vietnam. Vietnam had just renewed a treaty with the USSR; China was testing that treaty. The US warned the USSR not to intervene - thus taking China's side. In the 1980s, China allowed the CIA to monitor Soviet nuclear tests from within China:

U.S., China Team Up in Drug War; New Center Helps Nations Eavesdrop on Traffickers

The Washington Post; Washington, D.C.; Oct 31, 1998; John Pomfret; Douglas Farah;

ISSN: 01908286

In a step toward joint operations to fight international crime, the United States and China have established a secret electronic surveillance post along China's border with Burma to eavesdrop on narcotics traffickers from the Golden Triangle, one of the world's biggest sources of heroin, Chinese and U.S. sources say. ... It follows on the operation in the 1980s by the CIA and its Chinese counterpart of listening posts in China's far-western Xinjiang Autonomous Region to monitor Soviet nuclear weapons tests. ...

The conflict between the Zionist and Stalinist factions of Communism, emerging in public with the Doctors' Plot, thus brought it down.

The John Birch Society and the League of Rights blame Kissinger for accepting defeat in Vietnam, not crediting his role in winning China. These McCarthyists, like Douglas McArthur, would have used nuclear weapons in the Korean & Vietnamese wars.

After Mao's death, Deng Xiao-ping visited Japan, and decided to move towards the Japanese economic model. But Japan's hierarchic society, culminating in the Keiretsu, was different from China's; China later found the South Korean chaebol a better model for it to follow.

The Basle Accord of 1987 brought down the Japanese banks; and the Asia Crisis of 1997 destroyed the independence of the "Asian Tigers", leaving China with the inheritance of the "Asia model". Its Comnmunist Party helps to preserve its independence from the West; more on Asia at asia.html.

Stalin Versus the World Government: stalin.html.

on the Purges: stalin-purges.html.

The wives of Stalin: wives-of-stalin.html.

Seeing the real Trotsky: trotsky.html.

Isaac Deutscher wrote that the Bolshevik Government, in its first years, was run by "emigres had lived many years in the West", who looked down on Russian "backwardness" and pursued "internationalist" politics:

"... they were Marxists in partibus infidelium, West European revolutionaries acting against a non-congenial Oriental background, which ... tried to impose its tyranny upon them. Only revolution in the West could relieve them from that tyranny ... "

"No sooner had Bolshevism mentally withdrawn into its national shell than this attitude became untenable. The party of the revolution had to stoop to its semi-Asiatic environment. It had to cut itself loose from the specifically Western tradition of Marxism ... "

Beria and Gorbachev attempted to return to this "Western" Marxism: each emphatically rejected Stalin. But Deutscher was a Jewish Trotskytist, and this "Western" Marxism is Trotskyism by another name: beria.html.

On the successor-governments following the death of Stalin, see Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich UTOPIA IN POWER: the History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, translated by Phyllis B. Carlos (Hutchinson, London, 1985): marx-vs-the-peasant.html.

To order The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR' second-hand via ABEBooks:

Write to me at contact.html.

New material on this website: additions.html

Alphabetical Index of this website: download.html