Writings of Samuel P. Huntington - Selections by Peter Myers; my comments are shown {thus}. Date December 16, 2002; update June 6, 2008.

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(1) The Crisis Of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (2) Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993 (3) The West: Unique not Universal, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 75 No. 6, November/December 1996 (4) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) (5) Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (included here because Huntington draws heavily upon it) (6) Christian when it suits them; otherwise Jewish (7) Newsweek article about Neocons writes-out the JINSA connection (8) Bernard Lewis - a Jewish scholar - led Samuel Huntington to the "Clash of Civilizations" (9) Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage (10) PROFILE: BERNARD LEWIS: British Svengali Behind Clash Of Civilizations (11) Open Letter to the President - signed by Bernard Lewis

Included is a list of the members of the Trilateral Commission, as at August 15, 1975.

The list of members is a roll-call of the governing classes.

The war against the Arabs and Islam is run by two conspiracies, an Anglo-American one (the whale, because it controls the oceans), and a Zionist one (the elephant, the one you can't see in the china shop until you join up the dots).

Some people can't see the whale; some can't see the elephant. Chomsky and the Trotskyist Left see the whale but not the elephant.

The Balfour Declaration marked the joining-up of two conspiracies, the British one (now Anglo-American) and the Zionist one.

The British one had wanted to get the US back into the Empire, even if that meant transferring the capital to the US. In the end, they were only able to do that with the assistance of Jewish middlemen.

Before the Balfour Declaration, the two conspiracies were working against each other. It was in the Zionist interest to keep the protagionists in World War I as evenly balanced as possible, i.e. keep the US out of the war, until the fall of the Tsar, their hated enemy. Then they auctioned their support to the protagonists.

Suppose that the U.S. had entered the war earlier, and mobilized its troops and sent them to the front. Then Britain would not have made the Balfour Declaration, as "a contract with World Jewry", whereby Zionists got Palestine in return for getting the U.S. into the war - because the U.S. would already have titled the balance.

The catch was this: the Zionist one knew about the Anglo one, because Cecil Rhodes had invited Lord Rothschild to join it; but the Anglos did not know about the Zionist one.

Samuel Huntington is one of the leaders of the Anglo-American one. Huntington's importance as the oracle of George W. Bush's Clash of Civilizations justifies close study of his thinking.

Because these materials are so important to the workings of world power, they should be studied by the people of the world. After all, Huntington upholds Democracy as a core value. How can the people rule, if they be uninformed?

(1) The Crisis Of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission

Michel Crozier
Samuel P. Huntington
Joji Watanuki

Published by New York University Press 1975

{p. i} The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together among these regions.

{p. iii} INTRODUCTORY NOTE {by all three authors}

Is democracy in crisis? This question is being posed with increasing urgency by some of the leading statesmen of the West, by columnists and scholars, and - if public opinion polls are to be trusted - even by the publics. In some respects, the mood of today is reminiscent of that of the early twenties, when the views of Oswald Spengler regarding "The Decline of the West" were highly popular. This pessimism is echoed, with obvious Schadenfreude, by various communist observers, who speak with growing confidence of "the general crisis of capitalism" and who see in it the confirmation of their own theories.

The report which follows is not a pessimistic document. Its authors believe that, in a fundamental sense, the democratic systems are viable. ... Their discussion of "The Crisis of Democracy" is designed to make democracy stronger as it grows and becomes more and more democratic. ...

{p. iv} This report has been prepared for the Trilateral Commission and is released under its auspices. The Commission is making the report available for wider distribution as a contribution to informed discussion and handling of the issues treated. The report was discussed at the Trilateral Commission meetings in Kyoto, Japan, on May 30-31, 1975. The authors, who are experts from North America, Western Europe and Japan, have been free to present their own views.

The report is the joint responsibility of the three rapporteurs of the Trilateral Commission's Task Force on the Governability of Democracies, which was set up in the spring of 1974 and which submitted its report in the spring of 1975. The chapter on Japan is the work of Joji Watanuki. The chapter on Western Europe is the work of Michel Crozier. The chapter on the United States is the work of Samuel P. Huntington.

Although only the three authors are responsible for the analysis and conclusions, they were aided in their task by consultations with experts from the trilateral regions.

{p. v} Zbigniew Brzezinski
The Trilateral Commission

{p. 1} CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION {by all three authors}

At the present time, a significant challenge comes from the intellectuals and related groups who assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to "monopoly capitalism." The development of an "adversary culture" among intellectuals has affected students, scholars and the media. Intellectuals are, as Schumpeter put it "people who wield the power of the spoken and the written word, and one of the touches that distinguish them from other people who do the same is the absence of direct responsibility for practical affairs." In some measure, the advanced industrial societies have spawned a stratum of

{p. 7} value-oriented intellectuals who often devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions, their behavior contrasting with that of the also increasing numbers of technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals. In an age of widespread secondary school and university education, the pervasiveness of the mass media, and the displacement of manual labor by clerical and professional employees, this development constitutes a challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at least, as serious as those posed in the past by the aristocratic cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties.

In addition to the emergence of the adversary intellectuals and their culture, a parallel and possibly related trend affecting the viability of democracy concerns broader changes in social values. In all three Trilateral regions, a shift in values is taking place away from the materialistic work-oriented, public-spirited values toward those which stress private satisfaction, leisure, and the need for "belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment." These values are, of course, most notable in the younger generation. They often coexist with greater skepticism towards political leaders and institutions and with greater alienation from the political processes. They tend to be privatistic in their impact and import. The rise of this syndrome of values is presumably related to the relative affluence in which most groups in the Trilateral societies came to share during the economic expansion of the 1960s. The new values may not survive recession and resource shortages. But if they do, they pose an additional new problem for democratic government in terms of its ability to mobilize its citizens for the achievement of social and political goals and to impose discipline and sacrifice upon its citizens in order to achieve those goals.

{p. 8} The contextual challenges differ, as we have seen, for each society. Variations in the nature of the particular democratic institutions and processes in each society may also make some types of intrinsic challenges more prominent in one society than in another. But, overall, the intrinsic threats are general ones which are in some degree common to the operation of all democratic systems. The more democratic a system is, indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by intrinsic threats. Intrinsic challenges are, in this sense, more serious than extrinsic ones. Democracies may be able to avoid, moderate, or learn to live with contextual challenges to their viability. There is deeper reason for pessimism if the threats to democracy arise ineluctably from the inherent workings of the democratic process itself. Yet, in recent years, the operations of the democratic process do indeed appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to respond.

{p. 11} CHAPTER III - THE UNITED STATES by Samuel P. Huntington

{p. 113} Al Smith once remarked that "the only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy." Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could well be adding fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy - an "excess of democracy" in much the same sense in which David Donald used the term to refer to the consequences of the Jacksonian revolution which helped to precipitate the Civil War. Needed, instead, is a greater degree Of moderation in democracy.

{p. 114} Second, the effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political system. Yet the danger of overloading the political system with demands which extend its functions and undermine its authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of some groups thus needs to be replaced by more self-restraint on the part of all groups.

{p. 115} Political authority is never strong in the United States, and it is peculiarly weak during a creedal passion period of intense commitment to democratiC and egalitarian ideals. In the United States, the strength of democracy poses a problem for the governability of democracy in a way which is not the case elsewhere.

{p. 157} CHAPTER V - CONCLUSION {by all three authors}

Internationally, confrontation has given way to detente, with a resultant relaxation of constraints within societies and of the impetus to collaborate among societies. There has been a substantial relative decline in American military and economic power, and a major absolute decline in American willingness to assume the burdens of leadership. And most recently, the temporary slowdown in economic growth has threatened the expectations created by previous growth, while still leaving existent the "postbourgeois" values which it engendered among the youth and intellectuals.

{p. 159} What is in short supply in democratic societies today is thus not consensus on the rules of the game but a sense of Purpose as to what one should achieve by playing the game. In the past, people have found their purposes in religion, in nationalism and in ideology. But neither church, nor state, nor class now commands people's loyalties. In some measure, democracy itself was inspired by and its institutions shaped by manifestations of each of these forces and commitments. Protestantism sanctified the individual conscience; nation-

{p. 160} alism postulated the equality of citizens; and liberalism provided the rationale for limited govemment based on consent. But now all three gods have failed. We have witnessed the dissipation of religion, the withering away of nationalism, the decline - if not the end - of class-based ideology.

In a nondemocratic political system, the top leadership can select a single purpose or closely related set of goals and, in some measure, induce or coerce political and social forces to shape their behavior in terms of the priorities dictated by these goals. Third World dictatorships can direct their societies towards the "overriding" goal of national development; communist states can mobilize their populace for the task of "building socialism." In a democracy, however, purpose cannot be imposed from on high by fiat; nor does it spring to life from the verbiage of party platforms, state of the union messages, or speeches from the throne. It must, instead, be the product of the collective perception by the significant groups in society of a major challenge to their well-being and the perception by them that this challenge threatens them all about equally. Hence, in wartime or periods of economic catastrophe, common purposes are easily defined. ...

In this situation, the machinery of democracy continues to operate, but the ability of the individuals operating that

{p. 161} machinery to make decisions tends to deteriorate. Without common purpose, there is no basis for common priorities, and without priorities, there are no grounds for distinguishing among competing private interests and claims. Conflicting goals and specialized interests crowd in one upon another, with executives, cabinets, parliaments, and bureaucrats lacking the criteria to discriminate among them. The system becomes one of anomic democracy, in which democratic politics becomes more an arena for the assertion of conflicting interests than a process for the building of common purposes.


{p. 162} 1. The Delegitimation of Authority

In most of the Trilateral countries in the past decade there has been a decline in the confidence and trust which the people have in government, in their leaders, and, less clearly but most importantly, in each other. Authority has been challenged not only in government, but in trade unions, business enterprises, schools and universities, professional associations, churches, and civic groups. In the past, those institutions which have played the major role in the indoctrination of the young in their rights and obligations as members of society have been the family, the church, the school, and the army. The effectiveness of all these institutions as a means of socialization has declined severely. The stress has been increasingly on individuals and their rights, interests, and needs, and not on the community and its rights, interests, and needs. These attitudes have been particularly prevalent in the young, but they have also appeared in other age groups, especially among those who have achieved professional, white-collar, and middle-class status. The success of the existing structures of authority in incorporating large elements of the population into the middle class, paradoxically, strengthens precisely those groups which are disposed to challenge the existing structures of authority.

{p. 163} Leadership is in disrepute in democratic societies. Without confidence in its leadership, no group functions effectively. When the fabric of leadership weakens among other groups in society, it is also weakened at the top political levels of government. The governability of a society at the national level depends upon the extent to which it is effectively governed at the subnational, regional, local, functional, and industrial levels. In the modern state, for instance, powerful trade union "bosses" are often viewed as a threat to the power of the state. In actuality, however, responsible union leaders with effective authority over their members are less of a challenge to the authority of the national political leaders than they are a prerequisite to the exercise of authority by those leaders. If the unions are disorganized, if the membership is rebellious, if extreme demands and wild-cat strikes are the order of the day, the formulation and implementation of a national wage policy become impossible. The weakening of authority throughout society thus contributes to the weakening of the authority of government.

{p. 167} In times of economic scarcity, inflation, and possible long-term economic downturn ... the leaders of democratic governments turn increasingly to foreign policy as the one arena where they can achieve what appear to be significant successes. Diplomatic triumph becomes essential to the maintenance of domestic power; success abroad produces votes at home.

{p. 201} Another Japanese Commissioner recalled a statement of Lenin's that a revolution cannot be initiated by demands from below, but only when the governing classes are divided and dissatisfied. One might argue that governing classes are now in this condition.

{But does Democracy have "governing classes"?}

{The Tsarist Government suffered revolutions in 1905 and 1917, after defeats in war. And this Conference of the Trilateral Commission was being held in the wake of the US defeat in Vietnam. The Soviet Union, in the late 1970s, entertained imperial ambitions, overstretched itself, and later collapsed in the wake of defeat in Afghanistan. Might the United States under GWB, and to some extent following Huntington's blueprint (below), be following the same imperial path?}

{p. 215} (As of August 15, 1975)


North American Members

*W. Abel, President, United Steelworkers of America
David M. Abshire, Chairman, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies
Graham Allison, Professor of Politics, Harvard University
Doris Anderson, Editor, Chatelaine Magazine
John B. Anderson, House of Representatives
Ernest C. Arbuckle, Chairman, Wells Fargo Bank
J. Paul Austin, Chairman, The Coca-Cola Company
George W. Ball, Senior Partner, Lehman Brothers
Russell Bell, Research Director, Canadian Labour Congress
Lucy Wilson Benson, former President, League of Women Voters of the United States
W. Michael Blumenthal, Chairman, Bendix Corporation
*Robert W. Bonner, Q.C., Bonner & Fouks, Vancouver
Robert R. Bowie, Lawrence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University
John Brademas, House of Representatives
*Harold Brown, President, California Institute of Technology
James E. Carter, Jr., Former Governor of Georgia
Lawton Chiles, United States Senate
Warren Christopher, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers
Alden W. Clausen, President, Bank of America
§William T. Coleman, Jr., Secretary, Department of Transportation
Barber B. Conable, Jr., House of Representatives
Richard N. Cooper, Frank Altschul Professor of International Economics, Yale University
John C. Culver, United States Senate
Gerald L. Curtis, Director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Lloyd N. Cutler, Partner, Wilmer, Culler & Pickering
Archibald K. Davis, Chairman, Wachovia Bank & Trust Company
Emmett Dedmon, Vice President and Editorial Director, Field Enterprises, Inc.
Louis A. Desrochers, Partner, McCuaig and Desrochers

{p. 216} Peter Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Center for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade
Hedley Donovan, Editor-in-Chief, Time, Inc.
Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington
Gordon Fairweather, Member of Parliament
Donald M. Fraser, House of Representatives
Richard N. Gardner, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia University
*Patrick E. Haggerty, Chairman, Texas Instruments
William A. Hewitt, Chairman, Deere & Company
Alan Hockin, Executive Vice President, Toronto-Dominion Bank
Richard Holbrooke, Managing Editor, Foreign Policy Magazine
Thomas L. Hughes, President, Carnegie Endowment for Internatitional Peace
J. K. Jamieson, Chairman, Exxon Corporation
Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO
Sol M. Linowitz, Senior Partner, Coudert Brothers
Bruce K. MacLaury, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Claude Masson, Professor of Economics, Laval University
Paul W. McCracken, Edmund Ezra Day Professor of Business Administration, University of Michigan
Walter F. Mondale, United States Senate
Lee L. Morgan, President, Caterpillar Tractor Company
Kenneth D. Naden, President, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
Henry D. Owen, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Inshtution
David Packard, Chairman, Hewlett-Packard Company
*Jean-Luc Pepin, P.C., President, Interimco, Ltd.
John H. Perkins, President, Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company
Peter G. Peterson, Chairman, Lehman Brothers
*Edwin O. Reischauer, University Professor, Harvard University; former U.S. Ambassador to Japan
§EIliot L. Richardson, United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom
*David Rockefeller, Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank
Robert V. Roosa, Partner, Brown Bros., Harriman & Company
*William M. Roth, Roth Properties
William V. Roth, Jr., United States Senate
Carl T. Rowan, Columnist
*William W. Scranton, Former Governor of Pennsylvania
*Gerard C. Smith, Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
Anthony Solomon, Consultant
Robert Taft, Jr., United States Senate
Arthur R. Taylor, President, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
Cyrus R. Vance, Partner, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett
*Paul C. Warnke, Partner, Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney
Marina von N. Whitman, Distinguished Public Service Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
Carroll L. Wilson, Professor of Management, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, MIT
Arthur M. Wood, Chairman, Sears, Roebuck & Company
Leonard Woodcock, President, United Automobile Workers

*Executive Committee
§Currently in Government Service

{p. 217} European Members

*Giovanni Agnelli, President, FIAT, Ltd.
Raymond Barre, Former Vice President of the Commission of the European Community
Piero Bassetti, President of the Regional Governent of Lombardy
*Georges Berthoin, Former Chief Representative of the Commission of the European Community to the UK.
*Kurt Birrenbach, Member of the Bundestag; President, Thyssen Vermogensverwaltung
Franco Bobba, Company Director, Turin
Frederick Boland, Chancellor, Dublin University; former President of the United Nations General Assembly
Rene Bonety, Representant de la CFDT
Jean-Claude Casanova, Director of Shudies, Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris
Umberto Colombo, Director of the Committee for Scientific Policy, OECD
Guido Colonna di Paliano, President, La Rinascente; former member of the Commission of the European Community
*Francesco Compagna, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Mezzogiorno
The Earl of Cromer, Former Britiish Ambassador to the United States; Partner, Baring Bros. and Co., Ltd
Michel Debatisse, President de la F.N.S.E.A.
*Paul Delouvrier, Chairman, French Electricity Board
Barry Desmond, Member of the Lower House of the Irish Republic
Fritz Dietz, President, German Association for Wholesale and Foreign Trade Werner Dollinger, Member of the Bundestag
*Herbert Ehrenberg, Member of the Bundestag
Pierre Esteva, Directeur General de I 'U.A.P.
*Marc Eyskens, Commissary General of the Catholic University of Louvain
M. H. Fisher, Editor, Financial Times
Francesco Forte, Professor of Financial Sciences, University of Tunn
Jacques de Fouchier, President, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas
Michel Gaudet, President de la Federation Francaise des Assurances
Sir Reay Geddes, Chairman, Dunlop Holdings, Ltd
Giuseppe Glisenti, Director of General Affairs, La Rinascente
Lord Harlech, Former Brihish Ambassador to the United States; Chairman, Harlech Television
Karl Hauenschild, President, German Chemical-Paper-Ceramics Workers' Union
Jozef P. Houthuys, President, Belgian Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
Daniel E. Janssen, Deputy Director General, Belgian Chemical Union, Ltd.
Pierre Jouven, President de Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann
Karl Kaiser, Director of the Research Instihute of the German Society for Foreign Policy
Michael Killeen, Managing Director, Industrial Development Authority, Irish Republic
Andre Kloos, Chairman of the Socialist radio and television network "VA.R.A. "; former chairman of the Dutch Trade Union Federation
*Max Kohnstamm, President, European Community Institute for University Studies Baron Leon Lambert, President, Banque Lambert, Brussels
Count Otto Lambsdorff, Member of the Bundestag
Arrigo Levi, Director, La Stampa, Turin

{p. 218} Eugen Loderer, President, German Metal Workers' Union
*John Loudon, Chairman, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
Evan Luard, Member of Parliament
Robert Marjolin, Former Vice President of the Commission of the European Community
Roger Martin, President de la Cie Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson
Reginald Maudling, Member of Parliament; former Cabinet Minister
F. S. McFadzean, Managing Director, Royal Dutch Shell Group
Cesare Merlini, Director, Italian Institute for International Affairs
Alwin Munchmeyer, President, German Banking Federation
§Ivar Nrgaard, Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs and Nordic Affairs, Denmark
Michael O'Kennedy, Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Irish Republic; former Cabinet Minister
Bernard Pagezy, President Directeur General de la Paternelle Vie
Pierre Pescatore, Luxembourg; Member of the European Court of Justice
Sir John Pilcher, Former British Ambassador to Japan
Jean Rey, Former President of the Commission of the European Community
Julian Ridsdale, Member of Parliament; Chairman of the Anglo-Japanese Parliament Group
Sir Frank K. Roberts, Advisory Director of Unilever, Ltd; Advisor on Intemational Affairs to Lloyds of London
*Mary T. W. Robinson, Member of the Senate of the Irish Republic
Sir Eric Roll, Executive Director, S. G. Warburg and Company
Edmond de Rothschild, President de la Compagnie Financiere Holding
John Christian Sannes, Director, Norwegian Institute of Intemational Affairs
Gerhard Schroder, Member of the Bundestag; former Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany
Roger Seydoux, Ambassador of France
Andrew Shonfield, Director, The Royal Institute of International Affairs
Hans-Gunther Sohl, President, Federal Union of German Industry; President of the Board of Directors of August Thyssen Hutte A. G.
Theo Sommer, Editor-in-Chief, Die Zeit
Myles Staunton, Member of the Lower House of the Irish Republic
Thorvald Stoltenberg, International Affairs Secretary, Norwegian Trade Union Council
G. R. Storry, St. Antony 's College, Oxford (Far East Centre)
J. A. Swire, Chairman, John Swire and Sons, Ltd
*Otto Grieg Tidemand, Shipowner; former Norwegian Minister of Defense and Minister of Economic Affairs
A. F. Tuke, Chairman, Barclays Bank International
Heinz-Oskar Vetter, Chairman, German Federation of Trade Unions
Luc Wauters, President, Kredietbank, Brussels
Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President, Otto Wolff A. G.; President, German Chamber of Commerce
*Sir Kenneth Younger, Former Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
*Sir Philip de Zulueta, Chief Executive, Antony Gibbs Holdings, Ltd; former Chief Assistant to the British Prime Minister

*Executive Committee
§Currently in Government Service

{p. 219} Japanese Members

Isao Amagi, Director, Japan Scholarship Foundation; former Vice Minister of Education
Yoshiya Anyoshi, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kaisha
Yoshishige Ashihara, Chairman, Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc.
Toshio Doko, President, Japan Federation of Economic Organizabons (Keidanren)
Jun Eto, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Shinkichi Eto, Professor of International Relations, Tokyo University
*Chujiro Fujino, Chairman, Mitsubishi Corporation
Shintaro Fukushima, President, Kyodo News Service
Noboru Gotoh, President, TOKYU Corporation
Toru Hagiwara, Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; former Ambassador to France
Sumio Hara, Chairman, Bank of Tokyo, Ltd
*Yukitaka Haraguchi, Chairman, All Japan Federation of Metal and Mining Industries Labor Unions
Norishige Hasegawa, President, Sumitomo Chemical Company, Ltd
*Yoshio Hayashi, Member of the Diet
Teru Hidaka, Chairman, Yamaichi Securities Company, Ltd
*Kazushige Hirasawa, Radio-TV news commentator, Japan Broadcasting Inc.
Hideo Hori, President, Employment Promotion Project Corporation
Shozo Hotia, Chairman, Sumitomo Bank, Ltd
Shinichi Ichimura, Professor of Economics, Kyoto University
Hiroki Imazato, President, Nippon Seiko K.K.
Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
Kaoru Inoue, Chairman, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd
Rokuro Ishikawa, Executive Vice President, Kajima Corporation
Tadao lshikawa, Professor, Department of Political Science, Keio University
Yoshizane Iwasa, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, Fuji Bank, Ltd.
Motoo Kaji, Professor of Economics, Tokyo University
Fuji Kamiya, Professor, Keio University
*Yusuke Kashiwagi, Deputy President, Bank of Tokyo, Ltd; former Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance
Ryoichi Kawai, President, Komatsu Seisakusho, Ltd
Katsuji Kawamata, Chairman, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd
Kazutaka Kikawada, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.
Kiichiro Kitaura, President, Nomura Securities Company, Ltd
Koji Kobayashi, President, Nippon Electric Company, Ltd
Kenichiro Komai, Chairman, Hitachi, Ltd
Fumihiko Kono, Counselor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd
Masataka Kosaka, Professor, Faculty of Law, Kyoto University
Fumihiko Maki, Principal Partner, Maki and Associates, Design, Planning and Development
Shigeharu Matsumoto, Chairman, International House of Japan, Inc.
Masaharu Matsushita, President, Matsushita Electric Company, Ltd
§Kiichi Miyazawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Akio Morita, President, SONY Corporation
Takashi Mukaibo, Professor, Faculty of Engineering, Tokyo University
*Kinhide Mushakoji, Director, Institute of International Relatiions, Sophia University
Yonosuke Nagai, Professor of Political Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Shigeo Nagano, President, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

{p. 220} Eiichi Nagasue, Member of the Diet
Toshio Nakamura, President, Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd.
Ichiro Nakayama, President, Janpa Institute of Labor
Sohei Nakayama, President, Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency
Yoshihisa Ohjimi, Advisor, Arabian Oil Company, Ltd; former Administrative Vice Minister of Intemational Trade and Industry
*Saburo Okita, President, Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
Kiichi Saeki, Director, Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics
Kunihiko Sasaki, Chairman, Fuji Bank, Ltd.
*Ryuji Takeuchi, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Ambassador to the United States
Eiji Toyoda, President, Toyota Motor Company, Ltd
Seiji Tsutsumi, President, Seibu Department Store, Inc.
Kogoro Uemura, Honorary President, Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)
Tadao Umezao, Professor of Ethnology, Kyoto University
*Nobuhiko Ushiba, Former Ambassador of Japan to the United States
Jiro Ushio, President, Ushio Electric Inc.
Shogo Watanabe, President, Nikko Securities Company, Ltd
*Takeshi Watanabe, Chairman, Trident International Fmance, Ltd, Hong Kong, former President, the Asian Development Bank
Kizo Yasui, Chairman, Toray Industries, Inc.

*Executive Committee
§Currently in Government Service


In the light of this list of Who's Who, Huntington's stature is obvious: he is the leading analyst of the Anglo-American Establishment.

Given that major media owners were present at this Trilateral meeting, one might have expected that the public of the Trilateral countries would have read about it as a front page story, as would be appropriate if Democracy means "rule by the people". But instead, silence.

In the mid 1990s, I wrote a letter to Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia from 1972 to 1975, and in reply received a phone call from him, during which I asked him if he knew about the Trilateral commission. He said he had never heard of it. When I mentioned this to Professor E. L. Wheelwright he commented, "Whitlam had no idea what was going on".

(2) Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993



Samuel P. Huntington

Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993, v72, n3, p22(28) from the Academic Index (database on UTCAT system)

COPYRIGHT Council on Foreign Relations Inc. 1993


World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be -- the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes -- emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War 1. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its center- piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.


During the cold war the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. ...

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.


Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. ...

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. ...

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. ...

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. ...

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. ...

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

"Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China). ... From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network -- often based on extensions of the traditional clans -- has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy."(1)

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960 by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. ...

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.


The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed ...

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East. ...

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:

We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations -- the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.(2)

Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February I993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there. ...


The west in now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. ...


The obstacles to non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. ...

(1) Murray Weidenbaum, Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?, St. Louis: Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues, Series 57, February 1993, pp. 2-3.

(2) Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266, September 1990, p. 6o; Time, June 15, 1992, pp. 24-28.

{end of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article in Foreign Affairs of 1993}

(3) Samuel P. Huntington, The West: Unique not Universal, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 75 No. 6, November/December 1996

{p. 28} In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding, the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This conceit takes two forms. One is the Coca-colonization hypothesis. Its proponents claim that Western, and more specifically American, popular culture is enveloping the world: American food, clothing, pop music, movies, and consumer goods are more and more enthusiastically embraced by people on every continent. The other has to do with modernization. It claims not only that the West has led the world to modern society, but that as people in other civilizations modernize they also westernize, abandoning their traditional values, institutions, and customs and adopting those that prevail in the West. Both these project the image of an emerging, homogeneous, universally Western world - and both are to varying degrees misgruided, arrogant, false, and dangerous.

Advocates of the Coca-colonization thesis identify culture with the consumption ot material goods. The heart of a culture, however, involves language, religion, values, traditions, and customs. Drinking Coca-Cola does not make Russians think like Americans any more

{p. 29} than eating sushi makes Americans think like Japanese. Throughout human history, fads and material goods have spread from one society to another without significantly altering the basic culture of the recipient society. Enthusiasms for various items of Chinese, Hindu, and other cultures have periodically swept the Western world, with no discernible lasting spillover. The argument that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods around the world represents the triumph of Western civilization depreciates the strength of other cultures while trivializing Western culture by identifying it with fatty foods, faded pants, and fizzy drinks. The essence of Western culture is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac.

{Has Huntington campaigned to stop this trivializing and decadence, for example by tightening controls on Hollywood and the advertising industry? No, because, as he implies below when stressing the importance of Freedom, the Freedom to decadence is more important than the decadence itself}

The modernization argument is intellectually more serious than the Coca-colonization thesis, but equally flawed. The tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge that occurred in the nineteenth century allowed humans to control and shape their environment in unprecedented ways. Modernization involves industrialization; urbanization; increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization; and more complex and diverse occupational structures. It is a revolutionary process comparable to the shift from primitive to civilized societies that began in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the Nile, and the Indus about 5000 B.C. The attitudes, values, knowledge, and culture of people in a modern society differ greatly from those in a traditional society. As the first civilization to modernize, the West is the first to have fully acquired the culture of modernity. As other societies take on similar patterns of education, work, wealth, and class structure, the modernization argument runs, this Western culture will become the universal culture of the world.

That there are significant differences between modern and traditional cultures is beyond dispute. A world in which some societies are highly modern and others still traditional will obviously be less homogeneous than a world in which all societies are comparably modern. It does not necessarily follow, however, that societies with modern cultures should be any more similar than are societies with traditional cultures. Only a few hundred years ago all societies were traditional. Was that world any less homogeneous than a future world of universal modernity is likely to be? Probably not.

{Huntington now defines Western Civilization}

{p. 35} ... the commitment to individual freedom that now distinguishes the West from other civilizations. Europe, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said, is "the source - the unique source" of the "ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom ... These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern Ideas, except by adoption. ... " These concepts and characteristics are also in large part the factors that enabled the West to take the lead in modernizing itself and the world. They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is precious not because it is universal but because it is unique.

{and yet George W. Bush, the implementer of Huntington's Clash, is trying to take away those very freedoms that, Huntington says, define Western Civilization. Has Huntington leapt to their defence?}

{In defining of Western Civilization in terms of Freedom, Huntington follows in the wake of Arnold Toynbee (quigley.html) and Lionel Curtis (curtis1.html)}


To MODERNIZE, must non-Western societies abandon their own cultures and adopt the core elements of Western culture? From time to time leaders of such societies have thought it necessary. Peter the Great and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were determined to modernize their countries and convinced that doing so meant adopting Western culture, even to the point of replacing traditional headgear with its Western equivalent. In the process, they created "torn" countries, unsure of their cultural identity. Nor did Western cultural imports significantly help them in their pursuit of modernization. More often, leaders of non-Western societies have pursued modernization and rejected westernization. Their goal is summed up in the phrases ti-yong (Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical use) and woken, yosei (Japanese spirit, Western technique), articulated by Chinese and Japanese reformers of a century ago, and in Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan's comment in 1994 that "'foreign imports' are nice as shiny or

{p. 36} high-tech 'things.' But intangible social and political institutions imported from elsewhere can be deadly - ask the Shah of Iran ... Islam is for us not just a religion but a way of life. We Saudis want to modernize but not necessarily westernize." Japan, Singapore, Taiwan Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser degree, Iran have become modern societies without becoming Western societies. China is clearly modernizing, but certamly not westernizing

Interaction and borrowing between civilizations have always taken place, and with modern means of transportation and communication they are much more extensive. Most of the world's great civilizations however, have existed for at least one millennium and in some case for several. These civilizations have a demonstrated record of borrowing from other civilizations in ways that enhance their own chances of survival. China's absorption of Buddhism from India, scholars agree, failed to produce the "Indianization" of China, it instead caused the Sinification of Buddhism. {wrong: it introduced a puritanism not found in Chinese philosophies such as Taoism} The Chinese adapted Buddhism to their purposes and needs. The Chinese have to date consistently defeated intense Western efforts to Christianize them. If at some point they do import Christianity, it is more than likely that it wlll be absorbed and adapted in such a manner as to strenghen the continuing core of Chinese culture.

Similarly, in past centuries Muslim Arabs received, valued, and used thelr "Hellenic inheritance for essentially utilitarian reasons. Being mostly interested in borrowing certain external forms or technical aspects, they knew how to disregard all elements in the Greek body of thought that would confiict with 'the truth' as established in their fundamental Koranic norms and precepts." Japan followed the same pattern. In the seventh century Japan imported Chinese culture and made the "transformation on its own initiative, free from economic and military pressures," to high civilization. During the centuries that followed, periods of relative isolation from continental influences during which previous borrowings wcre sorted out and the useful ones assimilated would alternate wlth periods of renewed contact and cultural borrowing." In similar fashion, Japan and other non-Western societies today are absorbing selected elements of Western culture and using them to strengthen their own cultural identity. It would, as Braudel argues.

{p. 37} almnost "be childish" to think that the "triumph of civilization in the singular" would lead to the end of the plurality of cultures embodled for centuries in the world's great civilizations.

{Fernand Braudel was a historian of civilizations, like Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler and Carroll Quigley. Huntington refers repeatedly to all four; see, for example, the index to his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. A sample of Braudel's writing is at braudel.html}


MODERNIATION and economic development neither require nor produce cultural westernization. To the contrary, they promote a resurgence of, and renewed commitment to, indigenous cultures. At the individual level, the movement of people into unfamiliar cities, social settings, and occupations breaks their traditional local bonds, generates feelings of alienation and anomie, and creates crises of identity to which religion frequently provides an answer. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic wealth and military power of the country as a whole and encourages people to have confidence in their heritage and to become culturally assertive. As a result, many non-Western societies have seen a return to indigenous cultures. It often takes a religious form, and the global revival of region is a direct consequence of modernization. In non-Western societies this revival almost necessarily assumes an anti-Western cast, in some cases rejecting Western culture because it is Christian and subversive {i.e. missionary}, in others because it is secular and degenerate. The return to the indigenous is most marked in Muslim and Asian societies. The Islamic Resurgence has manlfested itself in every Muslim country; in almost all it has become a major social, cultural, and intellectual movement, and in most it has had a deep impact on politics. In 1996 virtually every Muslim country except Iran was more Islamic and more Islamist in its outlook, practices, and institutlons than it was 15 years earlier. In the countries where Islamist political forces do not shape the government, they invariably dominate and often monopolize the opposition to the government. Throughout the Muslim world people are reacting against the "Westoxification" of their societies.

{Wrong: Gay marriage ,the destruction of marriage and religion, and other such New Left and libertarian decadence, have only appeared in the wake of the Trotskyist victory in the universities following the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Why doesn't Huntington join the rest of the world in attacking these phenomena, instead of defending them as "Western Civilization"? The enemies are internal, not external, and they can be fought with laws, not guns}

East Asian societies have gone through a parallel rediscovery of indigenous values and have increasingly drawn unflattenng comparisons

{p. 38} between their culture and Western culture. For several centuries they along with other non-Western peoples, envied the economic prosperity, technologlcal sophistication, military power, and political cohesion of Western societies. They sought the secret of this success in Western practices and customs, and when they identified what they thought might be the key they attempted to apply it in their own societies. Now however, a fundamental change has occurred. Today East Asians attribute their dramatic economic development not to their import of Western culture but to their adherence to their own culture. They have succeeded, they argue, not because they became like the West, but because they have remained different from the West. {But this new West, the promoter of Gay Marriage, is, itself the enemy of the old West the rest of the world admired} In somewhat similar fashion, when non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, many of their leaders evoked Western values of self-determination, liberalism and democracy, and freedom to justify their opposition to Western global domination. Now that they are no longer weak but instead increasingly powerful, they denounce as "human rights imperialism" the same values they previously invoked to promote their interests. As Western power recedes, so too does the appeal of Western values and culture, and the West faces the need to accomodate itself to its declining ability to impose its values on non-Western societies. {Huntington seems to think it should so impose itself} In fundamental ways, much of the world is becoming more modern and less Western.

One manifestation of this trend is what Ronald Dore has termed the "second-generation indigenization phenomenon." Both in former Western colonies and in colltinuously independent, non-Western countrles, "the first 'modernizer' or 'post-independence' generation has often received its training in foreign (Western) universities in a Western cosmopolitan language. Partly because they first go abroad as imprressionable teenagers, their absorption of Western values and lifestyles may well be profound." Most members of the much larger second generation, in contrast, receive their education at home in universities the first generation established, where the local language, rather than its colonial replacement, is used for instruction. These universities "provide a much more diluted contact with metropolitan world culture" and knowledge is indigenized by means of translations - usually of limited

{p. 39} range and of poor quality." Graduates of these universities resent the dominance of the earlier Western-trained generation and thus often succumb to the appeals of nativist opposition movements. As Western influence recedes, young and aspiring leaders cannot look to the West to provide them with power and wealth. They have to find the means of success within their own society, and hence accommodate the values and culture of that society. Indigenization is furthered by the democracy paradox: when non-Western societies adopt Western-style elections, democracy encourages and often brings to power nativist and anti-Western political movements. In the 1960s and 1970s westernized and pro-Western governrnents in developing countries were threatened by coups and revolutions; in the 1980s and 1990s they have been increasingly in danger of being ousted in elections. Democracy tends to make a society more parochial, not more cosmopolitan. Politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western they are. Electoral competition stimulates them to fashion what they believe wlll be the most popular appeals, and those are usually ethnic, nationalist, and religious in character. The result is popular mobilization against Western-oriented elites and the West in general. This process, which began in Sri Lanka in the 1950s, has spread from country to country in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and is manifest in the vlctories of reliously oriented parties in India, Turkey, Bosnia, and Israel in elections in 1995 and 1996. Democratization is thus at odds with westernization.

{But is not Huntington an advocate of Democracy? Or is that a smokescreen for Empire?}

The powerful currents of indigenization at work in the world make a mockery of Western expectations that Western culture will become the world's culture. The two central elements of any culture are language and religion. English, it has been asserted, is becoming the world's language. It clearly has become the lingua franca for communication in multinational business, diplomacy, international institutions, tourism, and aviation. This use of English for intercultural communication, however, presupposes the existence of different cultures; like translation and interpretation, it is a way of coping with those differences, not eliminating

{p. 40} them. In fact, the proportion of the world's population speaking English is small and declining. According to the most reliable data, compiled by Sidney S. Culbert, a professor at the University of Washington, in 1958 roughly 9.8 percent of human beings spoke English as a first or second languae; in 1992, 7.6 percent did. A language foreign to 92 percent of the world's populatlon is not the world's language. Similarly, in 1958, 24 percent of humans spoke one of the five major Western languages; in 1992, less than 21 percent did. The situation is similar for religion. Western Christians now make up perhaps 30 percent of the world's population, but the proportion is declining steadily, and at some point in the next decade or so the number of Muslims wlll exceed the numer of Christians. With respect to the two central elements of culture, language and religion, the West is in retreat. As Michael Howard has observed, the "common Western assumption that cultural diversity is a historical curiosity being rapidly eroded by the growth of a common, Western-oriented, Anglophone world culture, shaping our basic values ... is simply not true."

As indigenization spreads and the appeal of Western culture fades, the central problem in relations between the West and the rest is the gap between the West's, particularly America's, efforts to promote Western culture as the universal culture and its declining ability to do so. The colapse of communism exacerbated this disparity by reinforcing the view in the West that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally and was thus universally valid. The West - and especially the United States, which has always been a missionary nation - believes that the non-Western peoples should commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions. Minorities in other civilizations embrace and promote these values, but the dominant attitudes toward them in non-Western cultures range from skepticism to intense opposition. What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest.

Non-Westerners do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and Western practice. Hypocrisy and double stan-

{p. 41} dards are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted, but not if it brings Islamic fundamentallsts to power; non-proliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel; free trade is the elixir of economic growth, but not for agriculture; human rights are an issue with China but not with Saudi Arabia; aggression arainst oil-owning Kuwaitis is repulsed with massive force, but not so aggresion asrainst oil-less Bosnians.

The belief that non-Western peoples should adopt Western values, institutions, and culture is, if taken seriously, immoral in its implications. The almost universal reach of European power in the late nineteenth century and the global dominance of the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century spread many aspects of Western civilization across the world. But European globalism is no more, and Alnerican hegemony is receding, if only because it is no longer needed to protect the United States against a Cold War Soviet threat. Culture follows power. If non-Western societies are once again shaped by Western culture, it will happen only as a result of the expansion and deployment of Western power. Imperialism is the necessary, logical consequence of universalism, yet few proponents of universalism support the militarization and brutal coercion that would be necessary to achieve their goal {Does Huntington?}. Furthermore, as a maturing civilization, the West no longer has the economic or demographic dynamism required to impose its will on other societies. Any effort to do so also runs contrary to Western values of self-determination and democracy. This March, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia told the assembled heads of European governments: "European values are European values; Asian values are universal values." As Asian and Muslim civilizations begin to assert the universal relevance of their cultures, Westerners will come to appreciate the connection between universalism and imperialism and to see the virtues of a pluralistic world.

{Aren't Asian values like the West's of only a few decades ago, before the Cultural Revolution Huntington despaired of in his Crisis of Democracy report to the Trilateral Commission?}


THE TIME has come for the West to abandon the illusion of universality and to promote the strength, coherence, and vitality of its civilization in a world of civilizations. The interests of the West are not served by promiscuous intervention into the disputes of other peoples. ...

{p. 43} In a multipolar, multicivilizational world, the West's responsibility is to secure its own interests, not to promote those of other peoples nor to attempt to settle conflicts between other peoples when those conflicts are of little or no consequence to the West.

{Huntington now calls for unity between Europe and North America}

The future of the West depends in large part on the unity of the West. Scholars of civiliations {read Arnold Toynbee} see them evolving through times of trouble and a period of warring states, eventually leading to a universal state for the civiliation that may be either a source ot or a prelude to decay and disintegration. Western Civilization has moved beyond its warring states phase and is heading toward its universal state phase {with World Government the aim? oneworld.html}. That phase is still incomplete, with the nation-states of the West cohering into two semi-universal states in Europe and North America. These two entities and their constituent units are, however, bound together by an extraordinarily complex network of formal and informal institutional ties. The universal states of previous civilizations were empires. Since democracy is the political form of Western civilization, the emerging universal state of Western civilization is not an empire but rather a compound of federations, confederations, and international regimes. {i.e. World Federalism}

The problem for the West, in this situation, is to maintain its dynamism and to promote its collerence. Western unity depends more on events in the United States than on those in Europe. At present the United States is pulled in three directions. It is pulled south by the continuing immigration of Latin Americans and the growing size and power of its Hispanic population; by the incorporation of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement and the possibility of extending NAFA to other western hemisphere countries, and by the political, economic, and cultural changes in Latin America that make it more like the United States. At the same time, the United States is pulled westward by the increasmg wealth and influence of East Asian societies; by the ongoing efforts to develop a Pacific community, epitomized in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; and by migration from Asian societies. If democracy, free markets, the rule of law, civil society, individualism, and Protestantism take firm root in Latin America,

{At this point, Huntington seems to define Western Civilization as Protestant, even though inhabiting the formerly Catholic domain}

{p. 44} that continent, whose culture has always been closely related to that of the West, will merge with the West and become the third pillar of Western civilization. No such conveence is possible with Asian societles. Asia is instead likely to pose continuing economic and political challenges to the United States specifically and the West more generally. The third pull, toward EULO, is the most important. Shared values, institutions, history, and culture dictate the continuing close association of the United States and Europe. Both necessary and desirable is the further development of institutional ties across the Atlantic, including negotiation of a European-Amerlcan free trade agreement and creation of a North Atlantic economic organization as a counterpart to NATO.

The major current differences between Europe and America arise not trom direct conflicts of interest with each other, but from their policies toward third parties. Among other questions, these include the provlsion of support to a Muslim-dominated Bosnia, the priority of Israeli securitv needs in Middle Eastern policy, U.S. efforts to penalize foreign companies that do business with Iran and Cuba, the maintenance of full economic sanctions against Iraq, and the part human rights and weapons proliferation concerns should play in dealing with China. Non-Western powers, especially China, have actively attempted to exploit these differences and play one Western country off against another. The differences themselves arise largey from difterent geopolitical perspectives and domestic political and economic interests. Maintaining the unity of the West is, however, is essential to slowing the decline of Western influence in world affairs. Western peoples have more in common with each other than they have with Asian, Middle Eastern, or African peoples. The leaders of Western countries have institutionalized patterns of trust and cooperation among themselves that, with rare exceptions, they do not have with the leaders of other societies. United, the West will remain a formidable presence on the international scene; divided, it will be prey to the efforts of non-Western states to exploit its internal differences by offering short-term gains to some Western countries at the price of long-term losses for all Western countries. The peoples o the West, in Benjamin Frinlklin's phrase, must hang together, or most assuredly they will hang separately.

{p. 45} Promoting the coherence of the West means both preserving Western culture within the West and defining the limits of the West. The former requires, among other things, controlling immigration from non-Western societies, as every major European country has done and the United States is beginning to do, and ensuring the assimilation into Western culture of the immigrants who are admitted. It also means recognizing that in the post-Cold War world, NATO is the security orgranization of Western civilization and that its primary purpose is to defend and preserve that civilization. Hence states that are Western in their history, religion, and culture should, if they desire, be able to join NATO. Practically speaking, NATO membership would be open to the Visegrad states, the Baltic states, Slovenia, and Croatia, but not countries that have historically been primarily Muslim or Orthodox. While recent debate has focused entirely on the expansion rather than the contraction of NATO, it is also necessary to recognize that as NATO's mission changes, Turkish and Greek ties to NATO will weaken and their membership could either come to an end or become meaningless. Withdrawal from NATO is the declared goal of the Welfare Party in Turkey, and Greece is becoming as much an ally of Russia as it is a member of NATO.

The West went through a European phase of development and expansion that lasted several centuries and an American phase that has dominated this century. If North America and Europe renew their moral life, build on their cultural commonality, and develop closer forms of economic and political integration to supplement their security collaboration in NATO, they could generate a third Euroamerican phase of Western affluence and political influence. Meaningful political integration would in some measure counter the relative decline in the West's share of the world's people, economic product, and military capabilities and revive the West's power in the eyes of the leaders of other civilizations. The principal responsibility of Western leaders is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West - which is increasingly

{p. 46} beyond their ability - but to preserve and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization. That responsibility falls overwhelmingly on the most powerful Western country, the United States of America. Neither globalism {the Trotskyist/Fabian variant of communism} nor isolationism {nationalism}, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism will best serve American interests. Its interests will be most effectively advanced if the United States eschews those extremes and instead adopts an Atlanticist policy of of close cooperation with its European partners, one that will protect and promote the interests, values, and culture of the precious and uniqlle civilization they share.


Huntington's imperial faction (Republican Party), and the Trotskyist/Fabian faction (Democratic Party), whilst opposing one another, unite against the isolationists (nationalists).

(4) Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

{p. 42} The key cultural elements which define a civilization were set forth in classic form by the Athenians when they reassured the Spartans that they would not betray them to the Persians ...

Blood, language, religion, way of life, were what the Greeks had in common and what distinguished them from the Persians and other non-Greeks. Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion, as the Athenians emphasized. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the Subcontinent {i.e. India-Pakistan}.

A significant correspondence exists between the division of people by cultural characteristics into civilizations and their division by physical characteristics into races. Yet civilization and race are not identical. People of the same race can be deeply divided by civilization; people of different races may be united by civilization. In particular, the great missionary religions, Christianity and Islam, encompass societies from a variety of races. The crucial distinctions among human groups concern their va!ues, beliefs, institutions, and social structures, not their physical size, head shapes, and skin colors.

{Note, below, how Huntington defines "civilization" in terms of Toynbee's ideas}

Third, civilizations are comprehensive, that is, none of their constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the encompassing civilization. Civilizations, Toynbee argued, "comprehend without being comprehended by others." A civilization is a "totality." Civilizations, Melko goes on to say,

{quote} have a certain degree of integration. Their parts are defined by their relationship to each other and to the whole. If the civilization is composed of states, these states will have more relation to one another than the do to states outside the civilization. They might fight more, and engage more frequently in diplomatic relations. They will be more interdependent economically. There will be perading aesthetic and philosophical currents. {endquote}

{p. 43} A civilization is the broadest cultural entity. ... It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he strongly identifies. Civilizations are the biggest "we" within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other "thems" out there {yet one may find detestable people within one's own religion, but admirable people of non-Western religions}. Civilizations may involve a large number of people, such as Chinese civilization, or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. Throughout history, many small groups of people have existed possessing a distinct culture and lacking any broader cultural identification. Distinctions have been made in terms of size and importance between major and peripheral civilizations (Bagby) or major and arrested or abortive civilizations (Toynbee). This book is concerned with what are generally considered the major civilizations in human history. ...

Fourth, civilizations are mortal but also very long-lived; they evolve, adapt, and are the most enduring of human associations, "realities of the extreme longue duree." Their "unique and particular essence" is "their long historical continuity. Civilization is in fact the longest story of all." Empires rise and fall, govemments come and go, civilizations remain and "survive political, social economic, een ideological uplleavals."

{p. 44} While civilizations endure, they also evolve. They are dynamic; they rise and fall; they merge and divide; and as any student of history knows, they also disappear and are buried in the sands of time. The phases of their evolution may be specified in various ways. Quigley sees civilizations moving through seven stages: mixture, gestation, expansion, age of conflict, universal empire, decay, and invasion. Melko generalizes a model of change from a crystallized feudal system to a feudal system in transition to a crystallized state system to a state system in transition to a crystallized imperial system. Toynbee sees a civilization arising as a response to challenges and then going through a period of growth involving increasing control over its environment produced by a creative minority, followed by a time of troubles, the rise of a universal state, and then disintegration. While significant differences exist, all these theories see civilizations evolving through a time of troubles or conflict to a universal state to decay and disintegration.

{Note the importance Huntington places on Quigley (p. 44, 48, 302, 303, 304) and Toynbee (p. 42, 43, 44, 48n, 55, 73, 301). The Quigley reference is Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations, Liberty Fund, 1979, Indianapolis. But Quigley, too, drew on Toynbee; thus Toynbee is the foundational thinker of the group: toynbee.html. Huntington's endorsement of Quigley adds credibility to Quigley's exposure, as an insider, of the workings of the Anglo-American Establishment: quigley.html}

Fifth, since civilizations are cultural not political entities, they do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do. The political composition of civilizations varies between civilizations and varies over time within a civilization. A civilization may thus contain one or many political units. Those units may be city states, empires, federations, confederations, nation states, multinational states, all of which may have varying forms of government. As a civilization evolves, changes normally occur in the number and nature of its constituent political units. At one extreme, a civilization and a political entity may coincide. China, Lucian Pye has commented, is "a civilization pretending to be a state." Japan is a civilization that is a state. Most civilizations, however, contain more than one state or other political entity. In the modern world, most civilizations contain two or more states.

{p. 45} "Reasonable agreement," as Melko concludes after reviewing the literature, exists on at least twelve major civilizations, seven of which no longer exist (Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Cretan, Classical, Byzantine, Middle American, Andean) and five which do (Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, and Western). Several scholars also add Orthodox Russian civilization as a separate civilization distinct from its parent Byzantine civilization and from Western Christian civilization. To these six civilizations it is useful for our purposes in the contemporary world to add Latin American and, possibly, African civilization. The major contemporary civilizations are thus as follows:

Sinic. All scholars recognize the existence of either a single distinct Chinese civilization dating back at least to 1500 B.C. and perhaps to a thousand years earlier, or of two Chinese civilizations one succeeding the other in the early centuries of the Christian epoch. In my Foreign Affairs article, I labeled this civilization Confucian. It is more accurate, however, to use the term Sinic. While Confucianism is a major component of Chinese civilization, Chinese civilization is more than Confucianism and also transcends China as a political entity. The term "Sinic," which has been used by many scholars, appropriately describes the common culture of China and the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere outside of China as well as the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea.

Japanese. Some scholars combine Japanese and Chinese culture under the heading of a single Far Eastern civilization. Most, however, do not and instead recognize Japan as a distinct civilization which was the offspring of Chinese civilization, emerging during the period between A.D. 1OO and 400.

Hindu. One or more successive civilizations, it is universally recognized, have existed on the Subcontinent since at least 1500 B.C. These are generally referred to as Indian, Indic, or Hindu, with the latter term being preferred for the most recent civilization. In one form or another, Hinduism has been central to the culture of the Subcontinent since the second millennium B.C. "[M]ore than a religion or a social system; it is the core of Indian civilization." It has continued in this role through modern times, even though India itself has a substantial Muslim community as well as several smaller cultural minorities. Like Sinic, the term Hindu also separates the name of the civilization from the name of its core state, which is desirable when, as in these cases, the culture of the civilization extends beyond that state.

Islamic. All major scholars recognize the existence of a distinct Islamic civilization. Originating in the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century A.D., Islam rapidly spread across North Africa and the Iberian peninsula and also eastward into central Asia, the Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. As a result, many distinct cultures or subcizilizations exist witl Islam, including Arab, Turkic, ersian, and Malay.

Western. Western civilization is usually dated as emerging about A.D. 700 or

{p. 46} 800. It is generally viewed by scholars as having three major components, in Europe, North America, and Latin America.

{Notice that this definition excludes the pre-Christian civilizations of Europe; for Huntington, "western" civilization is characterized by the fusion of the Greek and Jewish culture-streams}

Latin American. Latin America, however, has a distinct identity which differentiates it from the West. Although an offspring of European civilization, Latin America has evolved along every different path from Europe and North America. It has had a corporatist, authoritarian culture, which Europe had to a much lesser degree {what of monarchist France, France under Napoleon & Napoleon III, Germany under the Kaiser, Austria-Hungary? Were they not more like Russian corporatism, than English individualism? What Huntington is really saying, is that only English individualism counts as Western culture}, and North America not at all {what about the New Deal?}. Europe and North America both felt the effects of the Reformation and have combined Catholic and Protestant cultures. Historically, although this may be changing, Latin America has been only Catholic. Latin Arnerican civilization incorporates indigenous cultures, which did not exist in Europe, were effectively wiped out in North America, and which vary in importance from Mexico, Central America, Peru, and Bolivia, on the one hand, to Argentina and Chile, on the other. ...

The teml "the West" is now universally used to refer to what used to be called Western Christendom.

{p. 47} African (possibly). Most major scholars of civilization except Braudel do not recognize a distinct African civilization. The north of the African continent and its east coast belong to Islamic civilization. Historically, Ethiopia constituted a civilization of its own. Elsewhere European imperialism and settlements brought elements of Western civilization. In South Africa Dutch, French, and then English settlers created a multifragmented European culture. Most significantly, European imperialism brought Christianity to most of the continent south of the Sahara. Throughout Africa tribal identities are pervasive and intense, but Africans are also increasingly developing a sense of African identity, and conceivably sub-Saharan Africa could cohere into a distinct civilization, with South Africa possibly being its core state.

Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations, and, as Christopher Dawson said, "the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest." Of Weber's five "world religions," four-Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism - are associated with major civilizations. The fifth, Buddhism, is not. Why is this the case? Like Islam and Christianity, Buddhism early separated into two main subdivisions, and, like Christianity, it did not survive in the land of its birth. Beginning in the first century A.D., Mahayana Buddhism was exported to China and subsequently to Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. In these societies, Buddhism was variously adapted, assimilated to the indigenous culture (in China, for example, to Confucianism and Taoism), and suppressed. Hence, while Buddhism remains an important component of their cultures, these societies do not constitute and would not identify themselves as part of a Buddhist civilization. What can legitimately be de-

{p. 48} scribed as a Therevada Buddhist civilization, however, does exist in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. In addition, the populations of Tibet, Mongolia, and Bhutan have historically subscribed to the Lamaist variant of Mahayana Buddhism, and these societies constitute a second area of Buddhist civilization. Overall, however, the virtual extinction of Buddhism in India and its adaptation and incorporation into existing cultures in China and Japan mean that Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization. *

{footnote} * What about Jewish civilization? Most scholars of civilization hardly mention it In temls of numbers of people Judaism clearly is not a major civilization. Toynbee describes it as an arrested civilization which evolved out of the earlier Sriac civilization {Toynbee was no favourite among Zionists}. It is historically affiliated with both Christianity and Islam, and for several centuries Jews mailltained their cultural identity within Western, Orthodox, and Islamic ciilizations. With the creation of Israel, Jews have all the objective accoutrements of a civilization: religion, language, customs, literature, institutions, and a territorial and political home. But what about subjective identification? Jews living in other cultures have distributed themseles along a continuum stretching from total identification witll Judaism and Israel to nominal Judaism and full identification with the civilization withi which they reside, the latter, however, ocurring principally among Jews living within the West (See Mordccdi M Kaplan, Judaism as a Civilization (Philadelphia Reconstructionist Press, 1981; originally published 1934, esp pp. 173-208.

{Yet Ben-Ami Shillony writes in his book The Jews and the Japanese: the Successful Outsiders (Charles E. Tuttle Company, Rutland, Vermont, 1991):

"It is significant that Americans of Japanese ancestry call themselves Japanese-Americans, whereas the Jews living in America refer to themselves as American Jews. ... Unlike the Japanese-Americans who gave up allegiance to Japan, American Jews later became vigorous supporters of Israel. ... American Jews lobby for Israel." (p. 87) japan.html

Professor Shillony bills himself as "a Jew, an Israeli" (p. 10).}

{p. 49} The early civilizations in the valleys of the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, Indus, and Yellow rivers also did not interact {this is wrong; The Indus, Nile & Mespomotamia formed a trading triangle, in whose path Thor Heyerdahl followed in his travels by reed boat. Joseph Needham and David Anthony showed the early overland contacts between China and the West: needham-anthony.html}. Eventually, contacts between civilizations did multiplv in the eastern Mediterranean, southwestern Asia, and northern India. Communications and commercial relations were restricted, however, by the distances separating civilizations and the limited means of transport available to overcome distance. While there was some commerce by sea in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, "Steppe-traversing horses, not ocean-traversing sailing ships, were the sovereign means of locomotion by which the separate civilizations of the world as it was before A.D. 15OO were linked together - to the slight extent to which they did maintain contact with each other." {Huntington's sources for this statement are out of date}

Ideas and technology moved from civilization to civilization, but it often took centuries. Perhaps the most important cultural diffusion not the result of conquest was the spread of Buddhism to China, which occurred about six hundred years after its origin in northern India. Printing was invented in China in the eighth century A.D. and movable type in the eleventh century, but this technology only reached Europe in the fifteenth century. Paper was introduced into China in the second century A.D., came to Japan in the seventh century, and was diffused westward to Central Asia in the eighth century, North Africa in the tenth, Spain in the twelfth, and northern Europe in the thirteenth. Another Chinese invention, gunpowder, made in the ninth century, disseminated to the Arabs a few hundred years later, and reached Europe in the fourteenth century.

{On p. 49, Huntington reproduces a chart showing historical influences from one civilization to another, from Carroll Quigley's book The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 2nd ed., 1979 - first published in 1961), p. 83. This is the same Carroll Quigley who wrote The Anglo-American Establishment: quigley.html}.

{p. 50} Impact: The Rise of the West. ...

Intermittent or limited multidirectional encounters among civilizations gave way to the sustained, overpowering, unidirectional impact of the West on all other civilizations. The end of the fifteenth century witllessed the final reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors and the beginnings of Portuguese penetration of Asia and Spanish penetration of the Americas. During the subsequent two hundred fifty years all of the Western Hemisphere and significant portions of Asia were brought under European rule or domination.

{p. 51} In the course of European expansion, the Andean and Mesoamerican civilizations were effectively eliminated, Indian ani Islamic civilizations along with Africa were subjugated, and China was penetrated and subordinated to Western influence. Only Russian, Japanese, and Ethiopian civilizations, all three governed by highly centralized imperial authorities, were able to resist the onslaught of the West and maintain meaningful independent existence. For four hundred years intercivilizational relations consisted of the subordination of other societies to Western civilization. ...

The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.

{Is this what George W. Bush is trying to emulate?}

{p. 54} Every civilization sees itself as the center of the world and writes its history

{p. 55} as the central drama of human history. ... A few decades later Toynbee castigated the "parochialism and impertinence" of the West manifested in the "egocentric illusions" that the world revolved around it, that there was an "unchanging East," and that "progress" was inevitable. Like Spengler he had no use for the assumption of the unity of history, the assumption that there is "only one river of civilization, our own, and that all others are either tributary to it or lost in the desert sands." Fifty years after Toynbee, Braudel similarly urged the need to strive for a broader perspective and to understand "the great cultural conflicts in the world, and the multiplicity of its civilizations." The illusions and prejudices of which these scholars warned, however, live on and in the late twelltieth century have blossomed forth in the widespread and parochial conceit that the European civilization of the West is now the universal civilization of the world.


The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of Westem civilization.

{p. 67} Second, there is the assumption that increased interaction among peoples - trade, investment, tourism, media, electronic communication generally - is generating a common world culture. ... In 1913, however, international trade was at record highs and in the next few years nations slaughtered each other in unprecedented numbers. ...

In social psychology, distinctiveness theory holds that people define themselves by what makes them different from others in a particu}ar context: ... People define their identity by what they are not.

{p. 69} Whatever the overall merits of Wittfogel's hydraulic civilization thesis, agriculture dependent on the construction and operation of massive irrigation systems does foster the emergence of centralized and bureaucratic political authorities. ...

What were these distinguishing characteristics of Western society durillg the hundreds of years before it modernized? ...

The Classical legacy. ... The legacies of the West fronl Classical ciilization are many, including Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin, and Chlistianity. Islamic and

{p. 70} Orthodox civilizations also inherited from Classical civilization but nowhere near to the same degree the West did ...

{Yet the West inherited much of the Greek tradition via the Byzantine and Islamic worlds; it had been destroyed in Rome}

Rule of law. The concept of the centrality of law to civilized existence was inherited from the Romans. Medieval thinkers elaborated the idea of natural law according to which monarchs were supposed to exercise their power, and a common law tradition developed in England. During the phase of absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the rule of law was obsered more in the breach than in reality, but the idea persisted of the subordination of human power to some external restraint. "Non sub homine sed sub Deo et lege." The tradition of the rule of law laid the basis for constitutionalism and the protection of human rights, including property rights, against the exercise of arbitrary power. In most other civilizations law was a much less important factor in shaping thought and behavior.

{When did "the Rule of Law" arrive in the United States and Australia? Was it not brought by illegal means, i.e. invasion?

On p. 170 (below) , Huntington writes, "In China trust and commitment depend on personal contacts, not contracts or laws and other legal documents."

Yet not so long ago in the West, a handshake meant more than a signature. The attempt to codify all laws is casuistry, for which the Pharisees and Jesuits were famous. Consider, for example, the attempt to precisely define, by law, the rules for bringing up children. This takes common-sense judgments out of the hands of the parents, and places power in the hands of ideologues. I met a young woman teaching a Child-Care course at College. One of her pupils was another young woman with a baby; yet the teacher herself had, not the experience of rearing a child, but certificates of courses completed. This is what legalism leads to; the Asians are too smart to be caught in such a trap.}


The expansion of the West has promoted both the modernization and the Westernization of non-Western societies. The political and intellectual leaders of these societies have responded to the Western impact in one or more of three ways: rejecting both modernization and Westernization; embracing both; embracing the first and rejecting the second.

Rejectionism. Japan followed a substantially rejectionist course from its first contacts with the West in 1542 until the mid-nineteenth century. Only limited forms of modernization were permitted, such as the acquisition of firearms, and the import of Western culture, including most notably Christianity, was highly restricted. Westerners were totally expelled in the mid-seventeenth century. This rejectionist stance came to an end with the forcible opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in 1854 and the dramatic efforts to learn from the West following the Meiji Restoration in 1868. For several centuries China also attempted to bar any significant modernization or Westernization. Although Christian emissaries were allowed into China in 1601 they were then effectively excluded in 1722. Unlike Japan, China's rejectionist policy was in large part rooted in the Chinese image of itself as the Middle Kingdom and the firm belief in the superiority of Chinese culture to those of all other peoples. Chinese isolation, like Japanese isolation, was brought to an end by Western arms, applied to China by the British in the Opium War of 1839-1842. As these cases suggest, during the nineteenth century Western power made it

{p. 73} increasingly difficult and eventually impossible for non-Western societies to adhere to purely exclusionist strategies. In the twentieth century improvements in transportation and communication and global interdependence increased tremendously the costs of exclusion. Except for small, isolated, rural communities willing to exist at a subsistence level, the total rejection of modernization as well as Westernization is hardly possible in a world becoming overwhelmingly modern and highly interconnected. "Only the very most extreme fundamentalists," Daniel Pipes writes concerning Islam, "reject modernization as well as Westernization. They throw television sets into rivers, ban wrist watches, and reject the internal combustion engine. The impracticality of their program severely limits the appeal of such groups, however; and in several cases Ñ such as the Yen Izala of Kano, Sadat's assassins, the Mecca mosque attackers, and some Malaysian dakwah groups Ñ their defeats in violent encounters with the authorities caused them then to disappear with few traces." Disappearance with few traces summarizes gene ally the fate of purely rejectionist policies by the end of the twentieth century. Zealotry, to use Toynbee's term, is simply not a viable option.

Kernalism. A second possible response to the West is Toynbee's Herodianism, to embrace both modernization and Westernization. This response is based on the assumptions that modernization is desirable and necessary, that the indigenous culture is incompatible with modernization and must be abandoned or abolished, and that society must fully Westernize in order to successfully modemize. Modernization and Westernization reinforce each other and have to go together. This approach was epitomized in the arguments of some late nineteenth century Japanese and Chinese intellectuals that in order to modernize, their societies should abandon their historic languages and adopt English as their national language. This view, not surprisingly, has been even more popular among Westerners than among non-Western elites. Its message is: "To be successful, you must be like us; our way is the only way." The argument is that "the religious values, moral assumptions, and social structures of these [non-Western] societies are at best alien, and sometime hostile, to the values and practices of industrialism." Hence economic development will "require a radical and destructive remaking of life and society, and, often, a reinterpretation of the meaning of existence itself as it has been understood by the people who live in these civilizations." Pipes makes the same point with explicit reference to Islam:

{quote} To escape anomy, Muslims have but one choice, for modernization requires Westernization. ... Islam does not offer an alternative way to modernize.... Secularism cannot be avoided. Modern science and technology require an absorption of the thought processes which accompany them; so too with political institutions. Because contenlt must be emulated no less than form, the predominance of Western ciilization must be acknowledged ... {endquote}

{Interviewed on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's FOUR CORNERS television documentary Seven Ways To See A War, just before the 2003 war on Iraq, Shimon Peres endorsed the war as one of modernity against pre-modern forces: "SHIMON PERES: The war of the 20th century is not about ideologies, not about territories. It's about modern life. There is a group of para-fanatic religious people who are afraid that modernity may destroy their old tradition. They organise themselves into killing squads, into terroristic gangs, and we have to stop them. It became very dangerous because the availability of weapons that didn't exist in the 20th century. So I say on one hand, the fight against terrorists, and the other hand, the fight of terrorism against a modern world." http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s808664.htm}

{p. 98} More broadly, the religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity. Religious groups meet social needs left untended by state bureaucracies. These include the provision of medical and hospital services, kindergartens and schools, care for the elderly, prompt relief after natural and other catastrophes, and welfare and social support durillg periods of economic deprivation. The breakdown of order and of civil society creates vacuums which are filled by religious, often fundamentalist, groups.

{p. 108} In the early 1990s Asian triumphalism was articulated anew in what can only be described as the "Singaporean cultural offensive." From Lee Kuan Yew on down, Singaporean leaders trumpeted the rise of Asia in relation to the West and contrasted the virtues of Asian, basically Confucian, culture responsible for this success - order, discipline, family responsibility, hard work, collectivism, abstemiousness - to the self-indulgence, sloth, individualism, crime, inferior education, disrespect for authority, and "mental ossification" responsible for the decline of the West. To compete with the East, it was argued, the United states "needs to question its fundamental assumptions about its social and political arrangements and, in the process, learn a thing or two from East Asian societies."

{Why doesn't Huntington take Lee's advice and help in this regard, instead of treating him as an adversary?}

For East Asians, East Asian success is particularly the result of the East Asian cultural stress on the collectivity rather than the individual. "[T]he more communitarian values and practices of the East Asians - the Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and the Singaporeans - have proved to be clear assets in the catching up process," argued Lee Kuan Yew. "The values that East Asian culture upholds, such as the primacy of group interests over individual interests, support the total group effort necessary to develop rapidly." "The work ethic of the Japanese and Koreans, consisting of discipline, loyalty, and diligence," Malaysia's prime minister agreed, "has served as the motive force for their respectivc countries' economic and social development. This work ethic is born out of the philosophy that the group and the country are more important than the individual."

{p. 128} Greece and Turkey will undoubtedly remain members of NATO but their ties to other NATO states are likely to attenuate. So also are the alliances of the United States with Japan and Korea, its de facto alliance with Israel, and its security ties with Pakistan. Multicivilizatlonal international organizations like ASEAN could face increasing difficulty in maintaining their coherence.

{p. 130} Fifth and finally is the ubiquity of conflict. It is human to hate. For self-definition and motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, opponents in politics.

{p. 136} A lone country lacks cultural commonality with other societies. Ethiopia, for example, is culturally isolated by its predominant language, Amharic, written in the Coptic script; its predominant religion, Coptic Orthodoxy; its imperial history; and its religious differentiation from the largely Muslim surrounding peoples. ...

{p. 137} The most important lone country is Japan. ...

Cleft countries that territorially bestride the fault lines between civilizations face particular problems maintaining their unity. In Sudan, civil war has gone on for decades betweell the Muslim north and the largely Christian south. The same civilizational division has bedeviled Nigerian politics ... Other countries divided by civilizational fault lines include: India (Muslims

{p. 138} and Hindus), Sri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus), Malaysia and Singapore (Chinese and Malay Muslims), China (Han Chillese, Tibetall Buddhists, Turkic Muslims), Philippines (Christians and Muslims), and Indonesia (Muslims and Timorese Christians).

{p. 139} If Russia became Western, Orthodox civilization ceases to exist. The eollapse of the Soviet Union reindled an1ollg Russialls debate on the central issue of Russia and the West.

Russia's relations with Western civilization have evolved through four phases. In the first pl1ase, which lasted down to the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725)), Kievan Rus and Muscovy existed separately from the West and had little contact with Wester European societies. ... the Classical legacy, which, however, came to Russia via Byzan-

{p. 140} tium and hence was quite different from that which came to the West directly from Rome. Russian civilization was a product of its indigenous roots in Kievan Rus and Moscovy, substantial Byzantine impact, and prolonged Mongol rule. These influences shaped a society and a culture which had little resemblance to those developed in Western Europe under the influence of very different forces.

{Huntington exaggerates the differences between Russia and Western Europe, perhaps because the Russian people refuse to submit to Western domination. There are much greater commonalities than Huntington states. The Russian state was originally created by Vikings, who also created the Norman aristocracy of Western Europe. Further, the Greek legacy was lost in the West, but preserved in Byzantium, from which Moslems took it to Moslem Spain, and Christians re-learned of it there.}

{p. 142} The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, were both modern and secular and ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality, and material well-being. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be impossible for him to do that with a Russian Orthodox nationalist.

During the Soviet years the struggle between Slavophiles and Westernizers was suspended as both Solzhenitsyns and Sakharovs challenged the communist synthesis. With the collapse of that synthesis, the debate over Russia's true identity reemerged in full vigor. Should Russia adopt Western values, institutions, and practices, and attempt to become part of the West? Or did Russia embody a distinct Orthodox and Eurasian civilization, differnt from the West's with a unique destiny to link Europe and Asia? ...

{p. 143} Opinions were distributed over a continuum from one extreme to another. Grouped toward one end of the spectrum were those who articulated "the new thinking" espoused by Gorbachev and epitomized in his goal of a "common European home" ...

{Huntington brands Solzhenitsyn an "extreme nationalist" ... for wanting to preserve Russia's own civilization:}

The more extreme nationalists were divided between Russian nationalists, such as Solzhenitsyn, who advocated a Russia including all Russians plus closely linked Slavic Orthodox ByeloRussians and Ukrainians but no one else, and the imperial nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who wanted to recreate the Soviet empire and Russian military strength. People in the latter group at times were anti-Semitic as well as anti-Western and wanted to reorient Russian foreign policy to the East and South, either dominating the Muslim South (as Zhirinovsky urged) or cooperating with Muslim states and China against the West. The nationalists also backed more extensive support for the Serbs in their war with the Muslims.

{p. 149} Mexico. Turkey became a torn country in the 1920s, Mexico not until the 1980s. Yet their historical relations with the West have certain similarities. Like Turkey, Mexico had a distinctly non-Western culture. Even in the twentieth century, as Octavio Paz put it, "the core of Mexico is Indian. It is non-European."

{p. 150} Will Mexico succeed in its North American quest? The overwhelming bulk of the political, economic, and intellectual elites favor that course. Also, unlike the situation with Turkey, the overwhelming bulk of the political, economic, and intellectual elites of the recipient civilization have favored Mexico's cultural realignment.

{p. 151} Australia. In contrast to Russia, Turkey, and Mexico, Australia has, from its origins, been a Western society. ... In the early 1990s, however, Australia's political leaders decided, in effect, that Australia should defect from the West, redefine itself as an Asian society, and cultivate close ties with its geographical neighbors. Australia, Prime Minister Paul Keating declared, must cease being a "branch office of empire," become a republic, and aim for "enmeshment" in Asia. This was necessary, he argued, in order to establish Australia's identity as an independent country. "Australia cannot represent itself to the world as a multicultural society, engage in Asia, make that link and make it persuasively while in some way, at least in constitutional terms, remaining a derivative society." Australia, Keating declared, had suffered untold years of "anglophilia and torpor" and continued association with Britain would be "debilitating to our national culture, our economic future and our destiny in Asia and the Pacific." Foreign Minister Gareth Evans expressed similar sentiments.

{p. 152} Third and most important, the elites of Asian countries have been even less receptive to Australia's advances than European elites have been to Turkey's. They have made it clear that if Australia wants to be part of Asia it must become truly Asian, which they think unlikely if not impossible. "The success of Australia's integration with Asia," one Indonesian official said, "depends on one thing - how far Asian states welcome the Australian intention. Australia's acceptance in Asia depends on how well the government and people of Australia understand Asian culture and society." Asians see a gap between Australia's Asian rhetoric and its perversely Western reality. The Thais, according to one Australian diplomat, treat Australia's insistence it is Asian with "bemused tolerance."4' "[C]ulturally Australia is still European," Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia declared in October 1994, " ... we think it's European," and hence Australia should not be a member of the East Asian Economic Caucus. We Asians "are less prone to making outright criticism of other countries or passing judgment on them. But Australia, being European culturally, feels that it has a right to tell others what to do, what not to do, what is right, what is wrong. And then, of course, it is not compatible with the group. That is my reason [for opposing their membership in EAEC]. It is not the color of the skin, but the culture." Asians, in short, are determined to exclude Australia from their club for the same reason that Europeans do Turkey: they are different from us. Prime Minister Keating liked to say that he was going to change Australia from "the odd man out to the odd man in" in Asia. That, however is an oxymoron: odd men don't get in.

{Wrong. The subversive "rights" culture within Australia encourages children to rebel against their parents; and the sex war has made having children a very risky thing to do. Many Australians don't like it; if, one day, they manage to overthrow the Trotskyists and Fabians in academia, then Asian objections would subside, provided that Australia is no longer acting as an agent of Anglo-American "free trade" imperalism.}

{p. 170} Outside Japan and Korea the East Asian economy is basically a Chinese economy.

The emergence of the greater China co-prosperity sphere was greatly facilitated by a "bamboo network" of family and personal relationships and a common culture. Overseas Chinese are much more able than either Westerners or Japanese to do business in China. In China trust and commitment depend on personal contacts, not contracts or laws and other legal documents. {yet not so long ago in the West, a handshake meant more than a signature} ... The advantages of nonmainland Chinese dealing with the mainland were also well stated by Lee Kuan Yew: "We are ethnic Chinese. We share certain characteristics through common ancestry and culture. ... People feel a natural empathy for those who share their physical attributes. This sense of closeness is reinforced when they also share a basis for culture and language. It makes for easy rapport and trust, which is the foundation for all business relations."In the late 1980s and 1990s, overseas ethnic Chinese were able "to demonstrate to a skeptical world that quanxi connections through the same language and culture can make up for a lack in the rule of law and transparency in rules and regulations." The roots of economic development in a common culture were highlighted in the Second World Chinese Entrepreneurs Conference in Hong Kong in November 1993, described as "a celebration of Chinese triumphalism attended by ethnic Chinese businessmen from around the world." In the Sinic world as elsewhere cultural commonality promotes economic engagement.

The reduction in Western economic involvement in China after Tiananmen Square, following a decade of rapid Chinese economic growth, created the opportunity and incentive for overseas Chinese to capitalize on their common culture and personal contacts and to invest heavily in China. The result was a dramatic expansion of overall economic ties among the Chinese communities.

{p. 175} As a revolutionary movement, Islamist fundamentalism rejects the nation state in favor of the unity of Islam just as Marxism rejected it in favor of the unity of the international proletariat.

{Another reason may be that the Anglo-American world is secretly more united than appears on the surface; for example, a secret military pact, the UKUSA Pact or Agreement, is operative, as is the Echelon spy system; the Mont Pelerin Society was, similarly, a secret society spawning think-tanks which promote deregulation and privatization. The secret co-ordination of Anglo-American policy is disclosed by Carroll Quigley in his book The Anglo-American Establishment: quigley.html}

{p. 177} The rapid seventh-century Arab conquest of North Africa and the Middle East culminated in the Umayyad caliphate with its capital in Damascus. This was followed in the eighth century by the Baghdad-based, Persian-influenced, Abbasid caliphate, with secondary caliphates emerging in Cairo and Cordoba in the tenth century. Four hundred years later the Ottoman Turks swept across the Middle East, capturing Constantinople in 1453 and establishmg a new caliphate in 1517. About the same time other Turkic peoples invaded Indla and founded the Mogul empire. The rise of the West undermined both the Ottoman and Mogul empires, and the end of the Ottoman empire left Islam without a core state. ...

An Islamic core state has to possess the economic resources, military power, organizational competence, and Islamic identity and commitment to provide both political and religious leadership to the ummah. Six states are from time to time mentioned as possible leaders of Islam; at present, no one of them, however, has all the requisites to be an effective core state. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country and is growing rapidly economically, It is, however, located on the periphery of Islam far removed from its Arab center; its Islam is of the relaxed, Southeast Asian variety; and its people and culture are a mixture of indigenous, Muslim, Hindu, Chinese, and Christian influences.

{p. 178} Finally, Turkey has the history, population, middle level of economic development, national coherence, and military tradition and competence to be the core state of Islam. In explicitly defining Turkey as a secular society, however, Ataturk prevented the Turkish republic from succeeding the Ottoman empire in that role. Turkey could not even become a charter member of the OIC because of the commitment to secularism in its constitution. So long as Turkey continues to define itself as a secular state, leadership of Islam is denied it.

What, however, if Turkey redefined itself? At some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West and to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic interlocutor and antagonist of the West. ...

{p. 179} Turkey is unique in having extensive historical connections with Muslims in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia.

{p. 183} Alone among civilizations the West has had a major and at times devastating impact on every other civilization.

{p. 184} The West is attempting and will continue to attempt to sustain its preeminent position and defend its interests by defining those interests as the interests of the "world community." That phrase has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers. The West is, for instance, attempting to integrate the economies of non-Western societies into a global economic system which it dominates. Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Western peoples, however, the IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from almost everyone else, who would agree with Georgi Arbatov's description of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."

{p. 185} The realist theory of international relations predicts that the core states of non-Western civilizations should coalesce together to balance the dominant power of the West. In some areas this has happened. A general anti-Western coalition, however, seems unlikely in the immediate future. Islamic and Sinic civilizations differ fundamentally in terms of religion, culture, social structure, traditions, politics, and basic assumptions at the root of their way of life. Inherently each prpbably has less in common with the other than it has in common with Western civilization. Yet in politics a common enemy creates a common interest. Islamic and Sinic societies which see the West as their antagonist thus have reason to cooperate with each other against the West, even as the Allies and Stalin did against Hitler. This cooperation occurs on a variety of issues, including human rights, economics, and most notably the efforts by societies in both civilizations to develop their military capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction and the missiles for deliering them, so as to counter the conventional military superiority of the West. By the early 1990s a "Confucian-Islamic connection" was in place between China and North Korea, on the one hand, and in varying degrees Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria, on the other, to confront the West on these issues.

The issues that divide the West and these other societies are increasingly important on the international agenda. Three such issues involve the efforts of the West: (1) to maintain its military superiority through policies of nonprolifer-

{p. 186} ation and counterproliferation with respect to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons {the "weapons of mass destruction" George W. Bush talks of, overlooking his own and Israel's} and the means to deliver them; (2) to promote Western political values and institutions by pressing other societies to respect human rights as conceived in the West and to adopt democracy on Western lines; and (3) to protect the cultural, social, and ethnic integrity of Western societies by restricting the number of non-Westerners admitted as immigrants or refugees. In all three areas the West has had and is likely to continue to have difficulties defending its interests against those of non-Western societies.

{p. 187} That lesson has been taken to heart by political I leaders and military chiefs throughout the non-Westem world, as has a plausible corollary: "If you have nuclear weapons, the United States won't fight you." ...

It is thus not surprising that Russia has emphasized the role of nuclear weapons in its defense planning and in 1995 arranged to purchase additional intercontinental missiles and bombers from Ukraine. "We are now hearing what we used to say about Russians in 1950s," one U.S. weapons expert commented. "Now the Russians are saying: 'We need nuclear weapons to compensate for their conventional superiority.'" In a related reversal, during the Cold War the United States, for deterrent purposes, refused to renoul1ce the first use of nuclear weapons. In keeping with the new deterrent function of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world, Russia in 1993 in effect renounced the previous Soviet commitment to no-first-use. Simultaneously China, in developing its post-Cold War nuclear strategy of limited deterrence, also began to question and to weaken its 1964 no-first-use commitment. ...

Terrorism historically is the weapon of the weak, that is, of those who do not possess conventional military power.


If demography is destiny, population movements are the motor of history. In centuries past, differential growth rates, economic conditions, and governmental policies have produced massive migrations by Greeks, Jews, Germanic tribes, Norse, Turks, Russians, Chinese, and others. In some instances these movements were relatively peaceful, in others quite violent. Nineteenth-century Europeans were, however, the master race at demographic invasion. Between 1821 and 1924, approximately 55 million Europeans migrated overseas, 34 million of them to the United States. Westerners conquered and at times obliterated other peoples, explored and sttled less densely populated lands. The export of people was perhaps the single most important dimension of the rise of the West between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries.

The late twentieth century has seen a different and even larger surge in migration. In 1990 legal international rnigrants numbered about 100 million,

{p. 199} refugees about 19 million, and illegal migrants probably at least 10 million more. ... "If there is a single 'law' in migration Myron Weiner argues, "it is that a migration flow, once begun, induces its own flow. Migrants enable their friends and relatives back home to migrate by providing them with information about how to migrate, resources to facilitate movement, and assistance in finding jobs and housing." The result is, in his phrase, a "global migration crisis." ...

The influx of migrants to Western societies, however, has approached in absolute numbers nineteenth-century Western emigration. In 1990 an estimated 20 million first generation immigrants were in the United States, 15.5 million in Europe, and 8 million in Australia and Canada. The proportion of immigrants to total population reached 7 percent to 8 percent in major European countries. In the United States immigrants constituted 8.7 percent of the population in 1994, twice that of 1970, and made up 25 percent of the people in California and 16 percent of those in New York.

About 8.3 million people entered the United States in the 1980s and 4.5 million in the first four years of the 1990s.

The new immigrants came overwhelmingly from non-Western societies.

{p. 200} By the early 1990s two-thirds of the migrants in Europe were Muslim and European concern with immigration is above all concern with Muslim immigration. The challenge is demographic - migrants account for 10 percent of the births in Western Europe, Arabs 50 percent of those in Brussels - and cultural. Muslim communities whether Turkish in Germanv or Algerian in France have not been integrated into their host cultures and, to the concern of Europeans, show few signs of becoming so. There "is a fear growing all across Europe," Jean Marie Domenach said in 1991, "of a Muslim community that cuts across European lines, a sort of thirteenth nation of the European Community." ...

The immigration issue came to the fore somewhat later in the United States than it did in Europe and did not generate quite the same emotional intensity. ... The cultural distance of the two largest migrant groups from the host culture was also less than in Europe: Mexicans are Catholic and Spanish-speaking; Filipinos, Catholic and English-speaking.

{p. 201} Can either Europe or the United States stem the migrant tide?

{p. 207} Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the
clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a grand scale.

{Joel Kotkin on "Higher Tribalism" in a borderless world: tribes.html}

{p. 210} Conflict was, on the one hand, a product of difference, particularly the Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics versus the Western Christian concept of the separate realms of God and Caesar. The conflict also stemmed however, from their similarities. Both are monotheistic religions, which, unlike polytheistic ones cannot easily assimilate additional deities, and which see the world in dualistic,

{p. 211} us-and-them terms. Both are universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both are missionary reiigions believing that tnelr adherents have an obligation to convert nonbelievers to that one true faith. From its origins Islam expanded by conquest and when the opportunity existed Christianity did also. The parallel concepts of 'jihad" and "crusade" not only resemble each other but distinguish these two faiths from other major world religions. Islam and Christianity, along with Judaism, also have teleological views of history in contrast to the cyclical or static views prevalent in other civilizations.

{p. 213} In 1990 Bernard Lewis, a leading Western scholar of Islam, analyzed "The Roots of Muslim Rage," and concluded:

{quote} It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations - that perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is critically important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but equally irrational reaction against that rival {endquote}

{Was Huntington aware that Lewis is Jewish rather than Christian: http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/JewishDiscovery.htm}

{p. 232} Is it in American interest to be ready to go to war if necessary to prevent Chinese hegemony in East Asia? If Chinese economic development continues, this could be the single most serious security issue American policymakers confront in the early twenty-first century. If the United States does want to stop Chinese domination of East Asia, it will need to redirect the Japanese alliance to that purpose, develop close militarv ties with other Asian nations, and enhance its military presence in Asia and the military power it can bring to bear in Asia. If the United States is not willing to fight against Chinese hegemony, it will need to foreswear its universalism. Learn to live with that hegemony, and reconcile itself to a marked reduction in its ability to shape events on the far side of the Pacific.

{Huntington says that the U.S. must play Japan against China:}

{p. 236} The core of any meaningful effort to balance and contain China would have to be the American-Japanese military alliance. Conceivably Japan might slowly acquiesce in redirecting the alliance to this purpose.

{p. 237} The key question in Sino-Japanese relations, Kishore Mahbubani has observed, is "who is number one?" And the answer is becoming clear. "There will be 110 explicit statements or understandings, but it was significant that the Japanese Emperor chose to visit China in 1992 at a time when Beijing was still relatively isolated internationally."

{p. 241} Japan, as we have argued, over time and with great anguish and soul-searching is likely to shift away from the United States in the direction of China. Like other transcivilizational Cold War alliances, Japan's security ties to the United States will weaken although probably never be formally renounced. ...

In the post-Cold War world Russa has a "Russia card" to play. Russia and China united would decisively tilt the Eurasian balance against the West and arouse all the concerns that existed about the Sino-Soviet relationship in the 1950s.


... Fault line conflicts are communal conflicts between states or groups from different civilizations. Fault line wars are conflicts that have become violent. Such wars may occur between states, between nongovernmental groups, and between states and nongovernmental groups. ...

Fault line conflicts sometimes are stmggles for control over people. More frequently the issue is control of territory. ... The territory at stake often is for one or both sides a l-igl-ly charged symbol of their history and identity, sacred land to which they have an inviolable right: the West Bank, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Drina Valley, Kosovo. ... Since religion, however, is the principal defining characteristic of civilizations, fault line wars are alnlost always between peoples of different religions.

{p. 263} The West's sponsorship, at the height of its power vis-a-vis Islam, of a Jeish homeland in the Middle East laid the basis for ongoing Arab-Israeli antagonism.

{The problem is not the homeland per se, but the expansion in an attempt to re-create the putative Kingdom of Solomon, complete with the Third Temple in place of the Dome of the Rock: tmf.html. But if the West is in charge of Israel, and not the other way around, it can stop Israel's expansion into the Palestinian and Arab areas. Jimmy Carter said the way to do is by withholding funds.}

{p. 301} The West, Civilizations, and Civilization


History ends at least once and occasionall more ohen in the history of every civilization. As the civilization's universal state emerges, its people become blinded by what Toynbee called "the mirage of immortality" and convinced that theirs is the final form of human society. So it was with the Roman Empire, the 'Abbasid Calipllate, the Mughal Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. ...

{p. 302} In what is probably the most useful periodization of the evolution of historical civilizations, Carroll Quigley sees a common pattern of seven phases. (See above, p. 44.) In his argument, Western civilization gradually began to take shape between A.D. 370 and 750 through the mixing of elements of Classical, Semitic, Saracen, and barbarian cultures. Its period of gestation lasting from the middle of the eighth century to the end of the tenth century was followed by movement, unusual among civilizations, back and forth between phases of expansion and phases of conflict. In his terms, as well as those of other civilization scholars, the West now appears to be moving out of its phase of conflict. Western civilization has become a security zone; intra-West wars, apart from an occasional Cod War, are virtually unthinkable. The West is developing, as was argued in chapter 2, its equivalent of a universal empire in the form of a complex system of confederations, federations, regimes, and other types of cooperative institutions that embody at the civilizational level its commitment to democratic and pluralistic politics. The West has, in short, becollle a mature society entering into what future generations, in the recurring pattem of cvilizations, will look back to as a "golden age," a period of peace resulting, in Quigley's terms, from "the absence of any eompetillg units within the area of the civilization itself, and from the remoteness or even absence of struggles with other societies outside." It is also a period of prosperity which arises from "the ending of internal belligerent destruction, the reduction of internal trade barriers, the establishment of a common system of weights, measures, a coinage, and from the extensive system of government spending associated with the establishment of a universal empire." ...

{p. 303} Civilizations grow, Quigley argued in 1961, because they have an "instrument of expansion," that is, a military, religious, political, or economic organization that accumulates surpuls and invests it in productive innoations. Civilizations decline when they stop the "application of surplus to new ways of doing things. In modern terms we say that the rate of investment decreases." This happens because the social groups controlling the surplus have a vested interest in using it for "nonproductive but ego-satisfying purposes ... which distribute the surpluses to consumption but do not provide more effective methods of production." People live off their capital and the civilization moves from the stage of the universal state to the stage of decay. This is a period of

{quote} acute economic depression, declining standards of living, civil wars between the various vested interests, and growing illiteracy. 'The societ grows weaker and weaker. Vain efforts are made to stop the wastage by legislation. But the decline continues. The religious, intellectual, social, and political levels of the society began to lose the allegiance of the masses of the people on a large scale. New religious movements begin to sweep over the society. There is a growing reluctance to fight for the society or even to support it by paying taxes. {endquote}

Decay then leads to the stage of invasion "when the civilization, no longer able to defend itself because it is no longer willing to defend itself, lies wide open to 'barbarian invaders,' "who often come from "another, younger, more powerful civilization."

{The Quigley quotes are from his book The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis, first published in 1961. This is the same Carroll Quigley who wrote The Anglo-American Establishment: quigley.html}

The overriding lesson of the history of civilizations, however, is that many things are probable but nothing is inevitable. Civilizations can and have reformed and renewed themselves. The central issue for the West is whether, quite apart from any external challenges, it is capable of stopping and reversing the internal processes of decay. Can the West renew itself or will sustained internal rot simply accelerate its end and/or subordination to other economically and demographically more dynamic civilizations? *

* {footnote} In a prediction which may be right but is not really supported by his theoretical and empirical analysis, Quigley concludes: "Western civilization did not exist about A.D. 500; it did exist in full flower about A.D. 1500, and it will surely pass out of existence at some time in the future, perhaps before A.D. 2500." New civilizations in China and India, replacing those destroyed by the West, he says, will then move into their stages of expansion and threaten both Western and Orthodox civilizations. Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979; first published by Macmillan in 1961), pp. 127, 164-66. {end footnote}

{p. 304} In the mid-1990s the West had many characteristics Quigley identified as those of a mature civilization on the brink of decay. Economically the West was far richer than any other civilization, but it also had low economic growth rates, saving rates, and investment rates, particularly as compared with the societies of East Asia. Individual and collective consumption had priority over the creation of the capabilities for future economic and military power. Natural population grouth was low, particularly compared with that of Islamic countries. Neither of these problems, however, would inevitably have catastrophic consequences. Western econolllies were still growing; by and large Western peoples were becoming better off; and the West was still the leader in scientific research and technological innovation. Low birth rates were unlikely to be cured by governments (whose efforts to do so are generally even less successful than their efforts to reduce population growth). Immigration, however, was a potential source of new vigor and human capital provided two conditions were met: first, if priority were given to able, qualified, energetic people with the talents and expertise needed by the host country; second, if the neu migrants and their children were assimilated into the cultures of the country and the West. The United States was likely to have problems meeting the first condition and European countries problems meeting the second. Yet setting policies governing the levels, sources, characteristics, and assimilation of immigrants is well within the experience and competence of Western governments.

Even more significant than economics and demography are problems of moral decline, cultural suicide, and political disunity in the West. Oft-pointed-to manifestations of moral decline include:

1. increases in antisocial behavior, sucll as crime, drug use, and violence generally; 2. family decay, including increased rates of divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancy, and single-parent families; 3. at least in the United States, a decline in "social capital," that is, membership in volurltary associations and the interpersonal trust associated with such membership; 4. general weakening of the 'work ethic" and rise of a cult of personal indulgence; 5. decreasing commitment to learning and intellectual activity, manifested in the United States in lower levels of scholastic achievement.

The future health of the West and its influellce on other societies depends in considerable measure on its success in coping with those trends, which, of course, give rise to the assertions of moral superiority by Muslims and Asians.

{Faced with the signs of that decay in the West - exemplified by the Trotskyist push for "gay marriage" - Huntington takes no steps to rectify it (such as by reining in Hollywood's licentiousness), but instead makes war on Islam, itself resisting the same modernist decadence.}

{p. 305} The erosion of Christianity among Westemers is likely to be at worst only a very long term threat to the hea}th of Western civilization.

A more immediate and dangerous challenge exists in the United States. Historically American national identity has been defined culturally by the heritage of Western civilization and politically by the principles of the American Creed on which Americans overwhelmingly agree: liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. In the late twentieth century both components of American identity have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with Western civilization, d nied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings. They have denounced, in the words of one of their reports, the "systematic bias toward European culture and its derivatives" in education and "the dominance of the European-American monocultural perspective." The multiculturalists are, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., said, "very often ethnocentric separatists who see little in the Western heritage other than Western crimes." Their "mood is one of divesting Americans of the sinful European inheritance and seeking redemptive infusions from non-Western cultures."

{p. 306} The fate of the Soviet Union, the other major country whose unity, even more than that of the United States, was defined in ideological terms is a sobering example for Americans. "[T]he total failure of Marxism ... and the dramatic breakup of the Soviet Union," the Japanese philosopher Takeshi Umehara has suggested, "are only the precursors to the collapse of Westem liberalism, the main current of modernity. Far from being the alternative to Marxism and the reigning ideology at the end of histor, liberalism will be the next domino to fall." In an era in which peoples everywhere define themselves in cultural terms what place is there for a society without a cultural core and defined only by a political creed?

{p. 307} The clash between the multiculturalists and the defenders of Western civilization and the American Creed is, in James Kurth's phrase, "the real clash" within the American segment of Western civilization.


... First, statesmen can constructively alter reality only if they recognize and understand it. ... They promoted multicivilizational economic integration plans which are either meaningless, as with APEC, or involve major unanticipated economic and political costs, as with NAFTA and Mexico.

{p. 319} Yet even so, while they might supplement the Singaporean values and give some lower priority, few Westerners would reject those values as unworthy. At least at a basic "thin" morality level, some commonalities exist between Asia and the West. In addition, as many have pointed out, whatever the degree to which they divided humankind, the world's major religions - Western Christianity, Orthodoxy, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism - also share key values in common. If humans are ever to develop a universal civilization, it will emerge gradually through the exploration and expansion of these commonalities. ...

This effort would contribute not only to limiting the clash of civilizations but also to strengthening Civilization in the singular (hereafter capitalized for clarity). The singular Civilization presumably refers to a complex mix of higher levels of morality, religion, learning, art, philosophy, technology, material wellbelng, and probably other things.

{p. 321} In city after city - Moscow, Rio de Janeiro, Bangkok, Shanghai, London, Rome, Warsaw, Tokyo, Johannesburg, Delhi, Karachi, Cairo, Bogota, Washington - crime seems to be soaring and basic elements of Civilization fading away. People speak of a global crisis in governance. The rise of transnational corporations producing economic goods is increasingly matched by the rise of transnational criminal mafias, drug cartels, and terrorist gangs violently assaulting Civilization. Law and order Is the first prerequisite of Civilization and in much of the world - Africa, Latin America, the former Soviet Union, South Asia, the Middle East - it appears to be evaporating, while also under serious assault in China, Japan, and the West. On a worldwide basis Civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Ages, possibly descending on humanity. ..

In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately. In the greater clash, the global "real clash," between Civilization and barbarism, the world's great civilizations, with their rich accomplishments in religion, art, literature, philosophy, science, technology, morality, and compassion, will also hang together or hang separately. In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.

{end of book}

Huntington seems to be promoting a clash, by hinting that violence might be justified, yet also qualifying it - the way that George W. Bush contradicts himself from day to day.

Not least important is the dust-jacket of this book, which (front and back) depicts the Christian cross, the Taoist yin-yang symbol (eg on the South Korean flag) and the Islamic crescent-and-star.

Here is the front of the dust-jacket: clash.front.jpg. And here is the rear: clash.back.jpg.

Noticeably missing is the Star of David: is not Judaism at the centre of the clash? Is not Huntington distracting from that fact, obscuring it?

Further, Huntington has placed Russia outside Western Civilization. Does not the Cross represent the Orthodox religions as much as the West?

The rear of the dust-jacket carries endorsements from Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinsky. With Huntingtron they form a troika at the heart of the Establishment, so no outside referee was, it seems, invited or thought necessary. But with Kissinger at the centre, Huntington cannot define the West independently of Judaism. No other minority can gain the allegiance at the centre, that Judaism has.

Jimmy Carter has opposed pre-emptive a strike, but Kissinger, alone of the troika it seems, has publicly declared himself for war against Iraq: War on terror: Iraq is phase II by Henry Kissinger, Melbourne Age, September 6 2002 http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/09/05/1031115911092.html.

Note the importance Huntington places on Quigley (p. 44, 48, 302, 303, 304) and Toynbee (p. 42, 43, 44, 48n, 55, 73, 301).

The Quigley reference is Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations, Liberty Fund, 1979, Indianapolis.

But Quigley, too, drew on Toynbee; thus Toynbee is the foundational thinker of the group: toynbee.html.

A striking feature of Toynbee and Quigley - perhaps of the Anglo-American Establishment as a whole - is that they do not define Classical Greek or Roman Civilization as "Western". Instead, for them, Western Civilization commences in the Christian Middle Ages; it is characterized by a synthesis from Classical, Jewish and other sources. Here, Quigley describes its birth:

(5) Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations, Liberty Fund, 1979, Indianapolis. (included here because Huntington draws heavily upon it)

{p. 333} Western Civilization

The death of Classical civilization and the barbarian migrations that accompanied it left the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and an extensive hinterland behind them in cultural chaos. The area was filled with shattered social groups and cultural wreckage bobbing about on swirls and eddies as if a great ship had sunk in a quiet sea. In the next three hundred years (500-800) these peoples and cultural debris began to integrate to form core areas of three new civilizations. All of these were on the extreme periphery of the older Classical society. To the southeast, in Arabia, appeared Islamic civilization; to the northeast, in the Northern Flatlands, appeared Orthodox Russian civilization; and in the northwest, in France, appeared Western civilization. Each of these had its distinctive outlook and organization, as all societies do, and the relationship between the three became one of the continuing problems of the next fifteen hundred years.

Western civilization presents one of the most difficult tasks for historical analysis, because it is not yet finished, because we are a part of it and lack perspective, and because it presents considerable variation from our pattern of

{p. 334} historical change. The first two of these difficulties are obvious enough. If Western civilization is still in its course, its future is not yet settled and its past is, accordingly, capable of diverse interpretations. Moreover, our own involvement in it handicaps our interpretation because many of its most significant features are so familiar to us that we accept them without statement or even recognition. The importance of these two difficulties will appear in our own analysis.

Moreover, the analysis of Western civilization in terms of the seven stages is difficult because it clearly does not follow the straightforward pattern of seven simple stages. Of course, any student in any society has an inclination to regard his own culture as being in some way exceptional, but in this case, more than others, there seems to be objective justification for such a feeling. No culture has ever exceeded Western civilization in power and extent. Our society now covers more than half of the globe, extending in space from Poland in the east to Australia in the west. In the course of this expansion, most of it during the last five centuries, the power of Western civilization has been so great that it has destroyed, almost without thinking of it, hundreds of other societies, including five or six other civilizations.

As we have already indicated, the history of Western civilization to the middle of the twentieth century is not a simple story of rise and fall, but rather a series of at least three successive pulsating movements of expansion. Each period of expansion has been followed by an Age of Crisis, but in two, and probably in all three, of these crises the organization of expansion has been circumvented or reformed sufficiently to provide a new instrument of expan-

{p. 335} sion and accordingly a new period in Stage 3. We have already given these three periods of expansion the rough dates 970-1270, 1420-1650, and 1730-1929. Each of these ended in an Age of Conflict.

Any such analysis as this is bound to lead to disagreement among students of the subject and, as a consequence, it may be necessary to give in this chapter some references to scholarly research, something we have managed to avoid in the earlier chapters of this book.

Although Western civilization emerged from the wreckage of Classical antiquity, it differed from it in every important aspect of its culture. Even in its first three stages it had a different military system (based on specialized cavalry rather than on infantry), a different technology (based on animal power rather than on slavery), a different economic organization, a different political organization (formed about rural castles rather than around municipal acropolises), and, above all, an entirely different religious system and basic ideology. The only level where a certain similarity between the two cultures could be found is on the social levels where both civilizations began with a two-class society of fighting nobles and agricultural peasantry organized in self-sufficient economic units (genos and manor) and slowly changed, in both cases, by the insertion of a town-dwelling commercial middle class between the original two. We have already spoken of this similarity.

The differences between the two societies on most levels of culture are either well known or will be explained in the present chapter. But the most important difference, that on the intellectual level, is too significant to be discussed in this cursory way. In any society the nonmaterial culture is the most significant feature of the whole society, because it

{p. 336} is the least capable of being exported and because it is pervasive in all the other levels as well. In this particular case there is the additional necessity for exposition of this aspect, because of widespread ignorance or misunderstanding of it.

We might begin by saying that Western ideology is opti- mistic, moderate, hierarchical, democratic, individualistic yet social, and dynamic. All these terms refer only to aspects of the whole and do not really get us to its essence. This essence might be summed up in the belief that "Truth un- folds in time through a communal process." Before we attempt to analyze this rather cryptic statement, we should say a few words about the more superficial aspects.

The Western outlook is optimistic because it believes that the world is basically good and that the greatest good lies in the future. This covers all the ideas Etienne Gilson included in the term "Christian optimism." The Classical ideology began by being mundane and ended with a dualism in which it saw the universe as an evil material world opposed to a good spiritual sphere. Western ideology believes that the material is good and the spiritual is better but that they are not opposed to each other since the material world is necessary for the achievement of the spiritual world. The world and the flesh are good because they were both made by God (as in the Old Testament). The material world is necessary to the spiritual in two ways: (1) no soul exists without a body and (2) no soul can be saved except by its own efforts and cooperative actions with other persons, both of which can be achieved only by bodily actions in this world. These ideas appeared clearly in the Christian religion, although they had a very difficult time getting accepted because the dualistic late Classical ideology regarded the world and the flesh as evil and felt that the spirit

{p. 337} could achieve full spirituality only by freeing itself from the body, from the world, and from contact with one's fellow man and that such spiritual achievement was a consequence of the individual's own activity alone, without cooperation with his fellow men. This attitude appeared very clearly in Persian {Zoroastrian} thinking about 600 B.C., came into Classical antiquity through the Pythagorean rationalists, and was given a clear, explicit, and influential statement in Plato's Phaedo about 385 B.C. {see zoroaster-judaism.html} Although quite incompatible with the Classical outlook, these ideas became increasingly influential and became the generally accepted philosophic outlook after the third century of our era. This led to a phenomenal outgrowth of anchoritism in the third to sixth centuries. It must be recognized that this philosophic position was basically incompatible with the religious ideas of Christianity. The latter has been threatened ever since by dualistic heresies (like Arianism, Catharism, or Jansenism) derived from this philosophic background.

Western ideology believed that the world was good because it was made by God in six days and that at the end of each day He looked at His work and said that it was good. This meant that the world was a comprehensible place (one of the basic ideas of Western science) and that its existence unfolded in time (not by instantaneous creation or through eternal existence). The body was also good, being made by God in His own image. Man needed others in order to develop his capacities in time, and he needed his body, his fellow men, and God's help, as well as his own efforts to achieve, over time, salvation in the future. This salvation included the body as well as the soul ("resurrection of the body and life everlasting") and could be achieved by good works (requiring a body and one's fellow men) and God's

{p. 338} grace (granted by God Himself taking a human body and living in time in this world). All of these things were clearly stated in the New Testament, and the objections to them arising from Classical dualism were firmly rejected at the first church council held at Nicaea in 325. The full implications of the injunction to "love thy neighbor" were not completely unfolded in these two steps but continue to be so through the present and into the future.

While the aristocratic Classical culture had put the golden age in the past, more democratic Western culture put it (and salvation) in the future. This optimistic and hopeful attitude applied to most aspects of Western life. Its hierarchical aspect appeared originally in the belief that the spiritual rested on the material (not opposed to it) and also came to apply to much of life. This led to a basic distinction (now largely lost) between necessary and important, in which material things were necessary but spiritual things were important.

The democratic and individualistic aspects of the Western outlook were always present, and go back, like other aspects, to the New Testament. They rest on the belief that all men have souls fit for salvation and, in the long run, have equal opportunity to achieve salvation. These ideas also appear in Christ's concern with the downtrodden and oppressed, in the belief that the first and greatest sin was pride (the sin of Lucifer) and that the greatest virtue was humility, in the Beatitudes and in many parables (such as that of the lost sheep). It is worthy of note that all these points are concerned not only with the individual's relationship to himself and to God but also with his relationship to his fellow men. All these, along with the emphasis on good works and the importance of sacraments, show the significance of the

{p. 339} social element in Western thought. The same significance was underlined in the idea that man can be fully man and fully please God only in society. This idea was reflected in religion in the idea of the church (the societas perfecta), the belief that salvation could be obtained most readily through the church, the idea of the sacraments (all of which require the presence of at least two persons and most of which require three), the efforts, in the sixth century, to replace anchorites with monks (that is, to replace a late Classical aberration with a system more compatible with Western sociality).

{But the Pythagoreans were monks of a sort, too: india.html}

All these different aspects of the Western outlook cluster about the essence of the outlook that we have tried to express in the statement that "Truth unfolds through a communal process." The outlook to which this statement refers lies at the foundation of Western culture and is reflected equally in its religion, its politics, its science, and its economics.

This outlook assumes, first, that there is a truth or goal for man's activity. Thus it rejects despair, solipsism, skepticism, pessimism, and chaos. It implies hope, order, and the existence of a meaningful objective external reality. And it provides the basis for science, religion, and social action as the West has known these.

Second, this attitude assumes that no one, now, has the truth in any complete or even adequate way; it must be sought or struggled for. Thus this outlook rejects smugness, complacency, pride, and personal authority in favor of the Christian virtues and a kind of basic agnosticism (with the implication "We don't yet know everything"), as well as the idea of achievement of good through struggle to reach the good. The earliest great work of German literature, Parzival, has as its subtitle "The Brave Man Slowly Wise." This is

{p. 340} typical of the Western ideology's belief that wisdom (or any real achievement) comes as a consequence of personal effort in time. The same idea is to be found in Dante's Divine Comedy, in Shakespeare's tragedies (taken as a whole), and in Beethoven's symphonies.

There are two important ideas here: one is that no one has the whole truth now but that it can be approached closer and closer in the future, by vigorous effort, and the other is that no single individual does this or achieves this, but that it must be achieved by a communal effort, by a kind of cooperation in competition in which each individual's efforts help to correct the errors of others and thus help the development of a consensus that is closer to the truth than the actions of any single individual ever could be. We might call these two aspects the temporal and the social. They are covered in our maxim by the words "unfolds" and "social."

There is also a third idea here; namely, that the resulting consensus is still not final, although far superior to any earlier or more individual version. Thus the advance of man- kind or of any single individual is an endless process in which truth (or any achievement, even the development of an individual's personality ) is constantly approached closer and closer without ever being finished or reached.

We might mention also another phase of this outlook; namely, the idea that the cooperative effort that unfolds truth through a continuously developing consensus is a competitive process. More accurately it is cooperation through competition, as a game is. This refers to a social process that is superficially competitive but fundamentally cooperative, or, viewed in another way, a situation in which individuals compete and even struggle together for a higher social end (the consensus). This is a dialectic process and

{p. 341} is one of the heritages from Classical antiquity, where this idea of the emergence of truth from pluralistic debate in the market place is found in the earlier dialogues of Plato and of other thinkers. It is worthy of note that Plato, while retaining the form of the dialogue, really abandoned its function in his later writings (the Republic and those following) by using Socrates as the spokesman of his own ideas that contain the whole truth, while the other speakers contribute nothing to the final achievement since their ideas are erroneous and must be corrected by Socrates.

This idea of the fruitful debate from which truth grows is the basis for the method of medieval intellectual advance (in spite of the erroneous theory so widely accepted that medieval ideas were rigid systems imposed by authority). This conception is of course found behind medieval exposition as in Abelard's Sic et Non or Aquinas's Summa theologica, but it is much more fully realized in the process by which medieval ideas were reached than in the form in which they were presented. However, in both there was a fundamental assumption that each presentation was temporary and not fully perfect and was subject to improvement in a later revision as a consequence of criticism. The idea, so widely spread today that the Summa theologica was a final, complete, and permanent presentation of its subject, was not held at the time by anyone, least of all by Aquinas himself. After all, the Angelic Doctor offered the world at least three versions of this subject Ñ the Summa ... contra Gentiles, the Summa theologica, and the incomplete but really much improved Compendium Theologiae.

This attitude, to which I have referred by the maxim about the social unfolding of truth, is the basis of the Western religious outlook. This outlook believed that religious truth

{p. 342} unfolded in time and is not yet complete. The Old Testament, for example was not canceled or replaced by the New Testament but was supplemented by it. And the New Testament was never, in most of the life of Western civilization, regarded as a literal, explicit, and final statement of the truth. Rather, recognition of its truths have to be developed in time, by social action, from basically symbolic statements. Thus the doctrine of the Christian church was unfolded through church councils (like that at Nicaea) and by conferences of learned doctors and clerics, without ever any feeling that the process was finished. The fundamentalist position on biblical interpretation, with its emphasis on the explicit, complete, final, and authoritarian nature of Scripture, is a very late, minority view quite out of step with the Western tradition.

Closely related to this idea of the unfolding of doctrine through the church is the idea of the development of the individual, both in life and in death, toward the Beatific Vision. The same idea about the social (and dialectic) unfolding of truth is at the foundation of Western science. It assumes that science is never static or fully achieved, but pursues a constantly receding goal to which we approach closer and closer from the competition-cooperation of individual scientists, each of whom offers his experiments and theories to be critically reexamined and debated by his fellow scientists in a joint effort to reach a higher (and temporary) consensus.

The same outlook appears in the basic political ideas of the West. These are liberal and not authoritarian. They cannot be authoritarian because no individual or institution has full and final truth; instead a fuller and more complete truth emerges as a guide to social activity from the free debate in free assembly of all men's partial truths. Thus liberalism in this sense is basic in the outlook of the West and goes back, as we indicated earlier, to the dissociation of state and society in the Dark Ages when the former van- ished and the latter continued. In its narrowest version this idea appeared as the theory that all men with different outlooks or contributions cooperate together to form something greater than the partial opinions of any of them. This kind of pluralism is assumed by the Polycraticus of John of Salisbury in the twelfth century as much as it is assumed by the United States Constitution in the eighteenth century.

The same kind of pluralist outlook is the real justification of capitalism and of all laissez-faire or pluralist economic systems so typical of the West even in its early period when economic development was taking its first steps. It is the outlook behind the nineteenth century "Community of Interests" that has been exposed to such critical onslaughts in the twentieth century but yet remains as the unstated assumption behind our economic attitudes as they operate in actions.

Thus we see the basic ideology of the West reflected in all aspects of the society, and continuing to influence ideas and actions even after it has been explicitly rejected. It is, for example, behind the theories of such late and "unconventional" thinkers as Darwin or Marx, both of whom believed that the Better emerged from the Good by the superficial struggles of the many to achieve what could never have been reached by any single individual alone. In fact, of these two, Marxist dialectic materialism is rather closer to the Western tradition than Darwin's struggle for existence is. Marx, like his mentor Hegel, was Western in his belief that progress is achieved through struggle, but, like Hegel, he committed

{p. 344} the Western sin of pride (the sin of Lucifer) in the intellectual arrogance which expected achievement of a final goal in the material world and in the near future.

Part of the difficulty to be found in analysis of the history of Western civilization arises from the vicissitudes of the "Western tradition." These difficulties were present throughout Western history. In the early period (say up to 1150) the difficulty arose from the fact that the religious outlook and practices of our society were incompatible with the intellectual outlook and philosophy derived from the dualistic ideas of the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition. Thus, in a figure like Augustine, we find a Christian religious outlook combined with a Platonic philosophic outlook with which it is really not compatible. One consequence of this situation was a great prevalence of dualistic heresies. These were condemned as part of the religious settlement at Nicaea in 325, but they were not really overcome in philosophy until the twelfth century. At this latter time the triumph of moderate realism, as represented by Abelard, Albertus Magnus, or Thomas Aquinas, over exaggerated realism, as represented by St. Anselm or William of Champeaux, represented the achievement, within Christian society, of a philosophy that was compatible with its religious outlook. The official acceptance by the papacy in the early fourteenth century of Thomism, in spite of the attacks of the exaggerated realists, sealed this victory. Such a victory, in accordance with the tradition of the West, was not a victory of one extreme view over another but rather a moderate synthesis of the extremes in a higher unity. Thus the exaggerated realist extremists said that the universal was real and that the individual was an illusion (a position totally incompatible with Christianity and therefore never held, in this extreme

{p. 345} form, by any orthodox Christian). At the other end of the spectrum, the nominalists said that the individual was real and that the universal was only a word (or a subjective concept). The Thomistic compromise, which was compatible with Christianity and the Western tradition, said that both the individual and the universal were real. This synthesis disrupted very soon into two extremist positions, represented in philosophy by Scotist realism and Occamite nominalism. The same scission into two extremes was found in religion during the late Middle Ages between these who advocated salvation through good works (like St. Francis of Assisi and Thomas a Kempis) and those who advocated salvation through God's grace (the new ascetics, mystics, and ultimately the Protestants), each group tending to place such emphasis on its own path to salvation as almost to deny the other extreme. Or again, within the church appeared a split between those who emphasized it as a temporal organization (and thus corrupted it) and those who emphasized it as a spiritual group, and thus (like Savonarola, Huss, and Luther) tended to deny its organization.

From this it can be seen that the ideology of the Christian West was essentially a moderate one. It was constantly threatened, as moderates always are, by extremism. When these extremists argued for "either-or," the Western tradition answered "both!" But this answer was no sooner given than new appeals by extremists sought to reopen the debate, to destroy the moderates, and to disrupt the synthesis. The extremists from one side (the Left, if you will) based their appeals on individualism, the senses, and materialism, and thus on the Christian insistence on the need of the world and the body. The extremists from the other side (the Right, we might say) based their appeal on society, rationalism, and

{p. 346} spirituality, and thus on the Christian emphasis on the soul, God's grace, and the perfect rationality of God. Ultimately, in the history of ideas, the former extreme goes back to the Hebrews and to the Ionian atomists, while the latter extreme goes back to Persian Zorastrianism and to the Pythagorean rationalists, above all, to Plato {see zoroaster-judaism.html}. Within Western religious history ( and the history of the church, which is both temporal and spiritual) these two extremes have been represented by corruption and by dualistic heresy. It is easy for us to see how corruption (that is, too great emphasis on the material and temporal aspect) destroys religion, but it is not so easy for many to see how too great spirituality (that is, too great emphasis on the nonmaterial and eternal aspect) can destroy religion. This condition arises because religion is a linking (from ligare, to join together, as in English "ligament" or "ligature") of the two extremes (man and God) that cannot exist if either extremity is absent.

In the history of Western nonmaterial culture, including religion and philosophy, the threat to the synthesized moderate middle ground from the Right has come from dualistic rationalism and especially from the influence of Plato. This influence has worked historically through Augustine of Hippo, who was a Platonist in philosophy although a Christian in religion. In the field of religion itself, this influence has given rise to dualistic heresies of which the chief, as might be expected, have appealed to Augustine. Augustine himself was not a heretic. He said, "Man is saved by God's grace," but he never said, "Man is saved by God's grace alone." Since the orthodox position (the middle ground) was that man was saved by God's grace and his own good works among his fellow men, Augustine's statement was incomplete but not wrong (that is heretical). Only when

{p. 347} this partial statement was accepted as a whole, complete, and final statement did it become heresy. But the tendency for the Rightest extremists to do this was very strong, and this tendency was most irresistible among those who were closest to the Augustinian tradition. Thus Luther, who was an Augustinian monk, did believe in salvation by grace alone, and the last great heresy (from the spiritual extremists) was Jansenism, which grew out of Jansen's book the Augustinus, a study of Augustine's theology (1632). This spread through figures like Pascal and the Port Royal group and was condemned as a heresy by the papacy in the bull Unigenitus in 1715.

Of course, the threat to the Western ideology based on synthetic moderation came equally, if not more easily, from the Left, from the materialists and nominalists. But this is a well-known story that needs to be mentioned here only because the loss of the ideology of Western civilization (like the earlier loss of the ideology of Classical civilization) will rest rather on the overemphasis on materialism and selfish individualism than it will on overemphasis of rationalism or spirituality.

In most civilizations, as we have already shown, there is a strong tendency for the basic ideology of the society to become lost and misunderstood during the Age of Conflict and to be abandoned totally in the Age of Decay. Since Western civilization has gone into an Age of Conflict three times, the threat to the society's ideology has been practically endemic. Anyone who wishes to recover this ideology can do so by reflecting on the word "moderation" or the expression "reconciliation of extremes" or, more abstrusely, on our maxim about the "unfolding of truth through social activity over time." ...

{end of quotes}

Israel Shamir's talk "Civilization X",  on Huntington's Clash:

"Civilization X", by Israel Shamir

{quote} American political scientists revived the Neo-Darwinist and racist concept of Clash of Civilisations for practical reasons: to explain and encourage the war of America against the World. Its enemies are presented in 'civilisational' terms: 'Old' (read: independent) Europe, Dar al-Islam, China. If these are the enemies, who are the friends? What is 'our' civilisation of Huntington and Strauss, Perle and Wurmser, Feith and Rice? Whatever it is, this Civilisation X is equally rejected by people of Eastern and Western Europe, French and Ukrainian, Germans and Greeks, Chinese and Zulu.

Let us consider the qualities of this Civilisation X:

- It is exterritorial, knows no borders and able to attack and devour from Iraq to China, from Russia to Nicaragua. ...

- Its main occupation is usury. They provide loans to states, ensnare them with impossible conditions and ruin them.

- It considers human solidarity and brotherhood - 'totalitarianism'.

- It rejects Spirit and considers it 'fanaticism and fundamentalism'.

- It equally abhors Apostolic Christianity and Islam; but it loves to set the Christians upon the Muslims, and vice versa.

- Its devotion is given to the Jewish State. Not only the JINSA Cabal is ethnically faithful to Israel; the US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said that the security of Israel is the key to security of the world. Rice added that she feels a deep affinity with Israel.

- It is heavily engaged in drugs. Wherever they win, heroin has its field day. London's The Independent newspaper, reported from Baghdad: The city, which had never seen heroin, is now flooded with narcotics. It is not unusual that where the Americans go, the narcotics flourish. Taliban had successfully eliminated the drugs from Afghanistan but since the US forces took over the control, Afghanistan has become the largest producer of heroin. Some reports suggest that the drug and arms trafficking is patronized by the CIA to finance its covert operations worldwide.

- It exalts vengeance. The war against Afghanistan was promoted as 'vengeance for 9/11'.

- It has soul of dastardly knave, in its narrow meaning of 'opposite to noble'. They did not dare to attack Iraq until it was fully disarmed by the UN.

- It produces no art. In vain archaeologists of Fourth Millennium will search for their Venus. The rusty American Venus a.k.a opus 5327 exhibited in the Guggenheim is identical to any heap of scrap metal. There are no glorious temples, no exciting architecture, absolutely nothing to miss if the gods would pour sulphur and brimstone on its cities.

- It is obsessed with paranoid fear. It is not enough that America spends on weapons ten times more money than the rest of the world. They want to disarm everybody. The war in Iraq was caused by desire to remove its weapons. Now they want to disarm Iran, Syria, Korea, and Ukraine and Russia just wait for its turn.

- Fear of weapons is not aimed exclusively outside: the proponents of Civilisation X try their best to disarm the American people as well. For this reason they committed the mass murder at Waco and implicated militias in Oklahoma bombing.

- It despises labour and labourers. American cinema, the only existing quasi-art output of Civilisation X, depicts millionaires and whores, gamblers and brokers, bums and gangsters, but its last worker was depicted in the pre-war Grapes of Wrath.

- It loves the rich. They believe the rich are virtuous, for they are blessed with wealth, while the poor are evil and damned just because they are poor.

The psychological portrait should be recognisable for the Ukrainians. Yes, the Civilisation X presently at war with the rest of the world, is this eminently familiar and contemptible figure, a medieval Ukrainian Jew, a usurer, tax collector and alcohol pusher magnified by a factor of million. Its size impeded our recognition, for it is not easy to recognise an elephant-size louse. {endquote}

More from Shamir's essay Civilization X: asia-crisis.html.

(6) Christian when it suits them; otherwise Jewish

New York public schools have a Ban on Christmas Nativity displays at Christmas, but the Jewish Menorah and Islamic star and crescent are allowed on Jewish & Islamic holidays, because these are "secular" symbols:

Especially interesting in this context is Huntington's book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).

Not least important is the dust-jacket of this book, which (front and back) depicts the Christian cross, the Taoist yin-yang symbol (eg on the South Korean flag) and the Islamic crescent-and-star.

Here is the front of the dust-jacket: clash.front.jpg

And here is the rear: clash.back.jpg

Noticeably missing is the Star of David: is not Judaism at the centre of the clash?

Here's the rub: Christian displays are banned in New York public schools.

So much for the U.S. being a "Christian" country. Yet Huntington proclaims the war "Christian".

Christianity is being used as a mask, behind which the real forces promoting the war can hide.

(7) Newsweek article about Neocons writes-out the JINSA connection

Yes, a new term enters the language: "writing out"

Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2003 20:47:27 EST From: MORRIS434@aol.com

Please read the Sydney Morning Herald article which is linked at this URL as "Cheney's Hawks": http://www.lewrockwell.com/kwiatkowski/kwiatkowski-arch.html

Subj: JINSA/PNAC Cheney on "Newsweek" Cover this Week

Date: 11/11/03 11:01:18 AM Pacific Standard Time From: MORRIS434 To: michael isikoff

Dear Mr. Isikoff,

Thank you for your time on the telephone earlier today. Here is the email which I mentioned that I would send you with comment on your cover article for Newsweek this week:

Cheney's Long Path to War (Cover Article in the November 17th, 2003 issue of "Newsweek" magazine):

The Hard Sell: He sifted intel. He brooded about threats. And he wanted Saddam gone. The inside story of how Vice President Cheney bought into shady assumptions and helped persuade a nation to invade Iraq


This "Newsweek" magazine article is about the Cheney Neoconservative cabal that pushed US to invade Iraq for Israel and oil (as Cheney was on the board of advisors for JINSA and was involved with PNAC as well-he was also the CEO for Halliburton).

The "Newsweek" article still falls short though because it doesn't mention that Cheney, Feith, and Perle (who are all mentioned in the article as being part of the Neoconsevative cabal) are all associated with JINSA (Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) which had wanted regime change in Iraq for years before the tragic 9/11 attack ... The article allowed Cheney to have a staff member get away (without being challenged about Cheney's JINSA/PNAC association) with conveying that Cheney wasn't for "regime change" in Iraq until the tragic 9/11 attack..

As JINSA had wanted regime change in Iraq for years before 9/11 (and Cheney had been associated with JINSA and PNAC), Cheney (via his staff member who commented for that "Newsweek" article) is lying. In addition, Cheney was associated with PNAC (Project for the New American Century) which had wanted regime change in Iraq well before 9/11 as well (see the Bob Barr article on PNAC which is included below as it also mentions Cheney). So of course Cheney was involved with distorting and "cooking" intelligence to suit his JINSA/PNAC agenda of wanting to invade and do regime change in Iraq as soon as possible.

To read about Iraq and JINSA, type in "Iraq" at http://www.jinsa.org (if the "Iraq" material is still referenced there like it was before the Iraq invasion). In addition, Wolfowitz (whose mentor was JINSA/PNAC Zionist extremist Richard Perle) had put together that pre-emptive strike doctrine while Cheney was the Secretary of Defense under Bush Senior in the early 1990's, so Cheney was fully aware of it and wanted regime change in Iraq for years before the 9/11 attack.

Also, the writers of that "Newsweek" article didn't mention the Israeli spies at the Pentagon as you can read in the "Israeli Spies at the Pentagon" article from the UK Guardian newspaper which is linked under the photos of the Zion traitors (Israel Firsters) at http://www.nowarforisrael.com .

In addition, the "Newsweek" writers did not mention that "A Clean Break" document which JINSA Zionist extremists Richard Perle and Douglas Feith wrote for Israeli Zionist extremist Prime Minister Netanyahu in 1996 (as "A Clean Break" advised for Israel to do regime change in Iraq and in Syria as well as dissolve the Palestinian peace process). When Perle and Feith got into power/influential positions at the Pentagon in the current Bush regime, they had the US military do regime change in Iraq instead of Israel (with Syria to follow soon if they can get away with it). Zionist (Jew) extremist David Wurmser (who is also mentioned in the "Newsweek" article) was also involved with putting together that "A Clean Break" advisory paper (which you can read by clicking on the embedded link for "A Clean Break" at the following URL):


It is important to also know that Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and John Bolton (all mentioned below in the article from the "Forward" which is a respected Jewish publication out of New York) are JINSANs as well.. Perle is also associated with PNAC (which would like to have a confrontation with Russia and China sooner rather than later as you can access the JINSA web site at www.jinsa.org and PNAC's URL via www.newamericancentury.org). Robert Fisk (a respected journalist for the London Independent newspaper as you can read more via www.robert-fisk.com) wrote about JINSA (and Dick Cheney's association to JINSA as he is also associated with PNAC) in the following article: http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk0910.html

Fisk mentions this article ("Men from JINSA and CSP") from "The Nation" which is a must read as well: http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml%3Fi=20020902&s=vest


March 24, 2003 issue

The American Conservative

Whose War?

A neoconservative clique seeks to ensnare our country in a series of wars that are not in America's interest.

The Bush Administration's Dual Loyalties


Counterpunch December 13, 2002

A Rose By Another Other Name

The Bush Administration's Dual Loyalties


(8) Bernard Lewis - a Jewish scholar -led Samuel Huntington to the "Clash of Civilizations"

Samuel Huntington seems to have borrowed the expression "Clash of Civilizations" from Bernard Lewis.

On p. 213 of The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Huntington writes:

<<In 1990 Bernard Lewis, a leading Western scholar of Islam, analyzed "The Roots of Muslim Rage," and concluded:

{quote} It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations - that perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is critically important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but equally irrational reaction against that rival {endquote}>>

It now seems that Bernard Lewis is Jewish. The following book, subtitled Studies in Honor of Bernard Lewis, contains the proceedings of a conference held at Tel Aviv University. The publisher is The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

Note that, above, Huntington quotes Lewis speaking of "our Judeo-Christian heritage". Was Huntington aware that Lewis was Jewish rather than Christian?


Martin Kramer, "Introduction," in The Jewish Discovery of Islam: Studies in Honor of Bernard Lewis, ed. Martin Kramer (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1999), pp. 1-48.

The book is comprised of the proceedings of a conference held at Tel Aviv University in 1996, to honor Bernard Lewis on his 80th birthday. The volume is out of print. this is Part 1 ...


Lunch with the FT: Bernard Lewis

By Michael Steinberger

Published: August 9 2002 16:49 | Last Updated: August 9 2002 16:49


... Bernard Lewis is not your typical talking head. For one thing, he is 86 and a professor emeritus of history at Princeton University. ... Islam and the Middle East are hot topics, and it is widely agreed that there is no more sage guide to the Arab world and its discontents than Lewis.

... Lewis's ardently pro-American, pro-Israeli views have made him an object of derision in some circles and he perks up a bit when I mention his old bête noire, Edward Said. Lewis is, of course, the quintessential Orientalist, and Said has spent the past three decades lobbing barbs at him.

The two have met only once, debating with each other years ago at an academic conference. "It was pretty nasty," Lewis recalls. He finds Said's central argument - that western scholars of Islam and the Arab world are imperialist stooges - preposterous.

In agreeing to an interview, Lewis, who left the University of London to join Princeton's faculty in 1974, had warned me he would be reluctant to discuss the experience of being a Jewish scholar of Islam, and of being a Jew in a field traditionally dominated by ardent Arabists, because he was saving those reflections for a memoir.

Posted by DeLong at August 11, 2002 06:35 PM

(9) Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage

The Atlantic Monthly; September 1990; The Roots of Muslim Rage; Volume 266, No. 3; pages 47 - 60.


Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified

by Bernard Lewis

IN one of his letters Thomas Jefferson remarked that in matters of religion "the maxim of civil government" should be reversed and we should rather say, "Divided we stand, united, we fall." In this remark Jefferson was setting forth with classic terseness an idea that has come to be regarded as essentially American: the separation of Church and State. This idea was not entirely new; it had some precedents in the writings of Spinoza, Locke, and the philosophers of the European Enlightenment. It was in the United States, however, that the principle was first given the force of law and gradually, in the course of two centuries, became a reality.

If the idea that religion and politics should be separated is relatively new, dating back a mere three hundred years, the idea that they are distinct dates back almost to the beginnings of Christianity. Christians are enjoined in their Scriptures to "render ... unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's." While opinions have differed as to the real meaning of this phrase, it has generally been interpreted as legitimizing a situation in which two institutions exist side by side, each with its own laws and chain of authority -- one concerned with religion, called the Church, the other concerned with politics, called the State. And since they are two, they may be joined or separated, subordinate or independent, and conflicts may arise between them over questions of demarcation and jurisdiction.

This formulation of the problems posed by the relations between religion and politics, and the possible solutions to those problems, arise from Christian, not universal, principles and experience. There are other religious traditions in which religion and politics are differently perceived, and in which, therefore, the problems and the possible solutions are radically different from those we know in the West. Most of these traditions, despite their often very high level of sophistication and achievement, remained or became local -- limited to one region or one culture or one people. There is one, however, that in its worldwide distribution, its continuing vitality, its universalist aspirations, can be compared to Christianity, and that is Islam.

Islam is one of the world's great religions. Let me be explicit about what I, as a historian of Islam who is not a Muslim, mean by that. ...

The Muslim world is far from unanimous in its rejection of the West, nor have the Muslim regions of the Third World been the most passionate and the most extreme in their hostility. ... There is no Cuba, no Vietnam, in the Muslim world, and no place where American forces are involved as combatants or even as "advisers." But there is a Libya, an Iran, and a Lebanon, and a surge of hatred that distresses, alarms, and above all baffles Americans.

At times this hatred goes beyond hostility to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western civilization as such, not only what it does but what it is, and the principles and values that it practices and professes. These are indeed seen as innately evil, and those who promote or accept them as the "enemies of God." ...

Like every other civilization known to human history, the Muslim world in its heyday saw itself as the center of truth and enlightenment, surrounded by infidel barbarians whom it would in due course enlighten and civilize. But between the different groups of barbarians there was a crucial difference. The barbarians to the east and the south were polytheists and idolaters, offering no serious threat and no competition at all to Islam. In the north and west, in contrast, Muslims from an early date recognized a genuine rival -- a competing world religion, a distinctive civilization inspired by that religion, and an empire that, though much smaller than theirs, was no less ambitious in its claims and aspirations. This was the entity known to itself and others as Christendom, a term that was long almost identical with Europe.

The struggle between these rival systems has now lasted for some fourteen centuries. It began with the advent of Islam, in the seventh century, and has continued virtually to the present day. It has consisted of a long series of attacks and counterattacks, jihads and crusades, conquests and reconquests. For the first thousand years Islam was advancing, Christendom in retreat and under threat. The new faith conquered the old Christian lands of the Levant and North Africa, and invaded Europe, ruling for a while in Sicily, Spain, Portugal, and even parts of France. The attempt by the Crusaders to recover the lost lands of Christendom in the east was held and thrown back, and even the Muslims' loss of southwestern Europe to the Reconquista was amply compensated by the Islamic advance into southeastern Europe, which twice reached as far as Vienna. For the past three hundred years, since the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 and the rise of the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa, Islam has been on the defensive, and the Christian and post-Christian civilization of Europe and her daughters has brought the whole world, including Islam, within its orbit.

FOR a long time now there has been a rising tide of rebellion against this Western paramountcy, and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness. The Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers, and the enfranchisement of native non-Muslim elements. The third -- the last straw -- was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children. It was too much to endure, and the outbreak of rage against these alien, infidel, and incomprehensible forces that had subverted his dominance, disrupted his society, and finally violated the sanctuary of his home was inevitable. It was also natural that this rage should be directed primarily against the millennial enemy and should draw its strength from ancient beliefs and loyalties.

Europe and her daughters? The phrase may seem odd to Americans, whose national myths, since the beginning of their nationhood and even earlier, have usually defined their very identity in opposition to Europe, as something new and radically different from the old European ways. This is not, however, the way that others have seen it; not often in Europe, and hardly ever elsewhere.

Though people of other races and cultures participated, for the most part involuntarily, in the discovery and creation of the Americas, this was, and in the eyes of the rest of the world long remained, a European enterprise, in which Europeans predominated and dominated and to which Europeans gave their languages, their religions, and much of their way of life.

For a very long time voluntary immigration to America was almost exclusively European. There were indeed some who came from the Muslim lands in the Middle East and North Africa, but few were Muslims; most were members of the Christian and to a lesser extent the Jewish minorities in those countries. Their departure for America, and their subsequent presence in America, must have strengthened rather than lessened the European image of America in Muslim eyes. ...

The Second World War, the oil industry, and postwar developments brought many Americans to the Islamic lands; increasing numbers of Muslims also came to America, first as students, then as teachers or businessmen or other visitors, and eventually as immigrants. Cinema and later television brought the American way of life, or at any rate a certain version of it, before countless millions to whom the very name of America had previously been meaningless or unknown. A wide range of American products, particularly in the immediate postwar years, when European competition was virtually eliminated and Japanese competition had not yet arisen, reached into the remotest markets of the Muslim world, winning new customers and, perhaps more important, creating new tastes and ambitions. For some, America represented freedom and justice and opportunity. For many more, it represented wealth and power and success, at a time when these qualities were not regarded as sins or crimes.

And then came the great change, when the leaders of a widespread and widening religious revival sought out and identified their enemies as the enemies of God, and gave them "a local habitation and a name" in the Western Hemisphere. Suddenly, or so it seemed, America had become the archenemy, the incarnation of evil, the diabolic opponent of all that is good, and specifically, for Muslims, of Islam. Why? ...

After the collapse of the Third Reich and the temporary ending of German influence, another philosophy, even more anti-American, took its place -- the Soviet version of Marxism, with a denunciation of Western capitalism and of America as its most advanced and dangerous embodiment. And when Soviet influence began to fade, there was yet another to take its place, or at least to supplement its working -- the new mystique of Third Worldism, emanating from Western Europe, particularly France, and later also from the United States, and drawing at times on both these earlier philosophies. This mystique was helped by the universal human tendency to invent a golden age in the past, and the specifically European propensity to locate it elsewhere. A new variant of the old golden-age myth placed it in the Third World, where the innocence of the non-Western Adam and Eve was ruined by the Western serpent. This view took as axiomatic the goodness and purity of the East and the wickedness of the West, expanding in an exponential curve of evil from Western Europe to the United States. These ideas, too, fell on fertile ground, and won widespread support.

But though these imported philosophies helped to provide intellectual expression for anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism, they did not cause it, and certainly they do not explain the widespread anti-Westernism that made so many in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world receptive to such ideas.

It must surely be clear that what won support for such totally diverse doctrines was not Nazi race theory, which can have had little appeal for Arabs, or Soviet atheistic communism, which can have had little appeal for Muslims, but rather their common anti-Westernism. Nazism and communism were the main forces opposed to the West, both as a way of life and as a power in the world, and as such they could count on at least the sympathy if not the support of those who saw in the West their principal enemy. ...

The cause most frequently adduced for anti-American feeling among Muslims today is American support for Israel. ... the rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran have offered the most principled and uncompromising denunciation of Israel and Zionism. ...

{Part 2 follows: http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage2.htm}

... Is imperialism, then, the grievance? Some Western powers, and in a sense Western civilization as a whole, have certainly been guilty of imperialism, but are we really to believe that in the expansion of Western Europe there was a quality of moral delinquency lacking in such earlier, relatively innocent expansions as those of the Arabs or the Mongols or the Ottomans, or in more recent expansions such as that which brought the rulers of Muscovy to the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Caspian, the Hindu Kush, and the Pacific Ocean? In having practiced sexism, racism, and imperialism, the West was merely following the common practice of mankind through the millennia of recorded history. Where it is distinct from all other civilizations is in having recognized, named, and tried, not entirely without success, to remedy these historic diseases. And that is surely a matter for congratulation, not condemnation. We do not hold Western medical science in general, or Dr. Parkinson and Dr. Alzheimer in particular, responsible for the diseases they diagnosed and to which they gave their names.

Of all these offenses the one that is most widely, frequently, and vehemently denounced is undoubtedly imperialism -- sometimes just Western, sometimes Eastern (that is, Soviet) and Western alike. But the way this term is used in the literature of Islamic fundamentalists often suggests that it may not carry quite the same meaning for them as for its Western critics. In many of these writings the term "imperialist" is given a distinctly religious significance, being used in association, and sometimes interchangeably, with "missionary," and denoting a form of attack that includes the Crusades as well as the modern colonial empires. One also sometimes gets the impression that the offense of imperialism is not -- as for Western critics -- the domination by one people over another but rather the allocation of roles in this relationship. What is truly evil and unacceptable is the domination of infidels over true believers. ...

A Clash of Civilizations

THE origins of secularism in the west may be found in two circumstances -- in early Christian teachings and, still more, experience, which created two institutions, Church and State; and in later Christian conflicts, which drove the two apart. Muslims, too, had their religious disagreements, but there was nothing remotely approaching the ferocity of the Christian struggles between Protestants and Catholics, which devastated Christian Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and finally drove Christians in desperation to evolve a doctrine of the separation of religion from the state. Only by depriving religious institutions of coercive power, it seemed, could Christendom restrain the murderous intolerance and persecution that Christians had visited on followers of other religions and, most of all, on those who professed other forms of their own. ...

ULTIMATELY, the struggle of the fundamentalists is against two enemies, secularism and modernism. The war against secularism is conscious and explicit, and there is by now a whole literature denouncing secularism as an evil neo-pagan force in the modern world and attributing it variously to the Jews, the West, and the United States. The war against modernity is for the most part neither conscious nor explicit, and is directed against the whole process of change that has taken place in the Islamic world in the past century or more and has transformed the political, economic, social, and even cultural structures of Muslim countries. Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbed them of their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent even their livelihood.

There is something in the religious culture of Islam which inspired, in even the humblest peasant or peddler, a dignity and a courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equalled in other civilizations. And yet, in moments of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper passions are stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred which impels even the government of an ancient and civilized country -- even the spokesman of a great spiritual and ethical religion -- to espouse kidnapping and assassination, and try to find, in the life of their Prophet, approval and indeed precedent for such actions.

... To describe this perception I shall end as I began, with a quotation from an American President, this time not the justly celebrated Thomas Jefferson but the somewhat unjustly neglected John Tyler, who, in a letter dated July 10, 1843, gave eloquent and indeed prophetic expression to the principle of religious freedom:

{quote} The United States have adventured upon a great and noble experiment, which is believed to have been hazarded in the absence of all previous precedent -- that of total separation of Church and State. No religious establishment by law exists among us. The conscience is left free from all restraint and each is permitted to worship his Maker after his own judgement. The offices of the Government are open alike to all. No tithes are levied to support an established Hierarchy, nor is the fallible judgement of man set up as the sure and infallible creed of faith. The Mahommedan, if he will to come among us would have the privilege guaranteed to him by the constitution to worship according to the Koran; and the East Indian might erect a shrine to Brahma if it so pleased him. Such is the spirit of toleration inculcated by our political Institutions.... The Hebrew persecuted and down trodden in other regions takes up his abode among us with none to make him afraid.... and the Aegis of the Government is over him to defend and protect him. Such is the great experiment which we have tried, and such are the happy fruits which have resulted from it; our system of free government would be imperfect without it.

The body may be oppressed and manacled and yet survive; but if the mind of man be fettered, its energies and faculties perish, and what remains is of the earth, earthly. Mind should be free as the light or as the air. {endquote}


(10) PROFILE: BERNARD LEWIS: British Svengali Behind Clash Of Civilizations

by Scott Thompson and Jeffrey Steinberg

This article appears in the November 30, 2001 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.


On Nov. 19, octogenarian British Orientalist spook Bernard Lewis wrote an elaborate apologia for Osama bin Laden, a fervent pitch for the inevitability of the "Clash of Civilizations," in the pages of New Yorker magazine. Under the headline "The Revolt of Islam," Lewis lied that the emergence of "Islamic terrorism" in the recent decades, is completely consistent with mainstream Islam, which is committed to the subjugation of the infidels to Islamic law. He went through 14 pages of a fractured fairy-tale history of Islam, quoting bin Laden's Oct. 7, 2001 videotape, where the Saudi expatriate spoke of Islam's "humiliation and disgrace ... for more than 80 years" - a reference to the crushing of the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France in 1918. Lewis invented a tradition of jihad, "bequeathed to Muslims by the Prophet":

"In principle," Lewis explained, "the world was divided into two houses: the House of Islam, in which a Muslim government ruled and Muslim law prevailed, and the House of War, the rest of the world, still inhabited and, more important, ruled by infidels. Between the two, there was to be a perpetual state of war until the entire world either embraced Islam or submitted to the rule of the Muslim state." Among all the different "infidels" ruling the House of War, Lewis asserted, Christianity was singled out as "their primary rival in the struggle for world domination." Lewis cited slogans painted on the walls of Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock from the Seventh Century, assailing Christianity.

Lewis then claimed that the evolution of modern Islamic terrorism, specifically the al-Qaeda terrorism, had a long proud history within Islam, dating to the Assassins cult of the 11th-13th Centuries. (Lewis wrote a 1967 book, The Assassins, extolling the virtues of this secret society.) He also identified Saudi Arabia and Egypt as two regimes legitimately singled out by the Islamic jihadists, for their corruption by "modernism."

He concluded, ominously: "For Osama bin Laden, 2001 marks the resumption of the war for the religious dominance of the world, that began in the Seventh Century.... If bin Laden can persuade the world of Islam to accept his views and his leadership, then a long and bitter struggle lies ahead, and not only for America. Sooner or later, al-Qaeda and related groups will clash with the other neighbors of Islam - Russia, China, India - who may prove less squeamish than the Americans in using their power against Muslims and their sanctities. If bin Laden is correct in his calculations and succeeds in his war, then a dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam." ...

* During the Carter Administration, Lewis was the architect of madman Zbigniew Brzezinski's "Arc of Crisis" policy of fomenting Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalist insurrections all along the southern tier of the Soviet Union. The planned fostering of radical Islamist war provocations was known, at the time, as "the Bernard Lewis Plan." Among the fruits of this Lewis-Brzezinski collusion: the February 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini "Islamic Revolution" in Iran, which overthrew the Shah, and sent the once-proud center of the Islamic Renaissance back into a 20-year dark age; and the 1979-1988 Afghanistan War, provoked by Brzezinski's July 1979 launching of covert support for Afghan mujahideen "Contras" inside Afghanistan - six months prior to the Soviet Red Army's Christmas Eve invasion.

As early as 1960, in a book-length study he prepared for the Royal Institute for International Affairs, under the title The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Lewis polemicized against the modernizing, nation-building legacy of Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He argued instead for the revival of an Ottoman Empire that could be used as a British geopolitical battering ram against Russia and against the Arab states of the Persian Gulf - in alliance with Israel.

* It was Bernard Lewis who launched the hoax of the "Clash of Civilizations" - in a September 1990 Atlantic Monthly article on "The Roots of Muslim Rage," which appeared three years before Brzezinski clone Samuel Huntington's publication of his Foreign Affairs diatribe, "The Clash Of Civilizations." Huntington's article, and his subsequent book-length treatment of the same subject, were caricatures of Lewis' more sophisticated British Orientalist historical fraud, which painted Islam as engaged in a 14-century-long war against Christianity. Huntington acknowledged that Lewis' 1990 piece coined the term "Clash of Civilizations." ...

Caught In The Act

Osama bin Laden released his 1998 jihad call on Feb. 23, 1998, six months before the truck bombing attacks against the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The very next day, Bernard Lewis' signature appeared on a widely circulated Open Letter To President Bill Clinton, released by a previously unheard-of entity called the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, demanding that the U.S. government throw its full support behind a military campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The Open Letter called for carpet bombing Iraq, and for the United States to aggressively give financial and military support for the Iraqi National Congress, yet another corrupt and inept "Contra" pseudo-gang, created by U.S. and British intelligence elements, and based in London. ...

(11) Open Letter to the President - signed by Bernard Lewis


Open Letter to the President

February 19, 1998

Dear Mr. President,

Many of us were involved in organizing the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf in 1990 to support President Bush's policy of expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Seven years later, Saddam Hussein is still in power in Baghdad. And despite his defeat in the Gulf War, continuing sanctions, and the determined effort of UN inspectors to fetter out and destroy his weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein has been able to develop biological and chemical munitions. To underscore the threat posed by these deadly devices, the Secretaries of State and Defense have said that these weapons could be used against our own people. And you have said that this issue is about "the challenges of the 21st Century."

Iraq's position is unacceptable. While Iraq is not unique in possessing these weapons, it is the only country which has used them -- not just against its enemies, but its own people as well. We must assume that Saddam is prepared to use them again. This poses a danger to our friends, our allies, and to our nation.

It is clear that this danger cannot be eliminated as long as our objective is simply "containment," and the means of achieving it are limited to sanctions and exhortations. As the crisis of recent weeks has demonstrated, these static policies are bound to erode, opening the way to Saddam's eventual return to a position of power and influence in the region. Only a determined program to change the regime in Baghdad will bring the Iraqi crisis to a satisfactory conclusion.

For years, the United States has tried to remove Saddam by encouraging coups and internal conspiracies. These attempts have all failed. Saddam is more wily, brutal and conspiratorial than any likely conspiracy the United States might mobilize against him. Saddam must be overpowered; he will not be brought down by a coup d'etat. But Saddam has an Achilles' heel: lacking popular support, he rules by terror. The same brutality which makes it unlikely that any coups or conspiracies can succeed, makes him hated by his own people and the rank and file of his military. Iraq today is ripe for a broad-based insurrection. We must exploit this opportunity.

Saddam's long record of treaty violations, deception, and violence shows that diplomacy and arms control will not constrain him. In the absence of a broader strategy, even extensive air strikes would be ineffective in dealing with Saddam and eliminating the threat his regime poses. We believe that the problem is not only the specifics of Saddam's actions, but the continued existence of the regime itself.

What is needed now is a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime. It will not be easy -- and the course of action we favor is not without its problems and perils. But we believe the vital national interests of our country require the United States to:

{indent} Recognize a provisional government of Iraq based on the principles and leaders of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) that is representative of all the peoples of Iraq.

Restore and enhance the safe haven in northern Iraq to allow the provisional government to extend its authority there and establish a zone in southern Iraq from which Saddam's ground forces would also be excluded.

Lift sanctions in liberated areas. Sanctions are instruments of war against Saddam's regime, but they should be quickly lifted on those who have freed themselves from it. Also, the oil resources and products of the liberated areas should help fund the provisional government's insurrection and humanitarian relief for the people of liberated Iraq.

Release frozen Iraqi assets -- which amount to $1.6 billion in the United States and Britain alone -- to the control of the provisional government to fund its insurrection. This could be done gradually and so long as the provisional government continues to promote a democratic Iraq.

Facilitate broadcasts from U.S. transmitters immediately and establish a Radio Free Iraq.

Help expand liberated areas of Iraq by assisting the provisional government's offensive against Saddam Hussein's regime logistically and through other means.

Remove any vestiges of Saddam's claim to "legitimacy" by, among other things, bringing a war crimes indictment against the dictator and his lieutenants and challenging Saddam's credentials to fill the Iraqi seat at the United Nations.

Launch a systematic air campaign against the pillars of his power -- the Republican Guard divisions which prop him up and the military infrastructure that sustains him.

Position U.S. ground force equipment in the region so that, as a last resort, we have the capacity to protect and assist the anti-Saddam forces in the northern and southern parts of Iraq. {end indent}

Once you make it unambiguously clear that we are serious about eliminating the threat posed by Saddam, and are not just engaged in tactical bombing attacks unrelated to a larger strategy designed to topple the regime, we believe that such countries as Kuwait, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, whose cooperation would be important for the implementation of this strategy, will give us the political and logistical support to succeed.

In the present climate in Washington, some may misunderstand and misinterpret strong American action against Iraq as having ulterior political motives. We believe, on the contrary, that strong American action against Saddam is overwhelmingly in the national interest, that it must be supported, and that it must succeed. Saddam must not become the beneficiary of an American domestic political controversy.

We are confident that were you to launch an initiative along these line, the Congress and the country would see it as a timely and justifiable response to Iraq's continued intransigence. We urge you to provide the leadership necessary to save ourselves and the world from the scourge of Saddam and the weapons of mass destruction that he refuses to relinquish.


Hon. Stephen Solarz Former Member, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives

Hon. Richard Perle Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Hon. Elliot Abrams President, Ethics & Public Policy Center; Former Assistant Secretary of State

Richard V. Allen Former National Security Advisor

Hon. Richard Armitage President, Armitage Associates, L.C.; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Jeffrey T. Bergner President, Bergner, Bockorny, Clough & Brain; Former Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Hon. John Bolton Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute; Former Assistant Secretary of State

Stephen Bryen Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Hon. Richard Burt Chairman, IEP Advisors, Inc.; Former U.S. Ambassador to Germany; Former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Hon. Frank Carlucci Former Secretary of Defense

Hon. Judge William Clark Former National Security Advisor

Paula J. Dobriansky Vice President, Director of Washington Office, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Member, National Security Council

Doug Feith Managing Attorney, Feith & Zell P.C.; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy

Frank Gaffney Director, Center for Security Policy; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces

Jeffrey Gedmin Executive Director, New Atlantic Initiative; Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Hon. Fred C. Ikle Former Undersecretary of Defense

Robert Kagan Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Zalmay M. Khalilzad Director, Strategy and Doctrine, RAND Corporation

Sven F. Kraemer Former Director of Arms Control, National Security Council

William Kristol Editor, The Weekly Standard

Michael Ledeen Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Former Special Advisor to the Secretary of State

Bernard Lewis Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and Ottoman Studies, Princeton University

R. Admiral Frederick L. Lewis U.S. Navy, Retired

Maj. Gen. Jarvis Lynch U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

Hon. Robert C. McFarlane Former National Security Advisor

Joshua Muravchik Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute

Robert A. Pastor Former Special Assistant to President Carter for Inter-American Affairs

Martin Peretz Editor-in-Chief, The New Republic

Roger Robinson Former Senior Director of International Economic Affairs, National Security Council

Peter Rodman Director of National Security Programs, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom; Former Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State

Hon. Peter Rosenblatt Former Ambassador to the Trust Territories of the Pacific

Hon. Donald Rumsfeld Former Secretary of Defense

Gary Schmitt Executive Director, Project for the New American Century; Former Executive Director, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Max Singer President, The Potomac Organization; Former President, The Hudson Institute

Hon. Helmut Sonnenfeldt Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution; Former Counsellor, U.S. Department of State

Hon. Caspar Weinberger Former Secretary of Defense

Leon Wienseltier Literary Editor, The New Republic

Hon. Paul Wolfowitz Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS; Former Undersecretary of Defense

David Wurmser Director, Middle East Program, AEI; Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Dov S. Zakheim Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense

Organization affiliations given for identification purposes only. Views reflected in the letter are endorsed by the individual, not the institution.


Many of the signatories are Jewish Neo-Cons: cia-infiltrating-left.html .

Religions and the meeting of civilization, by Bernard Lewis
The Atlantic Monthly  May 2003
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/05/lewis.htm .

For more on the war behind the war: wtc.html .

As Henry Makow put it, "the anglo american elite as essentially a front for International (re. Rothschild) finance". Henry's site is http://www.savethemales.ca/ .

Yes, and especially because they've lost the concept of what their civilization is all about.

As if, in refutation of totalitarianism, one must let the media trash the minds of the next generation.

Huntington says nothing about Hollywood or Feminism.

He complains about the Hispanics, but they are much less of a problem than the Capitalism and the Western Marxism which are destroying our soul in equal parts.

I can only hope that the current cultural destruction is the prelude to some new flowering; and yet, I see no signs of that.

To purchase The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order new: http://www.anybook4less.com/detail/0684844419.html.

To purchase Samuel Huntington's books second-hand: http://dogbert.abebooks.com/abe/BookSearch?an=samuel+huntington.

Arnold J. Toynbee was one of the leading intellectuals of the British Empire. He combined deep insight into Civilizational History, with propaganda for the One-World goals of Cecil Rhodes' Round Table group. Here he writes about the formation of Judaism, and argues the case for World Government: toynbee.html.

Huntington's endorsement of Quigley adds credibility to Quigley's disclosures, as an insider, in his book The Anglo-American Establishment: quigley.html.

Carroll Quigley's best-known book Tragedy and Hope: tragedy.html.

Back to the One World index: oneworld.html.

Write to me at contact.html.