George Soros' Philosophy - Selection and comments by Peter Myers, August 27, 2001; update January 30, 2004. My comments are shown {thus}.

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(1) George Soros, The Capitalist Threat, Atlantic Monthly, February 1997 (2) Toward a Global Open Society, by George Soros (3) A contrary view: How the World Works, by James Fallows

(1) George Soros, The Capitalist Threat, Atlantic Monthly, February 1997.

Popper showed that totalitarian ideologies like communism and Nazism have a common element: they claim to be in possession of the ultimate truth. Since the ultimate truth is beyond the reach of humankind, these ideologies have to resort to oppression in order to impose their vision on society. Popper juxtaposed with these totalitarian ideologies another view of society, which recognizes that nobody has a monopoly on the truth; different people have different views and different interests, and there is a need for institutions that allow them to live together in peace. These institutions protect the rights of citizens and ensure freedom of choice and freedom of speech. Popper called this form of social organization the "open society." Totalitarian ideologies were its enemies.

{Since Popper and Soros are Jews, it follows that they expect the Open Society to accept Jews; but can it abide the presence of those opposed to Jewish lobbies too? I am not a "holocaust denier": I have not studied that question, and my argument does not depend on any particular stand on that matter. But in France and Germany, denial of the Nazi holocaust is a criminal, jailable, offence, whereas to deny the Bolshevik Holocaust, or that 30 million died in the Great Leap Forward, is quite legal, and incurs no penalty. Why the difference? Is this consistent with the Open Society?}

... I was driven to delve deeper into Karl Popper's philosophy, and to ask, Why does nobody have access to the ultimate truth? The answer became clear: We live in the same universe that we are trying to understand, and our perceptions can influence the events in which we participate.

... an open society may also be threatened. ... from excessive individualism. Too much competition and too little cooperation can cause intolerable inequities and instability. ...The present situation is comparable to that at the turn of the past century. ...Yet the free-market regime that prevailed a hundred years ago was destroyed by the First World War. ... How much more likely the present regime is to break down unless we learn from experience!

... laissez-faire doctrines ... Marxism-Leninism or Nazi ideas ...  all try to justify their claim to ultimate truth with an appeal to science. ...  laissez-faire ... is based on economic theory  ... The main scientific underpinning of the laissez-faire ideology is the theory that free and competitive markets bring supply and demand into equilibrium and thereby ensure the best allocation of resources. ... Economic theory is an axiomatic system: as long as the basic assumptions hold, the conclusions follow. But when we examine the assumptions closely, we find that they do not apply to the real world. As originally formulated, the theory of perfect competition -- of the natural equilibrium of supply and demand -- assumed perfect knowledge ... The assumption of perfect knowledge proved unsustainable, so it was replaced by an ingenious device. Supply and demand were taken as independently given. This condition was presented as a methodological requirement rather than an assumption. It was argued that economic theory studies the relationship between supply and demand; therefore it must take both of them as given.

As I have shown elsewhere, the condition that supply and demand are independently given cannot be reconciled with reality, at least as far as the financial markets are concerned ... Buyers and sellers in financial markets seek to discount a future that depends on their own decisions. ... There is a two-way feedback mechanism between the market participants' thinking and the situation they think about -- "reflexivity." {comment: reflexive = dialectical = lateral thinking}

... If we look at the behavior of financial markets ... instead of tending toward equilibrium, prices continue to fluctuate relative to the expectations of buyers and sellers. There are prolonged periods when prices are moving away from any theoretical equilibrium. ... In the absence of equilibrium, the contention that free markets lead to the optimum allocation of resources loses its justification. The supposedly scientific theory that has been used to validate it turns out to be an axiomatic structure whose conclusions are contained in its assumptions and are not necessarily supported by the empirical evidence. ... Economic theory has deliberately excluded reflexivity from consideration. In doing so, it has distorted its subject matter and laid itself open to exploitation by laissez-faire ideology.

...  reflexive interaction renders financial markets inherently unstable. Laissez-faire ideology denies the instability and opposes any form of government intervention aimed at preserving stability. History has shown that financial markets do break down, causing economic depression and social unrest {and Soros himself has massively contributed to such breakdowns}. The breakdowns have led to the evolution of central banking and other forms of regulation {Soros is arguing that, having destroyed the nation state, we need worldwide regulations}. Laissez-faire ideologues like to argue that the breakdowns were caused by faulty regulations, not by unstable markets. ... their argument rings hollow, because it fails to explain why the regulations were imposed in the first place. It sidesteps the issue by using a different argument, which goes like this: since regulations are faulty, unregulated markets are perfect.

The argument rests on the assumption of perfect knowledge: if a solution is wrong, its opposite must be right. In the absence of perfect knowledge, however, both free markets and regulations are flawed. ...

The cult of success has replaced a belief in principles. Society has lost its anchor.
...  laissez-faire ideology has effectively banished income or wealth redistribution. ... The laissez-faire argument relies on the same tacit appeal to perfection as does communism. ...  the open society needs to be redefined. Instead of there being a dichotomy between open and closed, I see the open society as occupying a middle ground, where the rights of the individual are safeguarded but where there are some shared values that hold society together. This middle ground is threatened from all sides. At one extreme, communist and nationalist doctrines would lead to state domination. At the other extreme, laissez-faire capitalism would lead to great instability and eventual breakdown. There are other variants. Lee Kuan Yew, of Singapore, proposes a so-called Asian model that combines a market economy with a repressive state. {Is there a place for such a society within Soros' "Open Society"? Apparently not; otherwise, Soros would not have used the word "repressive". Did Soros aim to destroy that model, in the "Asia Crisis"} ...

... whereas most cultures and religions regard their own values as absolute, an open society, which is aware of many cultures and religions, must regard its own shared values as a matter of debate and choice. ... Could the recognition of our imperfect understanding serve to establish the open society as a desirable form of social organization? ... We must promote a belief in our own fallibility to the status that we normally confer on a belief in ultimate truth. But if ultimate truth is not attainable, how can we accept our fallibility as ultimate truth? {end of selection}

For full text see

(2) Toward a Global Open Society, by George Soros

A billionaire financier, wrongly accused of being a hypocritical capitalist for his February Atlantic cover story, "The Capitalist Threat," returns to the fray

Toward a Global Open Society, by George Soros

Atlantic Monthly, January 1998; Volume 281, No. 1; pages 20 - 32.

LET me start with the obvious. We do live in a global economy. But it is important to be clear about what we mean by that. A global economy is characterized not only by the free movement of goods and services but, more important, by the free movement of ideas and of capital. This applies to direct investments and to financial transactions. Though both have been gaining in importance since the end of the Second World War, the globalization of financial markets in particular has accelerated in recent years to the point where movements in exchange rates, interest rates, and stock prices in various countries are intimately interconnected. ...

Global integration has brought tremendous benefits: the benefits of the international division of labor, which are so clearly proved by the theory of comparative advantage; dynamic benefits such as economies of scale and the rapid spread of innovations from one country to another, which are less easy to demonstrate by static equilibrium theory ...

But global capitalism is not without its problems, and we need to understand these better if we want the system to survive. ...

Let me group the deficiencies of the global capitalist system under five main headings: the uneven distribution of benefits, the instability of the financial system, the incipient threat of global monopolies and oligopolies, the ambiguous role of the state, and the question of values and social cohesion. The categories are of course somewhat arbitrary, and the various problem areas are interconnected.

1. The benefits of global capitalism are unevenly distributed. Generally speaking, capital is in a much better position than labor, because capital is more mobile. Moreover, financial capital is better situated in the global system than industrial capital; once a plant has been built, moving it is difficult. To be sure, multinational corporations enjoy flexibility in transfer pricing and can exert pressure at the time they make investment decisions, but their flexibility doesn't compare to the freedom of choice enjoyed by international portfolio investors. There is also an advantage in being at the center of the global economy rather than at the periphery. All these factors combine to attract capital to the financial center and account for the ever increasing size and importance of financial markets.

2. Financial markets are inherently unstable, and international financial markets are especially so. International capital movements are notorious for their boom-bust pattern. During a boom capital flows from the center to the periphery, but when confidence is shaken it has a tendency to return to its source. ...

The question poses itself: What should be done to preserve the stability of the financial system? This cannot be answered in the abstract, because every situation is different. Financial markets are best understood as a historical process, and history never quite repeats itself. The recent turmoil in Asian markets raises difficult questions about currency pegs, asset bubbles, inadequate banking supervision, and the lack of financial information which cannot be ignored. Markets cannot be left to correct their own mistakes, because they are likely to overreact and to behave in an indiscriminate fashion.

{Read: World Government}

3. Instability is not confined to the financial system, however. The goal of competitors is to prevail, not to preserve competition in the market. The natural tendency for monopolies and oligopolies to arise needs to be constrained by regulations. The process of globalization is too recent for this to have become a serious issue on a global level, but since we are dealing with a historical process, in time it will.

4. But whose job is it to prevent undue concentration of power and to preserve stability in financial markets? This brings me to the role of the state. Since the end of the Second World War the state has played an increasing role in maintaining economic stability, striving to ensure equality of opportunity, and providing a social safety net, particularly in the highly industrialized countries of Europe and North America. But the capacity of the state to look after the welfare of its citizens has been severely impaired by the globalization of the capitalist system, which allows capital to escape taxation much more easily than labor can. Capital will tend to avoid countries where employment is heavily taxed or heavily protected, leading to a rise in unemployment. That is what has happened in continental Europe. I am not defending the antiquated European social-security systems, which are badly in need of reform; but I am expressing concern about the reduction in social provisions both in Europe and in America. ...

If social services are cut too far while instability is on the rise, popular resentment could lead to a new wave of protectionism both in the United States and in Europe, especially if (or when) the current boom is followed by a bust of some severity. This could lead to a breakdown in the global capitalist system, just as it did in the 1930s. With the influence of the state declining, there is a greater need for international cooperation. But such cooperation is contrary to the prevailing ideas of laissez-faire on the one hand and nationalism and fundamentalism on the other.

The state has played another role in economic development: in countries deficient in local capital it has allied itself with local business interests and helped them to accumulate capital. This strategy has proved successful in Japan, Korea, and the now wounded tigers of Southeast Asia. Although the model has worked, it raises some important questions about the relationship between capitalism and democracy. ...

5. This brings me to the most nebulous problem area, the question of values and social cohesion. Every society needs some shared values to hold it together. Market values on their own cannot serve that purpose, because they reflect only what one market participant is willing to pay another in a free exchange. Markets reduce everything, including human beings (labor) and nature (land), to commodities. ...

Our global society contains many different customs, traditions, and religions; where can it find the shared values that would hold it together? I ...

WHAT is the open society? Superficially, it is a way to describe the positive aspects of democracy: the greatest degree of freedom compatible with social justice. It is characterized by the rule of law; respect for human rights, minorities, and minority opinions; the division of power; and a market economy. The principles of the open society are admirably put forth in the Declaration of Independence. But the Declaration states, "We hold these truths to be self-evident," whereas the principles of the open society are anything but self-evident; they need to be established by convincing arguments.

There is a strong epistemological argument, elaborated by Karl Popper, in favor of the open society: Our understanding is inherently imperfect; the ultimate truth, the perfect design for society, is beyond our reach {perspectivism.html}. We must therefore content ourselves with the next best thing -- a form of social organization that falls short of perfection but holds itself open to improvement. That is the concept of the open society: a society open to improvement. The more conditions are changing -- and a global economy fosters change -- the more important the concept becomes. ...

(3) A contrary view: How the World Works, by James Fallows

Americans persist in thinking that Adam Smith's rules for free trade are the only legitimate ones. But today's fastest-growing economies are using a very different set of rules. Once, we knew them--knew them so well that we played by them, and won. Now we seem to have forgotten

Atlantic Monthly, December 1993; Volume 272, No. 6; pages 61-87

... WHY Friedrich List? The more I had heard about List in the preceding five years, from economists in Seoul and Osaka and Tokyo, the more I had wondered why I had virtually never heard of him while studying economics in England and the United States. By the time I saw his books in the shop beneath the cherry trees, I had come to think of him as the dog that didn't bark. He illustrated the strange self-selectivity of Anglo-American thinking about economics.

I emphasize "Anglo-American" because in this area the United Kingdom and the United States are like each other and different from most of the rest of the world. The two countries have dominated world politics for more than a century, and the dominance of the English language lets them ignore what is being said and thought overseas -- and just how isolated they have become. The difference shows up this way: The Anglo-American system of politics and economics, like any system, rests on certain principles and beliefs. But rather than acting as if these are the best principles, or the ones their societies prefer, Britons and Americans often act as if these were the only possible principles and no one, except in error, could choose any others. Political economics becomes an essentially religious question, subject to the standard drawback of any religion -- the failure to understand why people outside the faith might act as they do. ...

But the difference is largest when it comes to economics. In the non-Anglophone world Adam Smith is merely one of several theorists who had important ideas about organizing economies. In most of East Asia and continental Europe the study of economics is less theoretical than in England and America (which is why English-speakers monopolize Nobel Prizes) and more geared toward solving business problems.

In Japan economics has in effect been considered a branch of geopolitics -- that is, as the key to the nation's strength or vulnerability in dealing with other powers. From this practical-minded perspective English-language theorists seem less useful than their challengers, such as Friedrich List.

Two Clashing World Views

BRITONS and Americans tend to see the past two centuries of economics us one long progression toward rationality and good sense. In 1776 Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations made the case against old-style mercantilism, just as the Declaration of Independence made the case against old-style feudal and royal domination. Since then more and more of the world has come to the correct view -- or so it seems in the Anglo-American countries. Along the way the world has met such impediments as neo-mercantilism, radical unionism, sweeping protectionism, socialism, and, of course, communism. One by one the worst threats have given way. Except for a few lamentable areas of backsliding, the world has seen the wisdom of Adam Smith's ways.

Yet during this whole time there has been an alternative school of thought. The Enlightenment philosophers were not the only ones to think about how the world should be organized. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Germans were also active -- to say nothing of the theorists at work in Tokugawa Japan, late imperial China, czarist Russia, and elsewhere.

The Germans deserve emphasis -- more than the Japanese, the Chinese, the Russians, and so on because many of their philosophies endure. These did not take root in England or America, but they were carefully studied, adapted, and applied in parts of Europe and Asia, notably Japan. In place of Rousseau and Locke the Germans offered Hegel. In place of Adam Smith they had Friedrich List.

The German economic vision differs from the Anglo-American in many ways, but the crucial differences are these:

"Automatic" growth versus deliberate development. The Anglo-American approach emphasizes the unpredictability and unplannability of economics. Technologies change. Tastes change. Political and human circumstances change. And because life is so fluid, attempts at central planning are virtually doomed to fail. The best way to "plan," therefore is to leave the adaptation to the people who have their own money at stake. These are the millions of entrepreneurs who make up any country's economy. No planning agency could have better information than they about the direction things are moving, and no one could have a stronger incentive than those who hope to make a profit and avoid a loss. By the logic of the Anglo-American system, if each individual does what is best for him or her, the result will be what is best for the nation as a whole.

Although List and others did not use exactly this term, the German school was more concerned with "market failures." In the language of modern economics these are the cases in which normal market forces produce a clearly undesirable result. The standard illustration involves pollution. If the law allows factories to dump pollutants into the air or water, then every factory will do so. Otherwise, their competitors will have lower costs and will squeeze them out. This "rational" behavior will leave everyone worse off. The answer to such a market failure is for the society -- that is, the government -- to set standards that all factories must obey.

Friedrich List and his best-known American counterpart, Alexander Hamilton, argued that industrial development entailed a more sweeping sort of market failure. Societies did not automatically move from farming to small crafts to major industries just because millions of small merchants were making decisions for themselves. If every person put his money where the return was greatest, the money might not automatically go where it would do the nation the most good. For it to do so required a plan, a push, an exercise of central power. List drew heavily on the history of his times -- in which the British government deliberately encouraged British manufacturing and the fledgling American government deliberately discouraged foreign competitors.

This is the gist of List's argument, from The Natural System of Political Economy, which he wrote in five weeks in 1837:

{quote} The cosmopolitan theorists [List's term for Smith and his ilk] do not question the importance of industrial expansion. They assume, however, that this can be achieved by adopting the policy of free trade and by leaving individuals to pursue their own private interests. They believe that in such circumstances a country will automatically secure the development of those branches of manufacture which are best suited to its own particular situation. They consider that government action to stimulate the establishment of industries does more harm than good....

The lessons of history justify our opposition to the assertion that states reach economic maturity most rapidly if left to their own devices. A study of the origin of various branches of manufacture reveals that industrial growth may often have been due to chance. It may be chance that leads certain individuals to a particular place to foster the expansion of an industry that was once small and insignificant -- just as seeds blown by chance by the wind may sometimes grow into big trees. But the growth of industries is a process that may take hundreds of years to complete and one should not ascribe to sheer chance what a nation has achieved through its laws and institutions. In England Edward III created the manufacture of woolen cloth and Elizabeth founded the mercantile marine and foreign trade. In France Colbert was responsible for all that a great power needs to develop its economy. Following these examples every responsible government should strive to remove those obstacles that hinder the progress of civilisation and should stimulate the growth of those economic forces that a nation carries in its bosom. {endquote}

Consumers versus producers. The Anglo-American approach assumes that the ultimate measure of a society is its level of consumption. Competition is good, because it kills off producers whose prices are too high. Killing them off is good, because more-efficient suppliers will give the consumer a better deal. Foreign trade is very good, because it means that the most efficient suppliers in the whole world will be able to compete. It doesn't even matter why competitors are willing to sell for less. They may really be more efficient; they may be determined to dump their goods for reasons of their own. In either case the consumer is better off. He has the ton of steel, the cask of wine, or -- in today's terms -- the car or computer that he might have bought from a domestic manufacturer, plus the money he saved by buying foreign goods.

In the Friedrich List view, this logic leads to false conclusions. In the long run, List argued, a society's well-being and its overall wealth are determined not by what the society can buy but by what it can make. This is the corollary of the familiar argument about foreign aid: Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to fish and you feed him for his life.

List was not concerned here with the morality of consumption. Instead he was interested in both strategic and material well-being. In strategic terms nations ended up being dependent or independent according to their ability to make things for themselves. Why were Latin Americans, Africans, and Asians subservient to England and France in the nineteenth century? Because they could not make the machines and weapons Europeans could.

In material terms a society's wealth over the long run is greater if that society also controls advanced activities. That is, if you buy the ton of steel or cask of wine at bargain rates this year, you are better off, as a consumer, right away. But over ten years, or fifty, you and your children may be stronger as both consumers and producers if you learn how to make the steel and wine yourself. If you can make steel rather than just being able to buy it, you'll be better able to make machine tools. If you're able to make machine tools, you'll be better able to make engines, robots, airplanes. If you're able to make engines and robots and airplanes, your children and grandchildren will be more likely to make advanced products and earn high incomes in the decades ahead.

The German school argued that emphasizing consumption would eventually be self-defeating. It would bias the system away from wealth creation -- and ultimately make it impossible to consume as much. To use a homely analogy: One effect of getting regular exercise is being able to eat more food, just as an effect of steadily rising production is being able to consume more. But if people believe that the reason to get exercise is to permit themselves to eat more, rather than for longer term benefits they will behave in a different way. List's argument was that developing productive power was in itself a reward. "The forces of production are the tree on which wealth grows," List wrote in another book, called The National System of Political Economy.

{quote} The tree which bears the fruit is of greater value than the fruit itself.... The prosperity of a nation is not ... greater in the proportion in which it has amassed more wealth (ie, values of exchange), but in the proportion in which it has more developed its powers of production. {endquote}

Process versus result. In economics and politics alike the Anglo-American theory emphasizes how the game is played, not who wins or loses. If the rules are fair, then the best candidate will win. If you want better politics or a stronger economy, you should concentrate on reforming the rules by which political and economic struggles are waged. Make sure everyone can vote; make sure everyone can bring new products to market. Whatever people choose under those fair rules will by definition be the best result. Abraham Lincoln or Warren Harding, Shakespeare or Penthouse -- in a fair system whatever people choose will be right.

The government's role, according to this outlook, is not to tell people how they should pursue happiness or grow rich. Rather, its role is that of referee -- making sure no one cheats or bends the rules of "fair play," whether by voter fraud in the political realm or monopoly in the economic.

In the late twentieth century the clearest practical illustration of this policy has been the U.S. financial market. The government is actively involved -- but only to guard the process, not to steer the results. It runs elaborate sting operations to try to prevent corporate officials from trading on inside information. It requires corporations to publish detailed financial reports every quarter, so that all investors will have the same information to work from. It takes companies to court -- IBM, AT&T -- whenever they seem to be growing too strong and stunting future competitors. It exposes pension-fund managers to punishment if they do not invest their assets where the dividends are greatest.

These are all ways of ensuring that the market will "get prices right," as economists say, so that investments will flow to the best possible uses. Beyond that it is up to the market to decide where the money goes. Short-term loans to cover the budget deficits in Mexico or the United States? Fine. Long-term investments in cold-fusion experimentation? Fine. The market will automatically assign each prospect the right price. If fusion engines really would revolutionize the world, then investors will voluntarily risk their money there.

The German view is more paternalistic. People might not automatically choose the best society or the best use of their money. The state, therefore, must be concerned with both the process and the result. ...

In The Natural System of Political Economy, List included a chapter on this theme, "The Dominant Nation." Like many other things written about Britain in the nineteenth century, it makes bittersweet reading for twentieth-century Americans. "England's manufactures are based upon highly efficient political and social institutions, upon powerful machines, upon great capital resources, upon an output larger than that of all other countries, and upon a complete network of internal transport facilities," List said of the England of the 1830s, as many have said of the United States of the 1950s and 1960s.

{quote} A nation which makes goods more cheaply than anyone else and possesses immeasurably more capital than anyone else is able to grant its customers more substantial and longer credits than anyone else....By accepting or by excluding the import of their raw materials and other products, England -- all powerful as a manufacturing and commercial country -- can confer great benefits or inflict great injuries upon nations with relatively backward economies. {endquote}

This is what England lost when it lost "dominance," and what Japan is gaining now.

Morality versus power. By now the Anglo-American view has taken on a moral tone that was embryonic when Adam Smith wrote his book. If a country disagrees with the Anglo-American axioms, it doesn't just disagree: it is a "cheater." Japan "cheats" the world trading system by protecting its rice farmers. America "cheats" with its price supports for sugar-beet growers and its various other restrictions on trade. Malaysia "cheated" by requiring foreign investors to take on local partners. And on and on. If the rules of the trading system aren't protected from such cheating, the whole system might collapse and bring back the Great Depression.

In the German view, economics is not a matter of right or wrong, or cheating or playing fair. It is merely a matter of strong or weak. The gods of trade will help those who help themselves. No code of honor will defend the weak, as today's Latin Americans and Africans can attest. If a nation decides to help itself -- by protecting its own industries, by discriminating against foreign products -- then that is a decision, not a sin. ...


Much of what Soros says is agreeable to me; but what of his actions?

Some months after Soros' Atlantic Monthly article of February 1997 appeared, Soros was heavily involved in the "Asia Crisis". Did he cause it? The currencies of Indonesia and some other Asian countries had been pegged to the yen prior to the "Asia Crisis", suggesting a "yen block". As the US dollar fell, those currencies rose with the yen. Those who exonerate Soros say that the "Asia Crisis" was caused by those currencies rising too high. Yet, subsequently, the whole "Asia model" has been discredited, suggesting ideological motives. And the "yen block" appears to have been destroyed as well. In the Sydney Morning Herald of February 19, 1998, Max Walsh commented, "A little-noticed but significant feature of the Asian crisis has been the demise of the yen bloc." soros.html.

A major study of the "Asia Crisis": asia-crisis.html.

Is the Open Society also the Open Conspiracy? opencon.html.

Fallibilism as a theory of knowledge; Falsifiability as a criterion for dismissing theories : perspectivism.html.

I consider Soros a Marxist: not of the Stalinist kind, but of the Fabian/Trotskyist.

New Left movements generally favour his social programs, e.g. heroin injecting rooms, the right to euthenasia (I agree on that), human rights campaigns (e.g. over Burma). These "human rights" campaigns have the capacity to bring down governments and split countries, as happened to the Soviet Union. I feel that China is a target of such campaigns, through its peripheries. Soros would love to see China split up and neutralised.

Soros, I guess, backs the World Court, Gay Marriage, Open Borders, and the Kyoto Protocol - all World Government initiatives. That's not to deny some merit in each cause, but to assess their import as a whole.

Is the issue "environmental protection", or is this just a surrogate for "World Government"? If we are being asked to sign up to World Government, in the guise of protecting "women's rights",  "indigenous peoples" etc., then we need to focus on the big issue behind the little issues. World Government is a one-way street. Who are the motive forces behind this push? Might they not become the rulers of "One World"?

These are the fingerprints of "Marxist Anti-Communism": kostel.html. This was the policy of the Democratic Party under Clinton & Gore, as well as the EU at present. One can expect that, if Bush falls, those forces will resume their march. Soros is merely part of it.

As for his promotion of Free Trade - well, the Trots promote that: xTrots.html

And so did Karl Marx: classwar.html

Those surprised at this miss the point: their first goal is "uniting the world" by destroying the independence of countries.

The choice we face is between Communism (the Fabian/Trotskyist variant), and Zionism. How despairing! But, at least, these forces are not united; that gives us some breathing space.

Many countries in Asia, South America and Africa oppose both the above camps. I feel that dissidents in the West must ditch the Apartheid past and join up with these new allies. We must try to help them understand our desperate struggle for survival; and, equally, we must be aware of theirs.

Fallibilism as a theory of knowledge; Falsifiability as a criterion for dismissing theories: perspectivism.html.

The Apotheosis of Albert Einstein: einstein.html.

Write to me at contact.html.